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REMEDIAL NURTURING SKILLS

We are not an assimilative, homogenous society, but a facilitative,
pluralistic one, in which we must be willing to abide someone else's
unfamiliar or even repellent practice because the same tolerant
impulse protects our own idiosyncrasies. Even if we can agree,
therefore, that "family" and "parenthood"are partof the good life, it
is absurd to assume that we can agree on the content of those terms
and destructive to pretend that we do.
-Justice William Brennan'
Girls had it better from the beginning. Boys can run around
fighting warsfor made-up reasons with toy guns going kksshh-kksshh
and arguing about who was dead, while girls play in the house with
their dolls, creating complex family groups and solving problems
through negotiation and role-playing. Which gender is better
equipped, on the whole, to live an adult life, would you guess?
-- Garrison Keillor

2

INTRODUCTION

This Article addresses two pressing problems in contemporary
family law and demonstrates the usefulness of feminist theory in
analyzing both The first problem is the practical, specific problem of
post-divorce nurturing of children; that is, why post-divorce nurturing is

1. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 141 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
2. Garrison Keillor, About Guys, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1992, at Ell. While Keillor's
description may resonate for many, one of the purposes of this Article is to show that such
gendered stereotypes are not as rigid as they may appear. See Barrie Thorne, Children and
Gender: Constructions of Difference, in THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL DIFFERENCE
100, 105 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 1990) (challenging stereotypes of the cooperative relations of
girls and the hierarchical relations of boys).
3. The importance of feminist theory in family law is beyond dispute and analyzed in most
of the major family law texts. See, e.g., JuDrri AREEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW
102-16 (3d ed. 1992) (citing June Carbone & Margaret F. Brinig, Rethinking Marriage:Feminist
Ideology, Economic Change, and Divorce Reform, 65 TUL. L. REV. 953, 954, 957-61, 988-1010
(1991), and describing the feminist perspectives on divorce); IRA MARK ELLMAN Er AL., FAMILY
LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 145-53 (2d ed. 1991) (describing the impact on family law of the
"changing woman's role"); LESLIE J. HARRIS ET AL., FAMILY LAW 376 (1996) (describing the
feminist perspectives on no-fault divorce); CARL E. SCHNEIDER & MARGARET F. BRINIG, AN
INVITATION TO FAMILY LAW: PRINCIPLES, PROCESS AND PERSPECTIVES 125-27 (1996) (describing
gender as a pervasive theme in family law); WALTER WADLINGTON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
DOMESTIC RELATIONS 191 (3d ed. 1995) (listing common goals of women's groups); WALTER 0.
WEYRAUCH ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW: LEGAL CONCEPTS AND CHANGING
HUMAN RELATIONSHIPS 829-31 (1994) (discussing the feminist analysis of surrogacy).
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so often difficult for custodial and visiting parents, as well as their
children. The second is a more theoretical, pervasive problem of
doctrinal reform; that is, the persistence of gendered stereotypes in
family law notwithstanding doctrinal reforms intended to eradicate
them. The first problem provides a concrete context in which to clarify
and analyze the second. It is a particularly apt context because the ways
in which children are nurtured can discourage as well as reinforce
replication of gender stereotypes.
Both problems are rooted in the story of what Justice Scalia calls
the "traditional unitary family" in Michael H. v. Gerald D.4 This story
defines "family" as a fixed social unit with fixed membership and fixed
roles. Part I first describes the story's underlying practice, i.e., the actual
day-to-day interaction among family members which it assumes.
Second, it draws on psychoanalytic theory to explain how this practice
is internalized and justified. Part I concludes by explaining how this
story is reflected in, and reinforced by, existing family law doctrine in
the post-divorce context.
Part II explains how the story of the unitary family fails postdivorce families, especially children. Its practice is no longer relevant.
Its theory frustrates the parties' efforts to adapt to new circumstances.
Its doctrine offers neither true closure nor constructive intervention, but
the ever present threat of legal action and the ever diminishing hope of
resolution.
Part III tells a different story of post-divorce families, drawing on
Justice Brennan's scathing dissent in Michael H. v. Gerald D. It
contemplates many stories, playing out in many cultural contexts,5 and
4. 491 U.S. at 123.
5. Family research has overwhelmingly focused on white families until very recently. See
Paul R. Amato, Life-Span Adjustment of Children to Their Parents' Divorce, 4 FUTURE OF
CHILDREN 143, 148 (1994). The first major study focusing on Black families was E. FRANKLIN
FRAZIER, THE NEGRO FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES (1939). Frazier explained how "variations in
sex and marital practices... grew out of the social heritage of slavery" and explained how "what
slavery began-the pattern of racism and economic deprivation-continued to impinge on the
family life of Afro-Americans." THE BLACK FAMILY: ESSAYS AND STUDIEs 2 (Robert Staples ed.,
4th ed. 1991) [hereinafter THE BLACK FAMILY]. A more recent, and very influential study, is
OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE NEGRO FAMILY: THE CASE
FOR NATIONAL ACTION (1965) (popularly referred to as the Moynihan Report). The Moynihan
study was an official government publication which has had a profound impact on public policy. It
has been widely criticized, however, for "shift[ing] the burden of Black deprivation onto the Black
family rather than the social structure of the United States." T)HE BLACK FAMILY, supra, at 2. For
studies on Latino families, see Maria Serrano Schwartz, Bringing PEACE to the Latino
Community: Implementing a ParentEducation Program,34 FAM. & CONCILIATION Crs. REv. 93
(1996); see also Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Rape, Race, and Representation:The Powerof Discourse,
Discourses of Power, and the Reconstruction of Heterosexuality, 49 VAND. L. REV. 869 (1996)
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within these proliferating stories it contemplates changing roles,
including changing gender roles and changing family memberships. It
shows how the acquisition of nurturing skills can help post-divorce
parents better cope with these changes. It concludes by proposing a
doctrinal reform encouraging parents to participate in a nurturing skills
program after divorce.
In fact, more than six hundred counties throughout the country
have already adopted similar programs. 6 These programs, like Justice
Brennan's story, do not assume any universal notion of family; they
assume merely that nurturing skills facilitate relations among postdivorce family members.7 Just as driver education classes teach students
(linking rape to the social construction of women's sexual vulnerability and comparing the
predominantly white, upper middle class "men's movement's" attempts at explaining rape to the
images that circulate in the subordinated discourses of Latin culture). For international
comparisons, see FAMILY LAW AND GENDER BIAs: COMPARATIVE PERSPECrIVES (Barbara Stark
ed., 1992).
6. See Ingrid E. Slezak, ParentEducation: It Makes a Difference, OR. ST. B. BuLL., Nov.
1996, at 70; see also Linda D. Elrod & Robert G. Spector, A Review of the Year in Family Law:
Children's Issues Take Spotlight, 29 FAM. L.Q. 741, 742 (1996) (noting that "[m]ore states are
instituting parent education courses"); Peter Salem et al., ParentEducation as a DistinctField of
Practice: The Agenda for the Future, 34 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REv. 9, 10 (1996) ("Recent
surveys have identified more than 560 [parent education] programs throughout North America
); Carol Lawson, Requiring Classes in Divorce, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1992, at C1 (describing
....
Cobb County's parent education program which began in October 1988); Junda Woo, More
CourtsAre Forcing Couples to Take Divorce-Education Class, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 1993, at B8
("This year alone, scattered counties in [various states] added divorce education ....). Andrew
Schepard is the leading legal scholar in this area, nationally recognized for his work with the
PEACE program, as well as his prolific scholarship on the subject. See Andrew Schepard &
Stephen v. Schiissel, Planningfor P.E.A.C.E.: The Development of Court-ConnectedEducation
Programsfor Divorcing and Separating Families, 23 HOFsTRA L. REv. 845 (1995); Andrew
Schepard, Taking Children Seriously: Promoting Cooperative Custody After Divorce, 64 TEX. L.
REv. 687 (1985); Andrew Schepard, War and P.E.A.C.E.: A PreliminaryReport and a Model
Statute on an InterdisciplinaryEducationalProgramfor Divorcing and SeparatingParents,27 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORi 131 (1993); see also Jane IV. Ellis, Plans, Protections, and Professional
Intervention:Innovations in Divorce Custody Reform and the Role of Legal Professionals, 24 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 65, 168 (1990) (concluding that the enactment of the Washington State
Parenting Act has resulted in a "substantial amount of shared decision making and of shared
residential time [which] were considerably greater [than cases] in the same jurisdiction when its
laws had no plan requirement"); Joan B. Kelly, The Determinationof Child Custody, 4 FUTURE OF
CHILDREN 121, 121 (1994) (explaining how parent education, including required viewing of
educational videos, influences the decision-making of parents, attorneys, and judges); Robert A.
Zibbell, A Short-Term, Small-Group Education and Counseling Programfor Separated and
Divorced Parents in Conflict, 18 J. DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE 189, 191-92 (1992) (describing
short-term, small-group education and counseling programs for separated and divorced parents).
See generally discussion infra note 92. For a concise history of the growing interest in parent
education in the United States since the 1920s, see TOMMm L HAMNER & PAULINE H. TURNER,
PARENTING INCONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 25 (2d ed. 1990).
7. The content of these courses varies widely. See Woo, supranote 6, at B8 ("What parents
learn varies widely, because many programs are custom-tailored with the help of a local university
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how to drive, not where to go, parent education programs teach parents
how to nurture more effectively while respecting their own sense of

moral direction.8
Feminists have shown, however, how family law reflects and
reinforces gender stereotypes and how even purportedly gender neutral
reforms have contributed to the problem. Part I1, accordingly, analyzes
the specific nurturing skills program endorsed here from a feminist
perspective. It describes the underlying feminist consensus, which I call
"bottom line feminist theory," which has already transformed family

law and shows how this particular skills program incorporates its basic
precepts. Like bottom line feminist theory, moreover, this program
exposes and challenges gender stereotypes. Like other parent education
programs, it should be acceptable to state legislators.9 But it should also
be acceptable to feminists and others opposed to the perpetuation of
gender stereotypes, including the matrimonial bar.'0
or nonprofit social-service agency."). For a comprehensive analysis, see Sanford L. Braver et al.,
The Content of Divorce EducationPrograms:Results of a Survey, 34 FAM. & CONCILIATION Crs.
REV. 41 (1996).
The most intensively covered content area reported is the benefits of parental
cooperation and the costs of parental conflict. Other intensively covered topics include
typical postdivorce reactions of children, the impact of brainwashing the child and
badmouthing the other parent, different reactions and needs of children of different
ages, and responsibilities of custodial parents.
Id. at 51. The program described in this Article, in contrast, focuses on the "long haul of divorce,"
that is, the long term process of "build[ing] a new life" after the initial crisis has been dealt with.
See infra text accompanying notes 93-96. The program is described infra Part ]fl.A.
8. Parent education has been defined simply as "an organized group meeting(s) that has an
educational rather than counseling or mediation purpose and focuses on the divorce transition for
families. It may be attended by one or both parents." Karen R. Blaisure & Margie J. Geasler,
Results of a Survey of Court-ConnectedParentEducation Programsin U.S. Counties, 34 FAM. &
CONCLIATION Cs. REv. 23, 25 (1996).
9. For a list of typical programs, with addresses, see id. at 38. Programs include Children
Cope with Divorce, PEACE, Kids First: Parenting Through Divorce, SMILE, and The Family
Matters. This Article is neither about custody determinations nor the presumptions used in making
those determinations. But see infra Part III.B.l.c.ii. (explaining how such presumptions fail to take
the needs and feelings of family members into account). Rather, it is about improving family
members' experiences with their various post-divorce custody arrangements, most of which are
uncontested. See infra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
10. "Lawyers in family law have a special opportunity and obligation to be vigilant about
gender bias and gender stereotyping in the practice, in our offices, and in the courts." Arnold H.
Rutkin, From the Editor, 17 FAM. ADVOC. 4, 6 (1994) (special symposium issue by the ABA
Family Law Section on gender bias); see also Nancy Levit, Feminism for Men: Legal Ideology
and the Construction of Maleness, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1037 (1996) (discussing how gender
stereotypes harm men). It is noteworthy that opposition to gender stereotypes, one of the first
demands of the second feminist wave, now receives broad support, in law as well as in popular
rhetoric. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Barbara Flagg, Some Reflections on the Feminist Legal
Thought of the 1970s, 1989 U. CHi. LEGAL F. 9, 9 (included in a symposium addressing feminism
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I. GuYsAND Dolls-TESTORY OF THE UNITARY FAMILY
A. Practice
The unitary family, while never as ubiquitous as popular culture or

Justice Scalia suggests, has been a pervasive cultural norm in this
country for most of the century." As Justice Scalia defines it, "the

'unitary family,' is typified, of course, by the marital family, but also

includes the household of unmarried parents and their children."' 2 The

unitary family is one of our most enduring fictions.'3 It tells a
profoundly gendered story, a story of "guys and dolls." The unitary
family consists of a woman, a man, and a child or children. Each family
member has a specific, gendered role.
The woman is the homemaker; she is responsible for nurturing, for
taking care of the family and the home. She provides emotional as well
as physical sustenance. She serves as a role model for her daughters,
who "play in the house with their dolls, creating complex family groups
and solving problems through negotiation and role-playing."'" Even if
in the law). Feminist theory, meanwhile, has developed more sophisticated analyses, recognizing,
for example, that applying the same standard to women and men often means holding women to a
standard designed for men. While most, if not all, parent education programs incorporate the
gender neutral pronouns that have now become standard, the program endorsed here, see infra Part
II.A., like feminist theory, recognizes that such standards are problematic in this context. Rather,
it becomes necessary to focus on actual behavior, especially gendered behavior, and consciously
support behavior that is nurturing and change that which is not. Part III of this Article explains
how nurturing behavior can be supported in practice, reflected in theory, and encouraged in
doctrine.
11. See, e.g., Carol Sanger, Misfor the Many Things, 1 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOIMEN's STUD.
15, 18 (1992) ("For most of this century, the dominant model of motherhood has meant something
closer to 'housewife'-a married, nonworking, inherently selfless, largely nonsexual, white
woman with children."). See generally ANN DALLY, INVENTING MOTHERHOOD (1983) (describing
the segregation of mothers and children in Western society); ADRIENNE RICH, OF WOMAN BORN:
MOTHERHOOD AS EXPERIENCE AND INsTInTIoN (10th ed. 1986) (examining, in feminist terms,

motherhood in a social context and as part of a political institution).
12. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123 n.3 (1989).
13.

See, e.g., Susan Chira, Images of the Perfect Mother: Put Them All Together in a

Multitude of Ways, N.Y. TMiEs, May 8, 1994, at A26 ("[']he image of a suburban mother at home
with her brood never reflected the reality for many Americans."); see also authorities cited supra
note 11.

14. Keillor, supra note 2, at Ell. For a collection of essays exploring "representations of
motherhood [which] are not essentialized, romanticized, or idealized," see MOTHERs IN LAW:
FEMIIST THEORY AND THE LEGAL REGULATION OF MOTHERHOOD at xii (Martha Albertson
Fineman & Isabel Karpin eds., 1995) [hereinafter MOTHERS N LAW]. See generally SHARON
HAYS, THE CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS OF MOTHERHOOD (1996) (describing tension between a
competitive economic system and ideas of "appropriate mothering"); MOTHERING: IDEOLOGY,
EXPERIENCE AND AGENCY (Evelyn Nakano Glenn et. al. eds., 1994) (featuring interdisciplinary
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she works outside the home as well as within it, and most women do in
the 1990s, her family always comes first. 5 The private sphere of the

home and family remains her domain.
The man is the primary breadwinner in the unitary family; that is,

he provides most of the family income, 6 His sphere is the public sphere
of the workplace and politics." He serves as a role model for his sons,

who "run around fighting wars for made-up reasons with toy guns.' 8
Unlike women, men are not expected to acquire nurturing skills. 9

"Guys" do not play with dolls.
Under this model, babies and young children are cared for by the

nurturing mother in the secure home she makes for them. As they
develop, children become miniature versions of the parent of the same
gender. The daughter learns what she needs to be a woman by emulating
her mother, helping her shop, cook, and take care of younger children!'
essays presenting the political, legal, and cultural debates surrounding mothering).
15. See Joan Williams, Gender Wars: Selfless Women in the Republic of Choice, 66 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 1559, 1608-12 (1991). As Virginia Woolf describes her:
She was intensely sympathetic. She was immensely charning. She was utterly
unselfish. She excelled in the difficult arts of family life. She sacrificed herself
daily.... [l]n short she was so constituted that she never had a mind or a wish of her
own, but preferred to sympathize always with the minds and wishes of others.
2 VIRGINIA WOOLF, Professionsfor Women, in COLLECrED ESSAYS 284, 285 (1966) (cited in
Milton C. Regan, Jr., Spousal Privilege and the Meanings of Marriage, 81 VA. L. REV. 2045,
2071 (1995)).
16. Some conservatives still insist that this is a fine model: "[F]atherhood and work go
together .... We do not live in a unisex world. Children may adore their fathers, but if it is love
they seek, they will usually prefer to go to mother." Irving Kristol, Life Without Father,WALL ST.
J., Nov. 3, 1994, at A18.
From the end of the nineteenth century until the 1970s, husbands or former husbands were
held financially responsible for children of the marriage. See Karen Czapanskiy, Volunteers and
Draftees: The Struggle for ParentalEquality, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1415, 1431-32 (1991); cf.
Editorial, Mom the Provider, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1995, at E14 (citing a Louis Harris &
Associates poll showing that women "share equally with their husbands in supporting their
families"); Sue Shellenbarger, Women Indicate Satisfaction with Role of Big Breadwinner,WALL
ST. J., May 11, 1995, at B1 (citing a study by the Families and Work Institute showing that "55%
of employed women bring in half or more of their household income, and 53% say they don't want
to give up any of their responsibilities either at work or at home").
17. See, e.g., ROBERT L. GRISWOLD, FATHERHOOD IN AERtcA: A HISTORY 201 (1993)
(noting that the attributes that "made for success in the white-collar workplace" were precisely the
attributes that made for "good fathering" between 1945 and 1965).
18. Keillor, supranote 2, at Ell.
19. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Carney, 598 P.2d 36,42 (Cal. 1979) (rejecting as an outdated
stereotype the notion of a father who only plays sports, hunts, and fishes with his sons).
20. The "Take Our Daughters to Work" project, in which mothers are encouraged to bring
their daughters to their workplaces, recognizes that daughters emulate their mothers while at the
same time expanding the scope of emulated activities. For a thoughtful answer to a common
question, see Anna Quindlen, What About the Boys?, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1993, at E19 (arguing
that boys need to learn more about "an interior world, of intimacy, of connection" than about the
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The son learns what he needs to be a man by emulating his father.2 ' The
unitary family replicates itself; indeed, its own replication is one of its
most critical functions. Finally, and crucially, the unitary family is selfsufficient; it is the smallest unit of a self-sufficient society.'
B. Theory
Psychoanalytic theory is not the only theory explaining the unitary
family, nor is it the least controversial.2 As feminists have observed,
however, it is still among the most powerful secular explanations of the
roots of gendered relations.' It also explains how gendered relations

may be internalized in individuals and thus replicated through gendered
relations in the unitary family.

According to psychoanalytic theory, the internalized constructs
established in the earliest months and years of life shape the individual's
lifelong experience.' While other psychologists focus more on social
contexts, such as the family and the school, psychoanalysts are more
likely to point out how these early patterns are replicated or sought in
these later contexts. Liberation is less liberation from these early
world of work).
21. For an illuminating and comprehensive history, see GRIswOLD, supranote 17.
22. See infra notes 166-70 and accompanying text (describing the representation of the
family as a microcosm of the state).
23. For early ground-breaking work, see DOROTHY DINNERSTEIN, THE MERMAID AND THE
MINOTAUR: SEXUAL ARRANGIIENTS AND HUMAN MALAISE (1976); JULIET MITCHELL, WOMAN'S
ESTATE (1973). Nancy Chodorow crystallized and built on this work, initiating an important and
invigorating debate. See NANCY CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING:
PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER (1978); Judith Lorber et al., On The
Reproduction of Mothering: A Methodological Debate, 6 SIGNS 482 (1981). In later work,
Professor Chodorow responded to her critics. See NANCY J. CHODOROW, FEMINISM AND
PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY (1989) [hereinafter CHODOROW, FMINSM AND PSYCHOANALYTIC
THEORY]; see also DRUCILLA CORNELL, BEYOND ACCOMMODATION: ETHICAL FEMINISM,
DECONSTRUCTION, AND THE LAw 50-52 (1991) (summarizing Nancy Chodorow's and Robin
West's views of object relations theory). For a thoughtful intellectual history of the varied strands
of feminist psychology, see ELLYN KASCHAK, ENGENDERED LIvES: A NEW PSYCHOLOGY OF
WOMEN'S EXPERIENCE 10-36 (1992). Cf. Herbert W. Titus, Defining Marriageand the Family, 3
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 327, 343 (1994) (stating that the unitary family is ordained by God).
24. As Martha Fineman notes, psychoanalysis is "particularly relevant" evidence of the
metadiscourse in which the "nuclear family is unquestionably accepted." MARTHA ALBERTSON
FINEMAN, THE NEuTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTuRY
TRAGEDIES 152 (1995).
25. For a physiological explanation, see DANIEL GOLEMAN, EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE 2122 (1995). For an in-depth discussion of pyschoanalytic theory and brain maturation, see ALLAN
N. SCHORE, AFFECT REGULATION AND THE ORIGIN OF THE SELF: THE NEUROBIOLOGY OF
EMOTIONAL DEVELOPMENT (1994). But see Lorber et al., supra note 23, at 496 n.34 (arguing that
very little of what occurs under six years of age predicts characteristics in adolescents and
adulthood).
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6

Object relations theory was developed by some of Freud's
followers to explain how the infant develops a subjective identity." The
theory begins with the infant and her mother, who is assumed to be the

infant's primary caregiver28 The infant develops a sense of self by
interacting with her surroundings under her mother's watchful eye. In
British psychoanalyst D.W. Winnicott's terms, the mother is usually

26. Indeed, Freud considered the wife's assumption of the maternal role essential to a
"secure" marriage: "[A] marriage is not fmnly assured until the woman has succeeded in making
her husband into her child and in acting the part of a mother towards him." SIGMUND FREUD, NEW
INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON PSYCHO-ANALYSIS 183 (WJ.H. Sprott trans., W.W. Norton & Co.
1964) (1933).
27. See, e.g., D.W. WINNICOTr, THE FAMILY AND INDIVIDUAL DEVELOPMENT 15-20 (1965)
[hereinafter WINNICOTT, INDIVIDUAL DEVELOPMENT] (describing the importance of the
relationship of a mother to her infant); D.W. WINNICOTT, THROUGH PEDIATRICS TO PSYCHOANALYSIS 162-73 (1958) (same). For a lively and accessible introduction, see MADELEINE DAVIS
& DAVID WALLBRIDGE, BOUNDARIES AND SPACE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE WORK OF D.W.
WINNICOTr (1990). See also MELANIE KLEIN, Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms, in ENVY AND
GRATITUDE & OTHER WORKS 1946-1963, at 2 (1975) (expressing the view that object relations
exist from the beginning of life); MELANIE KLEIN, The Development of a Child, in
CONTRIBUTIONS TO PSYCHO-ANALYSIS 1921-1945, at 13, 13 (2d ed. 1950) (stating that through
psycho-analysis, it has been determined that sexual enlightenment and the relaxation of authority
will have a positive effect on the development of children); MELANIE KLEIN, THE PSYCHOANALYSIS OF CHILDREN 3 (3d ed. 1975) (deeming that psycho-analysis has led to the creation of a
new child psychology).
28. Winnicott's consistent reference to "mother" rather than "parent," has contributed to the
disfavor with which he is regarded by some feminists. See, e.g., JANICE DOANE & DEVON HODGES,
FROM KLEIN TO KRISTEVA: PSYCHOANALYTIC FEMINISM AND THE SEARCH FOR THE "GOOD
ENOUGH" MOTHER 7-33 (1992) (stating that Winnicott's restaging of the mother's place in child
development is "hardly liberating for women"). Feminist analysts reject the equation of
"motherhood" and "parenL" As Chodorow explains:
[W]e must recognize that exclusive mothering by one isolated woman is the historical
exception, not the rule... [while] it appears that something like parental
involvement-ongoing commitment to a particularchild-is essential. One becomes a
person in relation to stable, caring others. But such commitment may be made by
biological and nonbiological parents, members of an extended household or kin
network, even, in some cases, nurses.
Lorber et al., supra note 23, at 513; see also Patricia Hill Collins, The Meaning of Motherhood in
Black Culture, in THE BLACK FAMILY, supra note 5, at 169, 173 (describing "othermothers" as
women who assist blood mothers by sharing mothering responsibilities). For a discussion of the
central role of grandmothers in poor Black families, see Sr. Mary Jean Flaherty et al.,
GrandmotherFunctionsin MultigenerationalFamilies: An Exploratory Study of Black Adolescent
Mothers and Their Infants, in THE BLACK FAMILY, supra note 5, at 192, 197 (identifying seven
functions of the Black grandmother: managing, caretaking, coaching, assessing, nurturing,
assigning, and controlling). See also ANDREW BILLINGSLEY, BLACK FAMILIES AND THE STRUGGLE
FOR SURVIVAL 47, 51-52 (1974) (noting that Black extended families are part of an African
heritage which neither slavery nor segregation could destroy); CAROL B. STACK, ALL OUR KIN:
STRATEGIES FOR SURVIVAL IN A BLACK COMMUNITY 22-31 (1974) (discussing the family life of
the "black urban poor").
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"good enough" to assure that the infant's basic needs for food, warmth,
and affection are met.2 Crucially, the mother is not too good. Because
she does not anticipate the infant's every desire, the infant gets
frustrated and soon learns that she must do something-cry, reach,
grasp-to satisfy her desires. Thus, the infant develops a sense of
herself as an active subject, capable of having an effect on the world.
The baby's emerging sense of self is necessarily gendered in a
gendered culture." Between the ages of two and four, the baby begins to
realize that the culture distinguishes between girls and boys, and that
she or he is expected to conform to a gendered role. The boy's first
consciousness of his own subjectivity, his own autonomy, his
independence, and his ability to control his surroundings, is linked to his
growing awareness of his place as a male, as opposed to his mother's
place as a female, in the larger, gendered social context. As Gayle
Rubin paraphrases Lacan, "[T]he Oedipal crisis occurs when a child
learns of the sexual rules embedded in the terms for family and
relatives. The crisis begins when the child comprehends this system and
his or her place in it; the crisis is resolved when the child accedes to
it." As feminist psychoanalyst Jessica Benjamin explained, boys
achieve their sense of independence by saying, "I am nothing like she
who cares for me."3 2 Because the baby boy perceives himself as an
active subject, he perceives his mother, his opposite, as a passive object.
According to object relations theory, the mother enables her son to
achieve independence by continuing to love and care for him even
though he treats her like an object. Boys do not learn to recognize the
subjectivity of others. Indeed, their sense of their own subjectivity is
based on denying the subjectivity of others, particularly women. Thus,
say the object relations theorists, empathy is often difficult for boys and
the men they grow up to be. The recognition of another's subjectivity
chafes. It is experienced as an infringement on their own autonomy.
29. See X'v coTr, INDIVmuAL DEvELoPMENT, supra note 27, at 3; see also Lorber et al.,
supranote 23, at 499 (arguing that parents are probably better than trained infant caretakers).
30. While Freud attributed this to physiology, feminists have pointed out that the baby is
growing up in a gendered culture: "Psychoanalysis... is a theory about the reproduction of
kinship. Psychoanalysis describes the residue left within individuals by their confrontation with
the rules and regulations of sexuality of the societies to which they are born." Gayle Rubin, The
Traffic in Women: Notes on the "PoliticalEconomy" of Sex, in TOWARD AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF
WOMEN 157, 183 (Rayna R. Reiter ed., 1975).
31. ld. at 188-89.
32.

JESsIcA BENJAMIN, THE BONDS OF LOVE: PSYCHOANALYSIS,

FEMINISM AND THE

PROBLEM OF DONINATION 76 (1988). As Alice S. Rossi asks, "Can any amount of equal parenting
or supplemental parenting by nonparents go very far in blurring the tendency for greater separation
of sons from mothers than daughters from mothers?" Lorber et al., supra note 23, at 493.
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Deferring to another person's subjective experience is particularly
grating, even intolerable, if the other person is a woman

3

Girls, in contrast, do not achieve independence by distinguishing
themselves from their mothers. Indeed, Benjamin explains that the
daughter has no clear route for the development of an autonomous self
and is often "unable to distinguish what she wants from what mother
wants ... [T]o the extent that the mother has sacrificed her own

independence, the girl's attempt at independence would represent an
assertion of power for which she has no basis in identification."' Object

relations theory explains why autonomy may be difficult for girls, and
why it may be difficult for the women they grow up to be to assert their
own independence. Rather, women remain sharply aware of the
subjective experience of others, which they may even perceive as more
compelling than their own. This makes them good mothers. But it

remains difficult for them as mothers to encourage their children's
autonomy, especially the autonomy of their daughters. Instead, they

model interdependent, empathetic behavior for their daughters, teaching
their daughters to become mothers like themselves. 3
Psychoanalytic theory in general has been criticized by feminists
for its acceptance and reinforcement of a gendered status quo. Object
relations theory, more specifically, has been criticized by feminists on

two major grounds. First, they have criticized this theory for assuming
that the unitary family is universal. As Elizabeth Spelman and others
33. Feminists have shown how this translates into the notion of gendered space. See IRIS
MARION YOUNG, THROWING LIKE A GIRL AND OTHER ESSAYS IN FEIINIST PHILOSOPHY AND
SOCIAL THEORY 38 (1990). The "arm rest" game, which can be played while flying, provides a
graphic illustration. Who gets the armrest between you when you are sitting next to a person of
another gender? How is this resolved? Who makes what kinds of adjustments, accommodations, or
assumptions of entitlement? (An anonymous source on the Internet refers to this as "elbonics.").
34. BENJAMIN, supra note 32, at 79; see also Sheila Bienenfeld, Breaking the Cycle,
WOMEN's REv., Dec. 1993, at 20 ("Because of their own disconnection from self, these mothers
serve as patriarchy's enforcers, indoctrinating their daughters in the norms that will cripple
them."). But see Collins, supra note 28, at 171-72 (describing a distinctly Afrocentric ideology of
motherhood involving emotional care for children and providing for the child's physical survival);
see also ELZABETH DEBOLD Er AL., MOTHER/DAUGHTER REVOLUTION: FROM BERAYAL TO
POWER (1993) (describing how to preserve girls' self-esteem through "politically-conscious
mothering").
35. For a thoughtful comparison of the "images of 'mother' recounted in [White]
psychoanalytic discourses" and the images "that circulate in the subordinated discourses of Black
and Latin culture," see Iglesias, supra note 5, at 875-76.
36. See, e.g., Catherine McBride-Chang et al., Mother-Blaming, Psychology and the Law, 1
S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 69 (1992) (discussing the historical scape-goating of mothers
for multi-causal problems of children). But see CHODOROW, FEMINISM AND PSYCHOANALYTIC
THEORY, supra note 23, at 153 (drawing on Winnicott to "begin to imagine not only liberated
individuals, but individuals mutually engaged in a society built on liberated forms of social life").
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have pointed out, this denies the experience of the many families which
are not unitary families, including most Black families,37 single-parent
families, gay and lesbian families, and other "nontraditional" families."

Second, related but distinct, feminists criticize object relations
theory for assuming that the unitary family should be universal. They
point out its enormous costs both to its members39 and to a larger society
presumptively made up of such units.' In short, object relations theory
has been criticized by feminists for assuming that the unitary family is
the norm, and that it should be.41 Feminist psychoanalysts counter that
the gendered relations characteristic of the unitary family are not
"normal," not innate, but that they are pervasive and that their deep
roots must be understood if they are to be effectively challenged. 42 As
Gayle Rubin warns:
37. See Collins, supra note 28, at 176 (distinguishing female roles modeled by White
mothers and Black mothers, particularly noting that "[t]he presence of working mothers, extended
family othermothers, and powerful community othermothers [in the Black community] offers a
range of role models that challenge the tenets of the cult of true womanhood"). For a description of
"multiple mothering" in Latin and Hindu families, see Iglesias, supra note 5,at 927.
38. ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMflNIST
THOUGHT 80-113 (1988). "[W]hile Chodorow's work is very compelling, it ought to be highly
problematic for any version of feminism that demands more than lip service to the significance of
race and class, racism and classism, in the lives of the women on whom Chodorow focuses." Id.at
81; see also GRISwOLD, supra note 17, at 216 ("Black families and black men did not need
therapy but rather massive programs 'to destroy the racial ghettos of America, house the black and
white poor decently and create full and fair employment in the process."'); KASCHAK, supra note
23, at 15 ('The approach is reductionist in that it traces all human behavior to a few basic drives
and/or early childhood experiences."); Manning Marible, The Black Male: Searching Beyond
Stereotypes, in THE BLACK FAMILY, supra note 5, at 103.
39. The psychoanalytic drama plays out far beyond the infant-parent relationship, as
Chodorow reiterates:
The boy comes to define his self more in opposition than through a sense of his
wholeness or continuity. He becomes the self and experiences his mother as the other.
The process also extends to his trying to dominate the other in order to ensure his sense
of self. Such domination begins with mother as the object, extends to women, and is
then generalized to include the experience of all others as objects rather than subjects.
This stance, in which people are treated and experienced as things, becomes basic to
male Western culture.
Lorber et al., supra note 23, at 503; see also DwNERs IN, supra note 23, at 5 ("[U]ntil we grow
strong enough to renounce the pernicious prevailing forms of collaboration between the sexes,
both man and woman will remain semi-human, monstrous.').
40. See SUSAN MOLLER OIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 14 (1989) ("Mhe family
...must be just if we are to have a just society ....).
41. "Widely-held and insistently reinforced beliefs of what is natural, normal and desirable
affect how we approach change.... In legal reform, the fundamental and initial debate is always
about the underlying cultural and social constructs." Martha L.A. Fineman, Masking Dependency:
The PoliticalRole of Family Rhetoric, 81 VA. L. REV. 2181, 2186-87 (1995).
42. Professor Iglesias has criticized my qualified support for gender neutral parenting, for
example, on the ground that "in the cultural logic of matrifocality, proposals promoting gender-

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1997

13

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 3
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:293

We cannot dismantle something that we underestimate or do not
understand. The oppression of women is deep; equal pay, equal work,

and all of the female politicians in the world will not extirpate the roots
of sexism. L6vi-Strauss and Freud elucidate what would otherwise be

poorly perceived parts of the deep structures of sex oppression. They
serve as reminders of the intractability and magnitude of what we
fight, and their analyses provide preliminary charts of the social
machinery we must rearrange. 43

C. Doctrine
The practice of the unitary family, reflected in and legitimated by
psychoanalytic object relations theory, remains embedded in
contemporary legal doctrine governing the post-divorce family. 4
Although the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the promotion of the
unitary family as a justification for gender classifications, 5 it remains at
the core of family law doctrine. 46 The assumption remains that the post47
divorce family simulates, or should try to simulate, the unitary family.
First, family law doctrine condones, even if it no longer requires,
the mother's primary caregiving responsibilities.4 After divorce, most

neutral parenthood are most problematic precisely because they are grounded in arguments
that ...indulge mainstream culture's psycho-sexual fear of female power (Stark's approach)."
Iglesias, supra note 5, at 990. Professor Iglesias is correct if she means that I recognize, as she
does, mainstream culture's psycho-sexual fear of female power. The word "indulge," however,
incorrectly suggests that I condone or support that fear, or that if I did not, mainstream culture, like
a spoiled child, would get over it.
43. Rubin, supra note 30, at 198.
44. See generally Sylvia A. Law & Patricia Hennessey, Is the Law Male?: The Case of
Family Law, 69 CrH.-KENT L. REV. 345, 345-51 (1993) (explaining how child custody law's
assumption of gendered roles systematically favors men and oppresses women).
45. See ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 264 (discussing Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979)).
46. Feminists, however, have challenged this. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking
Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the
Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879, 880-83 (1984) (suggesting a more inclusive
conception of family); Martha Minow, All in the Family & In All Families:Membership, Loving,
and Owing, 95 W. VA. L. REV.275, 276-305 (1992) (urging a broad definition of "family"); Note,
Lookingfor a Family Resemblance: The Limits of the FunctionalApproach to the Legal Definition
of Family, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1640, 1659 (1991) (urging registration through which
nontraditional adult families could formalize relationships).
47. Ann Laquer Estin argues, to the contrary, that family law assumes a partnership.
Although Professor Estin focuses on the assumption that the mother will cam money, while I focus
on the assumption that she will retain primary responsibility for the children, we agree that the law
fails to adequately consider and support her real needs. See Ann Laquer Estin, Maintenance,
Alimony, and the Rehabilitationof Family Care, 71 N.C. L. REV. 721, 802 (1993).
48. For a comprehensive history of custody law, see MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER'S
PROPERTY TO CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: THE HISTORY OF CHILD CUSTODY INTHE UNITED STATES
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children continue to live with their mothers, who continue to make a

home for them. Caregiving remains women's work even though it is not
doctrinally mandated. The "tender years doctrine," under which custody
of young children was usually awarded to the mother, has been rejected
by most states and may even be constitutionally impermissible. 49 The
primary caretaker presumption," which offers a facially gender neutral
standard under which the primary caretaker-again, usually the
mother-is awarded custody, has been adopted in only one state. 1 The
' standard remains the lodestar in the vast
"best interests of the child"52
majority of jurisdictions, although it has been widely criticized for its
indeterminacy, which leaves judges with enormous discretion."
The particular standard adopted, however, is not that important
because more than seventy-eight percent of custody arrangements are
(1994). For a discussion of the ways in which courts subject men as well as women to gender bias
in custody cases, see Levit, supra note J0, at 1075. For a summary of the scholarship refuting
men's claims that the best interest standard is a pretext for maternal bias, see 'IRRY ARENDELL,
FATHERS AND DIVORCE 78-83 (1995).
49. See ELLMAN Er AL., supra note 3, at 503.
50. This was first articulated by the West Virginia Supreme Court in Garska v. McCoy, 278
S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981). For a careful analysis of the actual impact of the primary caretaker
standard, see Mary Becker, Maternal Feelings:Myth, Taboo, and Child Custody, 1 S.CAL. REV.
L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 133, 192-203 (1992). See also Phyllis T. Bookspan, From a Tender Years
Presumptionto a Primary ParentPresumption:Has Anything Really Changed? ...Should It?, 8
BYU J. PuB. L. 75 (1994) (comparing tender years and primary caretaker presumptions and
concluding that the latter should be adopted); Laura Sack, Women and Children First:A Feminist
Analysis of the Primary CaretakerStandard in Child Custody Cases, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
291, 300-16 (1992) (providing a feminist analysis of the primary caretaker presumption in
Minnesota and west Virginia).
51. This is West Virginia. See supra note 50 and infra notes 316-18. Minnesota
experimented with the presumption for four years, repealing it in 1994.
52. UNIF. MARRIAGE AN DvORcE AcT § 402, 9A U.L.A. 561 (1968) (including among
factors to be considered in determining the "best interests of the child," parents' wishes, child's
wishes, child's relationships with parents and others, child adjustment to home, school, and
community, and mental and physical health of all involved). See, e.g., Beth K. Clark, Acting in the
Best Interest of the Child: Essential Components of a Child Custody Evaluation, 29 FAM. L.Q. 19
(1995) (describing how psychologists involved in custody disputes can apply this standard). But
see JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN Er AL, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1973) (concluding
that it is better for the child to be placed with the "psychological parent," that is, the adult with
whom the child is most strongly bonded).
53. See Becker, supra note 50, at 195-96 (arguing that mothers who do not conform to the
nurturing model risk losing their children). According to a recent study, men win more than 50%
of litigated cases, and litigated cases "so often employ gender-stereotyped assumptions [that]
virtually all feminists ...favor restricted judicial discretion." June R. Carbone, A Feminist
Perspective on Divorce, 4 FUTURE OF CHILDREN at 183, 198 (1994). See generally Sandra T. Azar
& Corina L. Benjet, A Cognitive Perspective on Ethnicity, Race, and Termination of Parental
Rights, 18 LAw & HUrM. BEHAV. 249,265 (1994) (urging that custody evaluations "be grounded in
a well-articulated theory of parenting competency" taking into account "the racial and ethnic
diversity in our society").
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made by the parties themselves.m In more than eighty-five percent of
these, mothers retain physical custody.5
Second, family law doctrine assumes that the father will continue
in his unitary family role; that is, he is expected to continue to provide
support and he is usually granted "liberal" visitation. Moreover,
mandatory child support guidelines and federal enforcement
machinery-including mandatory wage withholding and civil as well as

criminal contempt-confirm his ongoing breadwinning obligations. His
caregiving responsibilities, however, are generally minimal. For
example, fathers often treat visitation less as a responsibility than as an
option to be exercised at will.56 This is condoned by family law doctrine,
which imposes no penalty for the father's failure to visit." The postdivorce father's role basically reprises his role in the unitary family. He
no longer lives in the home, of course, but under the unitary family
model he was often more like a visitor anyway.
Just as the unitary family is supposed to protect young children by
removing them from the public sphere and enclosing them within the
security of the private sphere of the home,58 family law doctrine seeks to
protect young children by removing them from the public sphere
process of divorce. The child is protected by being excluded 9 and it is
left to the parents to protect her interests. 6° The child's role at divorce is
54. See Robert Mnookin et al., Private OrderingRevisited: What CustodialArrangements
"are
Parents Negotiating?,in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CRossRoADs 37, 51 (Stephen Sugarman &
Herna Hill Kay eds., 1990).
55. See Ross A. Thompson, The Role of the FatherAfter Divorce, in 4 FuTuRE OF CHILDREN
210, 215 (1994). While the court is required to confirm that any arrangement reached by the
parties is in fact in the "best interest of the child," courts rarely disturb these arrangements.
56. This is consistent with the law's laissez-faire approach to male nurturing. Professor
Czapanskiy has pointed out that in Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), for example, "[t]he
natural father is said to have an 'opportunity,' not a responsibility, to develop a relationship."
Czapanskiy, supra note 16, at 1420.
57. Penalties can be imposed, however, in the Settlement Agreements incorporated into
judgments at divorce. The father, for example, can be required to arrange alternative childcare,
satisfactory to the mother, or to pay as additional child support the cost of such childcare. Cf.
Nancy E. Dowd, Stigmatizing Single Parents, 18 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 19, 53 n.224 (1995) ("The
law strongly discourages unmarried fathers from parenting beyond biological or economical
fatherhood.").
58. But see DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 192-93
(1989) (describing agency failure to remove child from his abusive father and child's resultant
brain damage and institutionalization). For a defense of the much criticized decision, see Barbara
E. Armacost, Affirmative Duties, Systemic Harms, and the Due Process Clause, 94 MICH. L. REV.
982,985 (1996).
59. See Wendy Anton Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery: Children's
Perspectivesand the Law, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 11, 110 (1994) (noting how adults "justify children's
legal exclusion as necessitated by their immaturity").
60. Cf. Katherine Hunt Federle, Looking for Rights in All the Wrong Places: Resolving
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generally passive, often limited to an in-camera interview with the
court. To discourage parental bribes ("the lollipop syndrome") or
threats, the court often takes pains to tell the child that even if she
expresses a preference, it will not be dispositive
Finally, family law doctrine incorporates the ideal of selfsufficient, autonomous families. The goal of the final judgment is to
eliminate any further need for legal intervention. Courts do not want to
micromanage the ongoing conflicts of post-divorce families.62 If a
parent anticipates problems, such as a child's anxiety about the other
parent's sexual relationships, for example, the attorney can only seek to
include appropriate provisions in the judgment, warning the other parent
that such violation will trigger an application to the court and a demand
for costs. 63 While such provisions may sometimes be effective, a parent
often endures this violation rather than incur the psychological and
financial costs of additional litigation. If the parties are lucky, a
tolerable post-divorce arrangement may be reached. Often, however, the
tensions that fueled the breakup of the marriage simmer for years,
poisoning the atmosphere for all involved.

II. How THIs STORY FAILs POST-DIVORCE FAMILIES
The story of the unitary family is at best irrelevant to post-divorce
families.6 4 The practice it assumes is no longer feasible, if indeed it
Custody Disputes in Divorce Proceedings, 15 CARDOZo L. REv. 1523, 1526 (1994) (arguing for

"the mandatory appointment of independent counsel for children in all aspects of the divorce
proceeding"). For a disturbing account of the disruptive impact of a court-appointed guardian ad
litem, see Ann Shalleck, Child Custody and Child Neglect: Parenthoodin Legal Practice and
Culture, in MOTHERS IN LAW, supra note 14, at 309, 324-25.
61. For a promising remedy, see Scott Altman, Lurking in the Shadow, 68 S.CAL. L. REv.

493, 527 (1995) (arguing that settlement agreements should be submitted in distinct stages so that
custody and visitation arrangements would have to be approved prior to any financial agreement).
The lack of weight given children's preferences at divorce is also intended to discourage them
from playing one parent off against the other. For a lucid explanation of the "inappropriate
factors" likely to influence a child's preference, see Becker, supra note 50, at 188-90 ("[A] child
may choose the opposite-sex parent due to Oedipal fantasies ....[T]he child may have an
unrealistic and idealized image of the noncustodial parent-the zoo daddy ...[Teenagers] may be
influenced by how lenient or strict a parent is.").
62. For an eye-opening account of the difficult issues confronting a family court judge, see
Jan Hoffman, Judge Hayden's Family Values, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct 15, 1995, § 6 (Magazine), at 44
(describing the experiences of a family court judge and noting that "Americans fail at marriage
and parenting, and new family configurations require fresh solutions").
63. See Kelly v. Kelly, 524 A.2d 1330, 1332 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1986) ("Neither party
will do anything which might have an adverse effect upon the safety, physical, mental or moral
welfare of the children.").
64. Richard E. Behrman & Linda Sandham Quinn, Children and Divorce: Overview and
Analysis, 4 FTuRE OF CHILDREN 4,5 (1994) ("About 26% of all children under 18 years of age
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ever was. 66 The theory of the unitary family impedes, rather than
facilitates, necessary and inevitable change. 6 Its doctrine recapitulates
(17 million) live with a divorced parent, a separated parent, or a stepparent .. "). About 40% of
American children experience parental divorce by the age of 16. See Amato, supra note 5, at 143;
see also Susan Chira, Struggling to Find Stability When Divorce Is a Pattern, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
19, 1995, at 1 (according to Larry Bumpass, University of Wisconsin demographer, increasing
numbers of Americans are seeing their families split, reform, and split again).
Feminists persuasively demonstrated how the story of the unitary family fails women,
during as well as after marriage. See, e.g., Joan C. Williams, Married Women and Property, 1 VA.
J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 383, 384 (1994) (describing how women are impoverished by gender patterns
within marriage and "an economic system where the chief asset of most divorcing couples is the
human capital of the husband").
65. In analyzing the trend toward an increase in single-parent homes, Kathleen Gerson
notes:
Between 1970 and 1991, the proportion of children living with two parents declined
from 85 percent to 72 percent, while the proportion living with one parent-usually the
mother-rose from 12 percent to 26 percent. In 1991, 19 percent of all white families
and 58 percent of all black families with children were headed by a single mother.
KATHLEEN GERSON, No MAN'S LAND: MEN'S CHANGING COMMIT NTS TO FAIfLY AND WORK 7
(1993) (footnote omitted); see also Marilyn Bowens, The "Cleaver" Paradigmas an Anachronism
in a Multi-Cultural Society, 7 WIs. WOMEN'S L.J. 25 (1992-1993) (arguing that since most
Americans live in alternative families, the law should not be biased against them); Sue
Shelienbarger, Care-GiverDuties Make GenerationXers Anything but Slackers, WvALL ST. J., May
22, 1996, at B1 (discussing a new study which "proves, again, that stereotypes are nearly useless
in predicting the family conflicts of today's work force").
66. In recounting popular images of the 1950s, Kathleen Gerson notes:
[E]ven... in the 1950s, almost 22 percent of all households contained an employed
wife, and almost 9 percent were headed by single mothers. By 1960 the breadwinnerhomemaker arrangement had barely accounted for a majority of households, having
dropped to less than 52 percent.... [Olver 23 percent included an employed wife, 11
percent were single-parent families, and almost 15 percent were single adults ....
GERSON, supra note 65, at 3-4. Working class women, including most Black women, have almost
always worked outside as well as within the home. See Carbone, supra note 53, at 201 n. 11. A
landmark conference in 1961 and summarizing research of the 1940s and 1950s conducted to
determine the negative effects on children of mothers work outside the home concluded that "[n]o
differences were detected between the children of mothers who stayed at home and those whose
mothers worked outside the home." McBride-Chang et al., supranote 36, at 74.
67. This applies not only to change within the family, but to change within the larger culture
as well. By 1988. 47% of the children living in two-parent families lived in dual-worker families.
See GRISWOLD, supra note 17, at 220. The unitary family, moreover, is becoming increasingly
rare. "[O]ver two-thirds of children will spend some or all of their childhood in single-parent
families.
... Dowd, supra note 57, at 23. See generally WOMEN AS SINGLE PARENTS:
CONFRONTING INSTITIONAL BARRIERS IN THE COURTS, THE WORKPLACE, AND THE HOUSING
MARKET (Elizabeth A. Mulroy ed., 1988) [hereinafter WOMEN AS SINGLE PARENTS] (providing an
examination of the "realities" of single parenthood for women). This decline has been particularly
marked in the Black community. While noting that "historical studies demonstrate that the Black
family was a stable unit during slavery and in the immediate post-slavery years," Robert Staples
points out, "The rise in out-of-wedlock births and female-headed households are concomitants of
twentieth-century urban ghettos. A doubling of those phenomena is a function of the economic
contingencies of industrial America." TilE BLACK FAlLY, supra note 5, at 3. This is attributable
to divorce as well as an increase in never-married mothers. By the late seventies, Black women
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the adversarial legal framework of the divorce conflict itself and thereby
perpetuates it.
The story of the unitary family assumes a gendered division of
labor which is no longer an option at divorce.6t As a practical matter,
children's needs cannot be deferred until the child is returned to the
other parent. A child must be fed; a diaper must be changed; a temper
tantrum must be managed. To paraphrase one of the divorced fathers in
the film Bye Bye Love, "When we were married, we played ball with the
kids for a couple of hours on Saturday, took them to McDonald's, and
kissed them goodnight. Now we do everything." 69 His point is that this
makes his children even more precious to him, but he is clearly daunted
by his new responsibilities. Any story which suggests that fathers can
play an active role in their children's lives after divorce without coping

with these new responsibilities sets fathers up for failure.
The assumption that the man will continue as breadwinner,
maintaining the family's pre-divorce standard of living, is also false.
Even if he were contributing at pre-divorce levels, it is obviously more

expensive to maintain two households than one. In fact, support awards
generally take the father's own expenses into account and require him to
contribute substantially less to the household. 0 Most fathers fail to meet
even this reduced obligation. Nor is the nurturer/breadwinner model of
the unitary family useful here. Rather, those fathers who assume
substantial childcare responsibilities are more likely to support their
had a divorce/separation rate of thirty-eight per thousand marriages, compared with twenty-one for
White women. See also Joseph W. Scott & Albert Black, Deep Structures of African-American
Family Life: Female and Male Kin Networks, in THE BLACK FAMILY, supra note 5, at 201, 201
(observing that most parents in single-parent Black families have never been married).
68. Cf. Dowd, supra note 57, at 60-63 (stating that the realities of the post-divorce
relationship between the spouses is "starkly at odds" with the presumption that marriage is a
partnership among equals who share responsibilities, and that the "pattern of divorce is one of
striking inequality, split along clear gender lines"). Professor Dowd suggests that divorce law
makes the similarly unrealistic assumptions that "the burden of parenting will be equally
distributed between two independent self-supporting adults." Id. at 61; see also supra note 47.
69. BYE BYE LovE (Twentieth Century Fox 1995). Divorce is a consciousness-raising
experience for men as well as for women. See, e.g., ARENDELL, supra note 48, at 178-87
(providing narrative accounts of fathers' visitation routines); GERSON, supra note 65, at 237-40
(describing how fathers cope when they have no "woman to rely on"); E. Mavis Hetherington &
Margaret Stanley Hagan, Divorced Fathers: Stress, Coping, and Adjustment, in THE FATHER'S
ROLE: APPLIED PERSPECTIVES 103, 110-28 (Michael E. Lamb. ed., 1986) (describing the
emotional and psychological adjustment of noncustodial and custodial fathers).
70. "The level of child support has been so egregiously low that Congress has amended
federal child support laws five times since 1980." Carbone, supra note 53, at 191 (footnote
omitted). But see Thompson, supra note 55, at 211 ("[Fathers] question the increasing
coerciveness of child support enforcement procedures without equally helpful avenues to ensure
that their visitation privileges are not undermined or restricted by a former spouse.").
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children than those who do not.7 1

The story of the unitary family imposes similarly impractical
responsibilities on the mother at divorce.7 She is supposed to continue

as caregiver, although her task is much more complicated, and she
typically receives much less support.7 She is expected to provide

emotional and physical sustenance to children in crisis, whose
emotional needs are often overwhelming.74 Visitation provides a vivid
and commonplace example of the magnitude of the demands imposed
on the mother after divorce. Prior to divorce, most women assume
primary caretaking responsibility for their children, and they relinquish
responsibility to their husbands in carefully controlled doses." Many
divorced women do not trust their former husbands with their children.
At visitation, the divorced mother is required to relinquish control over
her children to a man she may no longer trust at a time when the
children are most at risk. Moreover, this temporary relinquishment
rarely provides the mother with any real respite. Because she usually

retains primary custodial responsibility, it is left to her to deal with the

71. As of 1993, men headed only 12.5% of all single parent households. See GERSON, supra
note 65, at 9; see also Behrman & Quinn, supra note 64, at 9 ("Only 10% to 15% of divorced
fathers have their children living with them more than half of the time.").
Nurturing fathers have to deal with the lack of societal support for nurturing, particularly
nurturing by men. See Joann S. Lublin, Yea to That '90s Dad, Devoted to the Kids... But He's
Out Again?, WALL ST. J., June 13, 1995, at Al ("As fathers put work second, colleagues can
resent it; moms feel special envy."). See generally supra note 56 and infra Part iI.B.2.b. (noting
that "nurturing skills can be learned by some men").
72. For a persuasive argument that younger divorced caregivers are particularly
disadvantaged by the law's failure to adequately value "family care," see Estin, supra note 47. See
also Susan Chira, New Realities Fight Old Images of Mother, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1992, at 1
(describing the "breathtaking transformation [in motherhood] in little more than 30 years").
73. As Professor Czapanskiy ironically notes:
[S]ince a mother's caregiving is not burdensome or difficult, it makes no difference that
she does it without recognition or that she be expected to continue to perform it fully
when she starts working at a paying job.... Further, since caring for children is not a
job, there is no need to ask men to share in its performance.
Czapanskiy, supra note 16, at 1435. Since women usually work more hours than men even before
divorce, combining hours at home and in the workplace, the additional burden is particularly
onerous. See GERSON, supra note 65,at 6.
74. In one of the earliest major studies, one-third of the children were doing well, but more
than a third were significantly worse off five years after divorce. See JUDITH S. VALLERSTEIN &
SANDRA BLAKESLEE, SECOND CHANCES: MEN, WOMEN, AND CHILDREN A DECADE AFrER
DIVORCE at xvii (1989); see also JUDrTH S. WALLERSTEIN & JOAN BERLIN KELLY, SURVIVING THE
BREAKUP: How CHILDREN AND PARENTS COPE wITH DIVORCE (1980). "[For children, divorce
seems to have a somewhat greater effect than the death of a parent, largely because of the lack of
social and economic supports for divorced families." ABIGAIL TRAFFORD, CRAZY TIME:
SURVIVING DIVORCE AND BUILDING A NEw LIFE 165 (rev. ed. 1992).
75. See ARLEHOCHCHILD, THE SECOND SmrFr 15 (1989).
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logistics, as well as the consequences, of visitation. Even so, mothers
report that the major problem with visitation by 76fathers is that fathers do
to.
not visit as often as mothers would like them

The post-divorce mother is also expected to continue as household
manager while taking a substantial cut in her budget. It is widely
recognized that women on the average suffer at least a thirty percent
decline in their post-divorce standard of living. 77 The practical demands

of maintaining a household on a reduced budget force women to assume

greater breadwinning responsibilities than ever before.78 Six months or' 7a9
alimony
year of what is euphemistically known as "rehabilitative
rarely enables her to overcome the "sticky floor" as well as the "glass
ceiling" of workplace discrimination. 0
76. See Czapanskiy, supra note 16, at 1450 n.123. But see Thompson, supra note 55.
77. See ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 294. Lenore Weitzman's famous claim that
divorced women and their minor children "experience a 73 percent decline in their standard of
living in the first year after divorce" has, however, been refuted. Stephen Sugarman, Dividing
FinancialInterests on Divorce, in DIvORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 54, at 130,
149.
78. For a thoughtful discussion of the difficulties faced by working women who are also
primary caretakers, see Estin, supra note 47.
The pretense that men and women stand on equal footing at divorce effectively assigns
custodial mothers primary responsibility for both caring for and supporting their
children....
[O]f those children born to middle-class parents, many end up being raised in
conditions of relative poverty because of divorce.... The hardships divorce imposes
on middle-class women and children constitute a disaster for the poor.
Carbone, supra note 53, at 192.
79. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Francis, 444 N.W.2d 59, 63 (Iowa 1989) ("Rehabilitative
alimony was conceived as a way of supporting an economically dependent spouse through a
limited period of re-education or retraining following divorce."). The PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Proposed Final Draft 1997),
reconceives alimony as compensation for financial losses arising from the failure of the marriage,
that is, as "compensatory payments." See 22 FAM. L. REP. 1339 (1996).
80. The "sticky" floor refers to all limits on women's mobility past low-level management.
The "glass ceiling" refers to limits on women's mobility past an invisible, but solid, upper limit.
See Felice N. Schwartz, Management Women and the New Facts of Life, HARv. BUS. REV., Jan.Feb. 1989, at 65, 68; see also Tracy Anbinder Baron, Keeping Women Out of the Executive Suite:
The Courts' Failureto Apply Title VII Scrutiny to Upper-Level Jobs, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 267, 26982 (1994) (arguing that courts are at least partly responsible for this phenomenon known as the
"glass ceiling"). See generally WOMEN AS SINGLE PARENTS, supra note 67, at 7-8 (dealing with
the many problems, challenges, and barriers that single mothers confront in the courts, in labor
markets, and in housing); Paulette Thomas, United States: Success at a Huge Personal Cost,
WALL ST. J., July 26, 1995, at B 1 (stating that, according to the U.S. Labor Department, in the first
quarter of 1995, U.S. women earned only 75.9 cents for every dollar earned by men and,
moreover, women hold only 5% of senior level management jobs in America's 1,100 biggest
companies). For an international comparison, see Women in Business: A Global Report Card,
WALL ST. J., July 26, 1995, at B 1 (comparing women in Sweden, Japan, Mexico, and the U.S., in
terms of workforce participation, managerial jobs held by women, female-headed businesses, and
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For all of these reasons, both parents are usually under tremendous
stress at divorce. Children are rarely understanding.' Rather, children
are apt to be most demanding and least tolerant of parental ineptitude
while their parents are getting divorced. The children's needs-social,
psychological, and economic-may well exhaust their already depleted
parents.82
Psychoanalytic theory, which explains and justifies the unitary
family, offers little consolation for the post-divorce family. Traditional

psychoanalytic theory assumes that a gendered division of labor is not
only functional but optimal.' Thus, divorce is often seen as a failure on
the part of one or both parents to assume the appropriate gendered adult

role. This leads to self-recrimination as well as increased acrimony.
Indeed, the emphasis on gendered roles encourages each parent to

blame the other for continuing problems within the other's presumed
sphere of responsibility. The mother who needs more money, for

example, blames the father for failing to meet his breadwinning
responsibilities."4 The father, tormented by his inability to maintain a
loving relationship with his children, similarly blames the mother for
failing to teach them to love and respect him. The story of the unitary

family, which assumes the continuation of a gendered division of labor
at divorce, denies and obscures the parties' real problems.' Worse, it

confines them to roles that only compound those problems.
Family lawyers and family courts are all too aware of parents'
post-divorce dissatisfaction and of family law's inability to provide
women's wage as a percentage of men's wage).
Nor do women typically receive enough property to sustain themselves and their children.
In New York in the early 1990s, for example, property subject to distribution was usually worth
less than $25,000. See Marsha Garrison, Good Intentions Gone Awry: The Impact of New York's
Equitable DistributionLaw on Divorce Outcomes, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 621, 662-63 (1991); see
also LENORE J. WErFzMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR VOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 54-60 (1985) (noting that
marital assets generally averaged $10,000 in California in the 1980s).
81. But see infra note 130 (describing children who become small adults and take care of
their parents at divorce).
82. See authorities cited supra note 74. "[T]he estimated negative effects of divorce on
social adjustment are stronger for boys than for girls. Social adjustment includes measures of
popularity, loneliness, and cooperativeness." Amato, supra note 5, at 147; see also, e.g., infra text
accompanying notes 123-24, 126-27.
83. See KASCHAK, supranote 23, at 15.
84. Many men do, of course, fail to meet their support obligations. See DAVID L.
CHAMBERS, MAKING FATHERS PAY: THE ENFORCEMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT 71-72 (1979).
85. As Professor Carbone notes, men and women have "different financial prospects and
different perceptions of their relationship to their children [at divorce]. The feminist critique of
divorce policy, despite the disagreement on objectives, focuses on the ways in which existing law
falls to take those differences into account." Carbone, supra note 53, at 186.
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effective remedies. Appellate review is rarely available, and trial courts
impose a heavy burden on the moving party before they will reconsider
cases.8 6 Accordingly, the diligent family lawyer advises the client to
keep careful records of the other parent's derelictions, encouraging the

client to focus on the other parent's shortcomings. Thus, lawyers
encourage post-divorce parents to engage in ever more detailed
recriminations, in a downward, destructive spiral."
III.

POST-DIVORCE FAMILIES:
REMEDIAL NURTURING SKILLS

CHANGING ROLES AND

The limits of family law doctrine reflect historical deference to the
unitary family, judicial economy concerns,' 8 the relatively recent
emergence of divorce as a commonplace social phenomena, 9 and the
even more recent research on the impact and consequences of divorce."
Divorce is more than an isolated legal event, an afternoon in court, or a
settlement agreement. Divorce plays an ongoing role in structuring the
86. Under section 316 of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, maintenance or support
awards may only be modified upon "a showing of changed circumstances so substantial and
continuing as to make the terms unconscionable." UNiF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE AcT § 316, 9A
U.L.A. 489 (1987). For a discussion of the fact patterns supporting adjustments in spousal
maintenance or child support, see ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 460-63.
87. See Andrew Schepard et al., Preventing Trauma for the Children of Divorce Through
Education and ProfessionalResponsibility, 16 NoVA L. REV. 767, 770 (1992) (describing how the
"adversarial process encourages parents to degrade each other rather than cooperate around the
essential tasks of childrearing"). See generally ARENDELL, supra note 48, at 111-40 (describing
how post-divorce spousal relations can become a "war without end").
88. The courts cannot handle the docket now, let alone an expanded docket, the judicial
economy argument goes. This paradoxically assumes a tenet of the unitary family, that is, that the
autonomy of the post-divorce family is efficient, that the court's own over-crowded docket belies.
89. After all, it was not until the 1970s and the "no-fault revolution" that divorce became
readily available. See Lawrence M. Friedman, Rights of Passage: Divorce Law in Historical
Perspective,63 OR. L. REv. 649, 662-67 (1984) (discussing historical trends which produced nofault). For critiques of no-fault, see, for example, MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION
OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM 32-33 (1991) (describing the
impact of no-fault divorce on women); WErmiAN, supra note 80, at 20-28, 38-40 (stating that the
institution of no-fault divorce in California launched a legal revolution in American family law).
Cf.Linda J. Lacey, Mandatory Marriage "Forthe Sake of the Children": A FeministReply to
Elizabeth Scott, 66 TuL. L. REv. 1435, 1453-61 (1992) (criticizing the imposition of penalties on
those seeking divorce).
90. See, e.g., WALLRSTEIN & BLAKESLEE, supra note 74, at 10-11, 298-301 (dealing with
the many effects on children as a result of growing up in a family involved in a divorce); Behrman
& Quinn, supra note 64 (providing an overview of divorce which affects millions of children in
the United States and citing the process, custody and financial arrangements of divorce as factors
which need to be addressed and remedied). There are, of course, many different divorces. See, e.g.,
Janet R. Johnston, High-Conflict Divorce, 4 FuTuRE OF CHILDREN 165, 167 (1994) (describing
some of the different types of conflict at divorce).
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future for post-divorce families. As Judith Wallerstein and Sandra
Blakeslee note:
Divorce has two purposes. The first is to escape the marriage,
which has grown intolerable for at least one person. The second is to
build a new life.... and this second-life-building aspect of divorce
turns out to be far more important than the crisis. It is the long haul of
divorce that matters. 9'
Because family law establishes the terms and conditions of postdivorce families' relationships, it owes them some support as they try to
build new lives and struggle with the "long haul of divorce." This is
reflected in the burgeoning adoption of post-divorce parent education
programs.' These programs typically focus on the immediate postdivorce coping skills of parents and children." This is a beginning, but it

91. WALLERSTEIN & BLAXEsLEE, supranote 74, at xi.
92. See Elrod & Spector, supra note 6, at 742 n.5 (citing Schepard & Schlissel, supra note 6
and listing 463 court-connected programs); see also authorities cited supra note 6. Like most
family law innovations, this has generated more commentary on the state level than on the national
level. See, e.g., Lynne M. Kenney & Diana Vigil, A Lawyer's Guide to TherapeuticInterventions
in Domestic Relations Court, 28 ARZ. ST. L.J. 629, 633-35 (1996) (noting the development of
family courts in many states including Rhode Island, Hawaii, New Jersey, Delaware, South
Carolina, Florida, Vermont, and Virginia); Hon. Sondra Miller et al., Parent Education and
Custody Effectiveness (P.E.A.C.E.): A PreliminaryReport to the New York Legal Community,
N.Y. ST. B.J., Feb. 1996, at 42 (stating that P.E.A.C.E. programs are being implemented in many
communities throughout New York on a pilot program basis); Slezak, supra note 6, at 70
(describing a recently enacted three-hour mandatory parent education program for divorcing
parents in Oregon); Laurie Arial Tochiki, Kids Are First,HAW. BJ., July 1995, at 6 (describing a
new program in Hawaii requiring children age six through eighteen to attend educational programs
with their parents).
The need for such education is not limited to post-divorce parents. "[Jjudges, lawyers, and
mediators ... need a better appreciation of child development.., and the needs of children during
and after divorce." Behrman & Quinn, supra note 64, at 8. The crucial role of education in family
law has also been recognized by lawyers representing lesbian and gay parents. See, e.g., Nancy D.
Polikoff, Educating Judges About Lesbian and Gay Parenting: A Simulation, I LAW &
SExIALrry 173, 174 (1991) (describing the author's participation in a District of Columbia
judicial education program on lesbian and gay parenting). These programs may be seen as part of a
larger project of family education programs intended to teach nurturing skills. It is noteworthy
that unlike such programs in high schools before the women's movement, these are addressed to
boys as well as to girls. See, e.g., Doll Is Reality Check for Teens, KNoXVLLE NEIS-SENTINEL,
Nov. 25, 1995, at B4 (describing "'Baby Think It Over,' an educational product used by schools
and social service agencies to give teens a brief but eye-opening test run at being a parent"); Ellen
Joan Pollock, Kids Get Education in Adult Relationships, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 1994, at BI
(describing a program where high school students take a course on techniques for developing
healthy peer relationships, including techniques to keep peace between angry partners).
93. See Salem et al., supra note 6, at 130.
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offers little guidance or support for dealing with the "long haul of
divorce. ' 94
This Part suggests a constructive next step, a practical guide for
post-divorce parent/child relations. The specific practice described here
is based on a popular "how-to" manual for improving nurturing skills,
How to Talk So Kids Will Listen, & Listen So Kids Will Talk ("How to
Talk").95 The practice developed by Adele Faber and Elaine Mazlish
focuses on teaching parents to empathize with their children, to respect
children's autonomy, and to engage in constructive problem solving
with their children-teaching children how to solve their own problems
and improving their own problem-solving skills in the process of doing
SO.96

94. Post-divorce education programs range from 25-minute videotapes to 18-hour seminars.
See Woo, supra note 6, at B8. Dr. Judith S. Wallerstein considers a four-hour course useful, but
would prefer a more ambitious series of required seminars. See Lawson, supra note 6, at C1. I
prefer the phrase "nurturing skills" rather than "parent education" first, to suggest the applicability
of these skills beyond a "parenting" context; that is, people other than parents nurture, and
nurturing takes place in many other relationships. Indeed, a basic premise of this Article is that the
skills learned in the post-divorce program will be applied more broadly by the participants. See
Nadine Taub, From ParentalLeaves to Nurturing Leaves, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE
381, 398-99 (1984-1985). Second, I prefer "skills" to "education" because the former suggests
ongoing practice and the experiential acquisition of particular approaches and techniques, rather
than a more abstract, intellectual mastery.
95. ADELE FABER & ELAINE MAZLISH, How TO TALK SO KIDS WILL LISTEN & LISTEN SO
KIDS VILL TALK (1980) [hereinafter FABER & MAZLISH, How TO TALK]. They are also the authors
of BETWEEN BROTHERS & SISTERS: A CELEBRATION OF LiE's MOST ENDURING RELATIONSHIP
(1989) [hereinafter FABER & MAZLISH, BROTHERS & SISTERS]; LIBERATED PARENTS/LIBERATED
CHILDREN (1974); and SIBLINGS WrHouT RIVALRY: How TO HELP YOUR CHILDREN LIvE
ToGEHER So You CAN LiVETOO (1987).
96. The practices outlined in How to Talk, see infra Part II.A.1-3., are widely accepted
among developmental psychologists. Parent education courses generally focus on teaching parents
communication skills that reflect acceptance of the child, build self-esteem, promote
independence, and reduce conflict between parents and children. See, e.g., RUDOLF DREIKURS,
THE CHALLENGE OF PARENTHOOD 53 (Plume Books 1992) (1948) (discussing efficient methods of
training parents and children in conflict avoidance); DR. THoMAS GORDON, P.E.T.: PARENT
EFFEcTiVESS TRAINING: THE TESTED NEW WAY TO RAISE RESPONSIBLE CHILDREN 23 (1970)
(stating that discipline occurs through praise for achievement, encouragement following failure,
the structure of the family's daily routine, and the influence parents have in pleasant conversation
with their children); PHmIP OSBORNE, PARENTING FOR THE '90s 11-12 (1989) (introducing four
groups of parenting skills and describing four specific areas of the parent-child relationship).
The practice set out in How to Talk closely corresponds with the practices used by
"authoritarian" parents, one of four parenting types identified by developmental psychologist
Diana Baumrind. Regarded as the optimal form of parenting, an authoritarian parenting style is
characterized by high levels of affection and attentive responsiveness to the child's needs, the use
of inductive reasoning in disciplinary situations, the granting of the child's psychological
autonomy, and parental imposition of clear requirements for pro-social, responsible behavior.
Baumrind's research has demonstrated that children reared in authoritarian homes exhibit higher
levels of self-reliance and social competency than children reared in non-authoritarian homes. See
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The practice set out in How to Talk grew out of parenting classes
Faber and Mazlish attended which were conducted by well-known child
development expert Haim Ginott. 9' The authors made his teachings their

own through an ongoing series of workshops with other parents.98 I
learned about How to Talk from Dr. Andrea Remez, who was using it in
a parenting class for drug-addicted mothers in New York City. She said
that the mothers were enthusiastic about How to Talk, which they told
her enabled them to "hit their children less." 99
This practice assumes that both parents can-and should-acquire
and improve nurturing skills after divorce.'J ° Unlike psychoanalytic
theory, this assumes that nurturing skills are neither exclusively defined

by gender, nor by our early gendered experience, but develop
throughout our lives and can be acquired and improved."' It is a practice
predicated on adaptability.1 ° Rather than replicating and reinforcing the
Diana Baumrind, ParentalDisciplinaryPatternsand Social Competence in Children, 9 YOUTH &
Soc'Y 239-76 (1978). For a description of the effectiveness of How to Talk, see infra Part III.B.2.
97. Dr. Ginott was the author of several parenting guides, including BETVEEN PARENT AND
CHILD: NEW SOLUTIONS TO OLD PROBLEMS (1965); BETWEEN PARENT AND TEENAGER (1969);
GROUP PSYCHOTHERAPY wrrH CHILDREN: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PLAY-THERAPY (1961);
TEACHER AND CHILD: A BOOK FOR PARENTS AND TEACHERS (1972).
98. Thus, this practice is "grounded in women's experience," i.e., the experience of the
authors as well as that of the mothers in their workshops. See infra Part III.B.2.
99. Telephone Interview with Andrea Remez, Ph.D. (February 1992); cf.Schwartz, supra
note 5, at 94 (stating that New York's PEACE program primarily serves "educated, upper middleclass, White men and women").
100. Children of divorce are not the only ones who benefit from better nurturing. See, e.g.,
Judith H. Dobrzynski, Should I Have Left an Hour Earlier?: On Mixing Work and Life: These
Workaholics Tell All, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1995, § 3, at 1 (citing a Wharton School Study that
found that "people who placed high importance on... a good family life actually ended up
earning more money than those who were willing to sacrifice home life for their careers").
101. In focusing on a "social-psychological perspective on gender," the authors note:
In contrast to the deterministic models offered by both psychoanalysis and behaviorism,
our framework presumes a repertoire of possibilities from which individual men and
women choose different responses on varying occasions with varying degrees of selfconsciousness. In other words, gender related behaviors are a process of individual and
social construction.
Kay Deaux & Brenda Major, A Social-Psychological Model of Gender, in THEORETICAL
PERSPECrIVES ON SEXUAL DIFFERENCE, supra note 2, at 91.
102. This includes adaptability to different ethnic and cultural contexts.
The tension is this: The more [parent education] programs tailor their message to
specific populations, the more diluted the unifying themes (e.g., keeping children out of
the middle of parental conflict) on which most programs are premised may become....
Programs must be prepared to function in an increasingly diverse society.... It is
imperative that providers develop an inclusive process, such as an advisory committee,
by which to carefully consider the implications of course content.
Salem et al., supra note 6, at 15-16; see also Schwartz, supra note 5 (describing how parent
education programs may need to be adapted or modified to serve the Latino community).
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assumptions
of the unitary family, this practice challenges and subverts
03
them.

A.

Practice

1. Empathy
a. Recognizing a Child's Feelings
According to How to Talk, parents can empower their children and
"engage their cooperation" by empathizing with them. The basic task
for parents is to help children recognize and deal with their own
feelings. Although few would deny that there is a "[d]irect connection
between how kids feel and how they behave,"' ' parents habitually
refuse to accept children's feelings as authentic."5 Instead, parents tell
them, "You don't really feel that way," "You're just saying that because
you're tired," or "There's no reason to be so upset."' ° As the authors put
it, "[We] ...[tell our] children over and over again not to trust their
own perceptions, but to rely upon [ours] instead."'"
How to Talk shows how the parents' failure to empathize makes

103. How to Talk is not, of course, a panacea. It does not assure poor children decent homes
or schools. It does not assure abused children safety. See, e.g., Symposium: Meeting the Basic
Needs of Children: Defining Public and Private Responsibilities, 57 Omo ST. L.J. 317 (1996)
(discussing the appropriate allocation of responsibility between the public and private sector for
the welfare of children). See generally SYLVIA ANN HEWLEr, WHEN THE BOUGH BREAKS: THE
COST OF NEGLECTING OUR CmILDREN (1991) (calling attention to the plight of American children
and, more specifically, the effects suffered by children of divorced and overworked parents). Nor,
as described below, is it appropriate for every post-divorce family. See infra Part II.B.2.
Hov to Talk, however, may make life a little better even for those children whose most
pressing needs are beyond its scope. Moreover, its promise is not limited to middle-class or white
children. Research has shown that despite differences in ethnicity, class, and family structure,
youth whose parents are accepting, firm, and democratic are more self-reliant and psychologically
adjusted than youth whose parents are uninvolved, rejecting, and overly harsh or lax in their
discipline. See, e.g., Laurence Steinberg et al., AuthoritativeParenting andAdolescent Adjustment
Across Varied Ecological Niches, 1 J. RES. ON ADOLESCENCE 19, 20-36 (1991). As Professor
Woodhouse reminds us, even the simplest skills can make an enormous difference in the quality of
parenting. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Home Visiting and Family Values: The Powers of
Conversation, Touching, and Soap, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 253, 263 (1994). These skills, however,
are not innate; they must be learned.
104. FABER & MAZLISH, How TO TALK, supra note 95, at 1.
105. A major focus in parent education has been on increasing the parents' awareness of the
child's perspective. See Jack Arbuthnot & Donald A. Gordon, Does MandatoryDivorce Education
for ParentsWork?, 34 FAm. & CONCILIATION Crs. REv. 60, 68 (1996).
106. FABER & MAZLISH, HOW TO TALK, supra note 95, at 2.
107. Id. at 3.
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children resentful and erodes their self-esteem. It demonstrates the
actual cost with role-playing exercises that require parents to "go back
in time and pretend you're a child listening to your parent[s] speak. Let
the words sink in. What do they make you feel?"'' There are empty
lines in the book, as in a workbook, to write down responses. For
example:
"(1) Name-calling:
It's below freezing today and you're wearing a light jacket! How
dumb can you get?
As a child, I'd feel

_

,_

The workbook also contains examples of blaming and accusing
("Your dirty fingerprints are on the door again! Why do you always do
that? ... What's the matter with you anyway?"); threats ("Just you
touch that lamp once more and you'll get a smack.");... commands
("You still didn't take out the garbage? Do it now!... What are you
waiting for? Move!");" lecturing and moralizing ("Do you think that
was a nice thing to do-to grab that book from me? I can see you don't
realize how important good manners are.");" warnings ("Don't climb
there! Do you want to fall?");"14 martyrdom statements ("Wait 'til you5
have children of your own. Then you'll know what aggravation is.");"
sarcasm ("Is that what you're wearing-polka dots and plaid? Well you
ought to get a lot of compliments today.");.. 6 and prophecy ("Just keep
on being selfish. You'll see, no one is ever going to want to play with
you. You'll have no friends."). 17 Instead of criticizing these tactics, the
authors provide sample reactions from other adults. There is, of course,
no "right" answer, but the sample reactions confirm that these methods
are usually counterproductive.
Instead, How to Talk suggests four simple techniques for
108. Id.at5l.
109. Id. These exercises show parents the value of empathy experientially. For a
psychologist's explanation of the crucial role of empathy in social life, altruism, and psychological
health, see GOLEMAN, supra note 25, at 96-106. In contrast, the inability to empathize, if severe
enough, makes it possible to victimize others. See id. at 106-10.
110. FABER & MAZmSH, How TO TALK, supra note 95, at 51.
111. Id.
112. Id. at52.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at53.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 54.
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recognizing the child's feelings and reality:
"1. Listen with full attention.
2. Acknowledge their feelings with a word-'Oh' ...
'I see.'
3. Give their feelings a name.
'5
4. Give them their wishes in fantasy."'

'Mmm'...

Each of the four techniques requires the adult to pause and to
consciously consider the contemporaneous but very different experience
of the child."9 By empathizing with the child, the adult validates the
child's experience. This empowers the child: "When we acknowledge a
child's feelings, we do him a great service. We put him in touch with his
inner reality. And once he's clear about that reality, he gathers the
strength to begin to cope."'"2
b. Engaging Cooperation
Empowering the child in this way, according to the authors, is the
key to "engag[ing] cooperation," convincing the child that she and the
parent are on the same side, rather than opponents. This eventually leads
to the sense that family tasks are the child's as well; that she is part of a
cooperative enterprise.
In the practical terms used throughout the text, the authors suggest
that parents employ the following techniques to "engage cooperation":
"1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Describe.
Give information.
Say it with a word.
feelings.
Talk about your
2
Write a note."' '

The authors explain each suggestion, as they do throughout the
book, and provide examples for further clarification. "Describe," for
example, means pointing out that there is milk on the floor, rather than
saying, "You spilled the milk." The focus is not on blame, but on an

118. Id. at 9.
119. The role-playing exercises that enable the adult to replicate the child's experience
provide a form of experiential learning. I have explored elsewhere the importance of such
experiential learning for law students. See Barbara Stark, What We Talk About When We Talk
About War, 28 STAN. J. INT'L L. 91, 114-18 (1996) (reviewing THOMAS EHRLICH & MARY ELLEN
O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE (1993)).
120. FABER & MAZLISH, HOW TO TALK, supranote 95, at 25.
121. Il at 56.
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objective, external situation, " communicating to the child that the adult
is upset and explaining what can be done about it.'3 The adult helps the
child deal with feelings by first looking at the situation from the child's
perspective. The adult teaches the child to empathize by empathizing
with her.

This skill is desperately needed at divorce. Maintaining postdivorce families requires an enormous amount of work. Responsibilities
once shared by two adults, however unfairly, are now assumed by one

or simply neglected. Two households mean two refrigerators to fill, two
homes to clean. For a child in joint custody or with overnight visitation
it means two routines to be mastered, two places to lose homework and
socks. Just when the parent is feeling most burdened, the child is most
likely to balk. As Wallerstein and Blakeslee note, disobedience,
messiness, and "acting out" are common at divorce. 2 4 It is an
emotionally tumultuous time, and "[c]hildren get angry at their parents,
experiencing divorce as indifference to their needs and perceiving
parents sometimes realistically as self-centered and uncaring, as
preaching a corrupt morality, and as weak and unable to deal with
problems except by running away.""'
c. Alternatives to Punishment
Children often express their anger in destructive ways and already
stressed parents are likely to punish them for it. As How to Talk points
out, and as the accompanying exercises demonstrate, children generally
respond to punishment with resentment or a diminished sense of selfworth. The use of physical force by a parent, moreover, legitimates the
use of force against someone smaller and weaker.'2 6
122. See id. at 79. The "objective situation" is a phrase at which many feminists balk. See,
e.g., Jana B. Singer, The Privatizationof Family Law, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 1443, 1535 (criticizing
the notion that all women have the same need and propensity for the female role in a traditional
family structure). We are all too aware of the contingency of perspectives and the risks of asserting
"foundational" authority. But see Ruth Colker, The Female Body and the Law: On Truth and Lies,
99 YALE L. 1159, 1164 (1990) (reviewing ZLLAH R. EISmNSTEm, THE FEMALE BODY AND THE
LAW (1988) (arguing that "feminist theory needs to rely on objective truths")). "Objectivity" may
seem irrelevant when the bathtub is overflowing, but it remains an issue to be grappled with, in
practice and in theory.
123. Again implicit, but critical here, is the assumption of the child's autonomy, the child's
separate perception and independent abilities, the premise that the adult needs only to point out
that something needs to be done and give the child the room-and if necessary, the tools-to
figure out how to do it. See infra text accompanying notes 129-39.
124. See WALLERSTEIN & BLAXESLEE, supra note 74, at 291.
125. Id.
126. Some parents regard corporal punishment as permissible, even necessary. See, e.g., In re

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol26/iss2/3

30

Stark: Guys and Dolls: Remedial Nurturing Skills in Post-Divorce Practic
1997]

REMEDIAL NURTURING SKILLS

Just when the need for effective discipline becomes sharpest, the
costs may become too high. As Andre Dubus poignantly observes:
[HI]e saw that, in his eight years as a father, he had been attentive,
respectful, amusing; he had taught and disciplined. But no: not now:
when they were too loud in the car or they fought, he held onto his
anger, his heart buffetted with it, and spoke calmly, as though to
another man's children, for he was afraid that if he scolded as he had
before, the day would be spoiled, they would not have the evening at
home, the sleeping in the same house, to heal them; and they might not
want to go with him next day or two nights from now or two days.
Instead of punishment, How to Talk suggests the following steps:
"1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Point out a way to be helpful.
Express strong disapproval (without attacking character).
State your expectations.
Show the child how to make amends.
Give a choice.
Take action.
Allow the child to experience the consequences of his
misbehavior.""
Express yourfeelings strongly

State your expectations

Marriage of Hadeen, 619 P.2d 374, 375 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980) (relying on church teachings of a
"strict code of discipline" to defend the practice of spanking children); Schwartz, supra note 5, at
98 ("The use of physical punishment on children is a widely accepted norm in the Latino
culture."). Child development experts generally do not endorse the use of physical punishment.
Nevertheless, recognizing that many parents rely on such punishment as a means of discipline,
Osborne discusses the conditions under which such punishment is most effective. See OSBORNE,
supranote 96, at 189-208.
127. ANDRE Duus, The Winter Father,in SELECTED STORIES 27 (1988).
128. FABER & MAZLISH, How TO TALK, supra note 95, at 94.
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Show the child how to make amends.

Reprinted, by permission, from ADELE FABER & ELAINE MAZLISH, How TO TALK So KiDs WiLL
LISTEN & LisTEN So KIDs WILL TALK, 98. © 1980 by Rawson, Wade Publishers.

The stories used to illustrate these steps could easily be those of
divorced parents. The propensity of children to forget to pick up after
themselves, for example, is only exacerbated by tight visitation
schedules.
2. Autonomy
The chapter on "Encouraging Autonomy" recognizes that the
parent/child relationship is inherently and necessarily unstable. A vital
part of the parent's job is to assure her own obsolescence. This is not a
simple matter of leaving the child alone. Rather, it requires the parent to
recognize the child's desire for independence and her growing but
uneven capacity for self-sufficiency: to respect, in short, the child's
development, however lurching and nonlinear its progress."'
Again, the task is particularly difficult at divorce. Many children
regress, i.e., return to a developmental level which they remember,
accurately or not, as more comfortable. Other children assume an adult
persona, a facade, long before they are able to develop an authentic,
autonomous self."3° Many children are simply left on their own. 3 '

129. For a description of the ways in which the law generally disempowers children, see Ira
C. Lupu, The SeparationofPowers and the Protection of Children,61 U. CHl. L. REv. 1317, 1318
(1994). For a stimulating collection of articles on the relationship between legal and psychological
perspectives on autonomy, see Symposium: IntegratingLegal and Psychological Perspectiveson
the Right to PersonalAutonomy,37 V.L. L. REV. 1563 (1992).
130. See WALLERsT=a & BLAXmsLEE, supra note 74, at 184-204. This reversal of parental
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How to Talk provides guidelines for recognizing and supporting a
child's developing sense of autonomy. At the same time, its suggestions
are carefully tuned to the child's responses. How to Talk avoids
imposing responsibilities on the child which will overwhelm her, doom
her to failure, and erode the self-confidence that makes it possible to
take further risks, to assume additional responsibilities, to develop a
sense of independence. Again, a handy list is provided:
"1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Let children make choices.
Show respect for a child's struggle.
Don't ask too many questions.
Don't rush to answer questions.
Encourage children to use sources outside the home.
Don't take away hope."' 3 2

Through a series of exercises, cartoons, and practical illustrations,
How to Talk assures readers that the skills involved in encouraging
autonomy can be taught, learned, and strengthened. One exercise, for
example, presents situations that often inspire parents to take over for
the child, to assume responsibility, and deprive the child of the
satisfaction of finding her own solution. The reader is invited to ask
himself what kind of response would keep the child dependent and what
kind of response might encourage autonomy:
Child: "I was late for school today. You have to wake me up earlier
tomorrow."

and child roles is referred to as "parentification" of the child. See WnIAM F. HODGES,
INTERVENTIONS FOR CHILDREN OF DIVORCE: CUSTODY, ACCESS, AND PSYCHOTHERAPY 204 (2d

ed. 1991). In essence, the divorced parent comes to rely on the child as a source of comfort.
Hodges refers to the following common patterns in divorced families: children may join the parent
in bed; parent discusses his or her intimate relationships and work problems with child; child may
soothe the depressed parent; child takes on household responsibilities such as cooking and
laundry. See LAURENCE STEINBERG & ANN LEVINE, You AND YOUR ADOLESCENT: A PARENT'S
GUIDE FOR AGES 10 to 20, at 54 (1990) (observing that divorced mothers may lean on their
children and often treat their adolescent daughters as their best friends). Hodges and Steinberg
recommend against such practices because they enmesh the child with a dependent parent and
potentially restrict the development of autonomy by drawing the child into the parent's problems
and making the child feel obligated to the needy parent when he or she should be engaging in
developmentally appropriate activities. In other words, it hinders the differentiation process.
131. See generally Ellen Graham, Working Parents' Torment: Teens After School, WALL ST.
J., May 9, 1995, at B1 ("More than three-quarters of children aged 14 to 17 have mothers who are
employed, up from 56% in 1975. Most of these youngsters are on their own after school.").
132. FABER & MAZLISH, How TO TAUK, supra note 95, at 139; see also OSBORNE, supranote
96, at 125-42 (arguing that parents can support children in their struggles for independence by
praising their efforts, respecting their individuality, and declining to rescue the children from
difficult situations).
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"I don't like eggs and I'm tired of cold cereal."
"I'm not going to eat breakfast anymore."
'
"Is it cold out? Do I need a sweater?" 33
These are the same kinds of problems that clients complain about
after divorce, made more annoying by a child's barbed comparison: "I
was late for school today. Mom always wakes me up earlier." How to
Talk provides the divorced parent with an alternative to a defensive
response. Instead, it encourages the parent to focus on whether the
response will keep the child dependent or encourage her autonomy.
As in the section on empathy, these exercises function as a form of
consciousness-raising, educating the parent about the stages of

developing autonomy. Some parents-especially, perhaps, fathers
raised in unitary families1-are likely to take autonomy for granted.

Indeed, they may take it too much for granted, quickly becoming
impatient with children's necessarily fumbling first efforts. Such may
even put their children at risk. 3 How to Talk shows that encouraging a
child's autonomy requires specific skills and it provides the parent with
a set of specific tools. At the same time, these tools sensitize a parent to
the parameters of the child's autonomy, as distinguished from the
adult's own. The tools for encouraging the child's autonomy are also
helpful for the parent who finds it difficult to encourage or model
autonomy--especially, perhaps, mothers raised in unitary families.'36
3. Problem solving
Instead of conceptualizing a conflict over behavior as a clash of
wills, How to Talk suggests that parents approach it as a problem,
something that both the child and the adult probably feel bad about and
would like to avoid if their respective interests can be accommodated.'37

This list is arranged not as alternatives, but as steps in a process:
133. FABER & MAZLISH, How TO TALK,supra note 95, at 149.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 24-32.
135. My two-year-old neighbor had somehow climbed seven feet up in an old maple tree. His
father was mowing the lawn. His mother rushed from the house to the tree, reaching up to coax the
child to crawl down to a point where he could safely jump into her arms. She asked her husband if
he was out of his mind. He told her that if the child could climb up that high, he could climb
down.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 26-27. As Baumrind observed, overly high levels of
maternal nurturance may inhibit autonomy and intellectual achievement of girls. See Diana
Baumrind, New Directions in Socialization Research, 35 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 639 (1980). But see
McBride-Chang et al., supra note 36, at 71-72 (arguing that in the past, a mother's behavior was
erroneously thought to cause child autism, homosexuality, stuttering, and schizophrenia).
137. More than one hundred divorce education programs gave "moderate coverage" to "skill
building in conflict management and parenting." Braver et al., supra note 7, at 5 1.
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Step I: Talk about the child's feelings and needs.
Step II: Talk about your feelings and needs.
Step III: Brainstorm together to find a mutually agreeable solution.
Step IV: Write down all ideas-without evaluating.
Step V: Decide which suggestions you like, which you don't like and
which you plan to follow through on."'
These suggestions for problem solving are familiar to lawyers who
have used mediation, negotiation, or other forms of alternate dispute
resolution ("ADR"). ADR is ubiquitous in family practice, as it is in any
context where the preservation of an ongoing relationship is important.
Problems are being solved rather than punishments meted out. Parents,
along with their children, learn new ways of dealing with problems and
with each other.
The practical nurturing skills set out above, on empathizing with
children and encouraging their autonomy, are requisites for effective
problem solving. The child is always portrayed as a separate,
autonomous self, toward whom the adult is deeply empathetic. While
How to Talk recognizes that conflicts arise in an infinite variety of
contexts, the autonomy of each problem solver, and her willingness and
ability to empathize with the others, is emphasized as critical to any
workable resolution: "The key word is respect-for my child, for
myself, and for the unlimited possibilities of what can happen when two
'
people of goodwill put their heads together."139
B. Feminist Theory
This section compares feminist conceptions of empathy, autonomy,
and problem solving with the conceptions developed in How to Talk. It
also explains how feminists have used these conceptions to expose and
challenge gendered stereotypes in family law and how each conception
has evolved as it has been applied in increasingly diverse family law
contexts. 40 I am not suggesting a "new paradigm," or even a coherent
138. FABER & MAZLISH, How TO TALK, supra note 95, at 102; see also GORDON, supra note
96, at 200-07 (stating that the benefits of mutually agreed upon solutions to parent-child conflicts
include: (1) an increased motivation in children to carry out solutions; (2) an increased chance of
finding a high-quality solution; (3) the development of children's thinking skills; (4) reduced
hostility and more love; (5) a reduced need for parental enforcement; and (6) targeting the real
problem(s) bothering the child).
139. FABER & MAZLISH, HowTO TALK, supra note 95, at 122.
140. By feminists, I mean those commentators who identify themselves as feminists or who
are expressly "committed to the participation of women as genuine equals in our society." MARY
BECKER ET AL.,

CASES AND

MATERIALS ON FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE: TAKING WOMEN

SERIOUSLY at v (1994). Thus, feminist work would include, among others, the rich critiques of
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feminist critique. Rather, a basic premise here is that feminist critiques
of family law are as diverse and wide-ranging as feminism itself."'
Nevertheless, I will show that the simple skills set out in How to Talk fit

easily within the larger, more problematic, feminist conceptions. How to
Talk may be understood, accordingly, as a kind of "lowest common

denominator," or "bottom line" feminist theory.4 2 By effectively
introducing bottom line feminist conceptions in a new context, that is,
intra-family relations, How to Talk exposes and challenges gender
stereotypes on a practical, experiential level.
This notion of bottom line consensus is borrowed from

international law, in which customary international law ("CR") is
defined as the actual practice of nation States accompanied by their
belief that such practice is legally mandated. 43 The strength of a
particular customary international law norm depends upon the degree of

contemporary family law developed by Katharine Bartlett, June Carbone, Karen Czapanskiy,
Nancy Dowd, Jane Ellis, Martha Field, Martha Fineman, Lisa Ikemoto, Martha Minow, Fran
Olsen, Twila Perry, Milton Regan, Dorothy E. Roberts, Reva B. Siegal, Jana B. Singer, Joan
Chalmers Williams, and Barbara Bennett Woodhouse.
141. See DAPHNE PATAI & NORETFA KOERTGE, PROFESSING FEMINISM: CAUTIONARY TALES
FROM THE STRANGE WORLD OF WOMEN'S STUDIES (1994) (describing the balkanization of
feminist academia); see also JANE FLAX, DISPUTED SUBJECTS: ESSAYS ON PSYCHOANALYSIS,
POLITICS AND PHILOSOPHY 3, 6 (1993) (deploring feminists' demonization of each other); infra
text accompanying note 148. For a cogent discussion of the liberal/radical divide in feminist
theory, see Cynthia V. Ward, The Radical Feminist Defense of Individualism, 89 Nw. U. L. REV.
871 (1995) (challenging the "assumed link between the gender hierarchy and the rejection of
liberalism"). Family law itself is in flux, moreover, inviting and inspiring wide-ranging critiques.
See, e.g., FOUND. FOR A COMPASSIONATE SOC'Y, FEMINIST FAMILY VALUES FORUM (Susan Bright
ed., 1996) (providing four eminent feminists' views on critical issues for liberating the family);
Symposium, New Directions in Family Law, 81 VA. L. REV. 2043 (1995).
142. This should not be mistaken for an endorsement of essentialism. As Linda Lacey
reminds us, "Feminist authors should not let a healthy caution about essentialism keep us from
talking about what we have in common, because it is exploration of similar experiences (and
differences) that gives us a sense of identity and purpose." Linda J. Lacey, Mimicking the Words,
But Missing the Message: The Misuse of Cultural Feminist Themes in Religion and Family Law
Jurisprudence,35 B.C. L. REV. 1, 48 (1993). As Regenia Gagnier observes, "mhe bottom line of
feminism is that the oppression of women exists, and its normative project is to make the world
better for women. On this point feminists agree, although many of us would extend the
emancipatory project beyond women." Regenia Gagnier, Feminist Postmodernism: The End of
Feminism or the Ends of Theory?, in THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL DIFFERENCE, supra
note 2, at 21, 24.
143. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900) (dispute involving coast fishing vessels);
see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102(2) (1986) ("Customary international law results from a general and consistent practice of
states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation."). For a provocative, but ultimately
misguided, critique of CIL as binding law, see Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary
InternationalLaw as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modem Position, 110 HARV. L.
REV. 815 (1997).
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consensus it has achieved. General norms, such as the norm against
44 More
torture, are widely accepted, and thus considered strong CL.'
specific norms, such as a norm condemning a particular act as torture,
are less widely accepted, and thus considered weak CIL.'45 The
substance of CL changes and evolves as normative consensus changes
and evolves. CIL has been used by other commentators to illuminate
domestic contexts.' 6 Its use is particularly apt in the context of family
law because like international law, family law is basically shaped and
governed by normative consensus, rather than bright line legal rules' 4 7
The argument here is that the general norm set out in How to
Talk-that is, that people should be treated with empathy and with
respect for their autonomy and problem-solving capabilities-is widely
accepted by feminists. While feminists' understandings of empathy,
autonomy, and problem solving are wide-ranging and in flux, there is
sufficient consensus at this point to treat these as important feminist
norms. Feminists may well argue, however, about the more specific
meaning of these norms-what it means to treat a particular person with

empathy in a specific situation, for example.'48

144. See Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 37-40 (2d ed.
1987).
145. Feminists have argued, for example, that rape should be considered an act of torture, but
this has not achieved the requisite consensus to qualify as CIL. See BECKER ETrAL., supra note
140, at 897. Indeed, there is no customary international law norm against gender discrimination,
although a substantial body of treaty law exists against it. See, e.g., Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of DiscriminationAgainst Women, G.A. Res. 180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No.
46, at 193, U.N. Doc A/34/46 (1979). For an insightful analysis, see Rebecca J. Cook,
Accountability in InternationalLmv for Violations of Women's Rights by Non-state Actors, in
RECONCEIVING REALITY: WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 93 (Dorinda G. Dallmeyer ed.,
1993).
146. For a recent article drawing on CIL in a domestic context, see David J. Bederman, The
Curious Resurrectionof Custom: Beach Access and Judicial Takings, 96 CoLUM. L. REv. 1375,
1451-52 (1996).
147. As Elizabeth Scott points out, "norms, or 'customary law,' regulate family relations
more effectively than do formal legal enactments because norms structure conduct into roles and
functions that create stable expectations." Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism, ParentalPreference,and
Child Custody, 80 CAL. L. REV. 615, 669 (1992). Cass Sunstein thoughtfully argues that "behavior
is pervasively a function of norms ....[and that] norm management is an important strategy for
"-Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96
accomplishing the objectives of law ....
COLUMi. L. REV. 903, 907 (1996).
148. See infra text accompanying note 277. These arguments, which often involve
controversial, cutting edge feminist applications, are briefly described in the subsections
captioned, "Spiraling out." See infra Parts M.B.l.a.iv., b.iii., c.iii. The phrase is from MARY
DALY, OuTERCOURSE: THE BE-DAZZLING VOYAGE (1992). See generally Nancy Levit, Defining
Cutting Edge Scholarship:Feminism and Criteria of Rationality, 71 CH.-KENT L. REv. 947, 968
(1996) (arguing for "more universal standards that place a premium on innovation, rationality, and
social consciousness").
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In international law, consensus is ascertained by looking to the
practice of states and other sources irrelevant here.'49 However, the

statute of the International Court of Justice provides that "the teachings
of the most highly qualified publicists" may be relied upon "as
subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law."'' 0 The
publication within the past few years of several first-rate texts on
feminist jurisprudence makes a similar approach possible here.'
This method should be palatable to most feminists, for my very
limited purpose, for three reasons. First, if there is one clear,

overarching theme in feminist jurisprudence,
commitment to diversity.

2

it is feminists'

Because of their deep suspicion of

universalizing norms,"' feminists might be expected to balk at the quest
for a "bottom line." How to Talk shares this deep suspicion of
universalizing norms and is similarly committed to context-specific
149. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055,
1060, T.S. No. 993.
150. Id. The United States, like all member States of the United Nations, is a party to the
Statute. Reliance on the "teachings of the most highly qualified publicists" was specifically
endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895).
151. See KATHARINE T. BARTLETT, GENDER AND LAW: THEORY, DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY
(1993); BECKER ET AL., supra note 140; MARY JOE FRUG, WOMEN AND THE LAW (1992).
In accordance with this approach, the citations supporting feminist propositions in the
remainder of this Part will primarily be to these three texts, to show that the cited propositions are
recognized by the "most highly qualified publicists." Propositions which do not purport to reflect
such consensus, but are rather on the more controversial, cutting edge, see, e.g., infra Parts
I.B.l.aiv., b.iii., c.iii., are cited conventionally to the primary sources. See supra note 148 and
accompanying text. See generally CAROL SMART, FEMINISM AND THE POWER OF LAW (1989)
(encouraging feminist discourse and arguing that feminist jurisprudence should reject existing
parameters of the law).
152. See BARTL= , supra note 151, at xxviii ("The premise of this book is that a fuller
understanding, and at least partial acceptance, of numerous perspectives on law and gender is the
most promising precondition for meaningful reform."); BECKER ET AL., supra note 140, at v
("[Olne pervasive theme [of this text] is that there are many types of feminism .... "); FRUG, supra
note 151, at vii ("IThere are lively and significant differences among the analyses and solutions
[feminist legal scholars] advocate for legal issues affecting women."); Anne C. Dailey, Feminism's
Return to Liberalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1265, 1279 (1993) (reviewing FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY:
READINGS IN LAW AND GENDER (Katharine T. Bartlett & Rosanne Kennedy eds., 1991)) ("Many
feminists now locate 'the source of community in its diversity."'). This has not always been the
case. See Kathryn Abrams, Songs of Innocence and Experience: Dominance Feminism in the
University, 103 YALE LJ. 1533, 1533 (1994) (reviewing KATIE ROIPHE, THE MORNING AFTER:
SEX, FEAR AND FEMINISM ON CAMPUS (1993)) ("Mainstream feminists first decried the race
critique as freighting their efforts with 'extra baggage' .... ").
153. As Jennifer Nedelsky notes: "Because posited sameness has always had an implicit norm
that finds some wanting, the insistence on difference is a source not only of fracturing, but of the
possibility of a solidarity whose precondition is not compliance with hierarchical norms." Jennifer
Nedelsky, The Challenges of Multiplicity, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1591, 1604-05 (1991) (reviewing
ELIzABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION INFEMINIST THOUGHT
(1988)).
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applications. Thus, the consensus sought to be ascertained here is one
predicated upon "the hard and disruptive work entailed in making

difference central,"' 4 as Jennifer Nedelsky puts it.
Second, this method reflects feminists' shared sense of women's

oppression and the need to define some common ground in order to
address this oppression. As Angela Harris reminds us, "Even a
jurisprudence based on multiple consciousness must categorize; without
categorization each individual is... isolated.., and there can be no
moral responsibility or social change."'55

Third, the purpose of this method here is to demonstrate a clear but
necessarily rough correlation between theory and practice, to show that
the practice set out in How to Talk is not only consistent with feminist
theory, but reinforces and supports feminist challenges to gendered
norms. As feminists have long recognized, "'the personal is
political."" 56 How to Talk infuses personal intra-familial relationships
with simple versions of the norms that permeate feminist theory. 57 The
correlation is necessarily rough because practice is messy, rich, and
spilling over the edges of neatly delineated theory. Most feminists,

154. Id. at 1605.
155. Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV.
581, 586 (1990). Professor Harris concludes:
Any "essential self' is always an invention; the evil is in denying its artificiality. To be
compatible with this conception of the self, feminist theorizing about "women" must
similarly be strategic and contingent, focusing on relationships, not essences. One
result will be that men will cease to be a faceless Other and reappear as potential allies
in political struggle.
Id. at 611-12 (footnotes omitted); see also Lacey, supra note 142, at 48 (encouraging women to
revel in the advances of modem feminism instead of harping on self-destructive anger towards the
female experience); Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist CriticalTheories, 42 STAN. L. REV. 617, 624-25
(1990) (noting tension between the recognition of difference and the continuing need for a
gendered critique).
156. OKIN, supranote 40, at 124 (identifying this as the "central message of feminist critiques
of the public/domestic dichotomy"); see also Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103
HARV. L. REV. 829, 864 n.143 (1990) ("[W]hat it is to know the politics of women's situation is to
know women's personal lives."); Martha Minow, Introduction, Perspectives on Our Progress:
Twenty Years of Feminist Thought, 20 HARV. WOmEN'S LJ.1, 2 (1997) (reminding readers of "the
converse truth: the political as personal"). For an examination of the ways in which endorsement
of the slogan has differed among liberal, radical, and Marxist feminists, see LINDA J. NICHOLSON,
GENDER AND HISTORY: THE Lairrs OF SOCIAL THEORY IN THE AGE OF THE FAMILY 17-42 (1986).
157. Is feminist theory "political?" As Professor Bartlett explains in "asking the woman
question":
The political nature of this method arises only because it seeks information that is not
supposed to exist. The claim that this information may exist-and that the woman
question is therefore necessary-is political, but only to the extent that the stated or
implied claim that it does not exist is also political.
Bartlett, supranote 156, at 846-47.
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however, are suspicious of overly elegant theory. 5 ' Rather, as Professor

Harris suggests, feminists prefer to "make our categories explicitly
tentative, relational, and unstable."''

9

How to Talk is unlike feminism, most glaringly, in that it neither
identifies itself as "feminist," nor does it focus on the subordination of
women. Rather, it focuses on the relationships between children, boys
as well as girls, and their parents, fathers as well as mothers. As a
practical matter, unfortunately, this failure to explicitly identify itself as
feminist probably makes it more palatable to the general public and
surely makes it less objectionable to most state legislatures'6W

Substantively, however, How to Talk is profoundly feminist.
Because it enables men as well as women to nurture, it "undermin[es]
the effect of gender on the lives of women and men."' 6' Because it posits
nurturers as "the norm of the fully human being,"' 62 it challenges the
"'separate spheres' ideology" of the unitary family; in which female
nurturers are relegated to the private sphere of the family, while male
breadwinners are relegated to the public sphere of the market.' 63 Because

it encourages women and men-and girls and boys-to be empathetic
and autonomous problem solvers, it promotes "the participation of
women as genuine equals in our society-in our educational, legal and
158. See, e.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, Introduction to AT THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW:
FEMINISM AND LEGAL THEORY at xi-xii (Martha Albertson Fineman & Nancy Sweet Thomadsen
eds., 1991) (arguing for "middle range theory"); Martha Minow, FeministReason: Getting It and
Losing It, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 47, 55 (1988) ("In established academic institutions, what has
counted as theory meets criteria of coherence, value neutrality, and abstraction that themselves
may embody the false universalism that feminists criticize."); Frances Olsen, Feminist Theory in
Grand Style, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1147, 1178 (1989) (reviewing CATHARiNE A. MACKINNON,
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987)) (concluding that MacKinnon's second book "offers a powerful
challenge" to the impoverished view that scholarship should be objective and arguing that
academics should not limit themselves to an arbitrary requirement of "(false) neutrality" when
engaging in feminist scholarship).
159. Harris, supra note 155, at 586.
160. See, e.g., SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST AMERICAN
WOMEN at xxi, xxiii (1991) (describing the pervasive, albeit uncoordinated, opposition to
feminism, including "New Right politicians... antiabortion protestors... fundamentalist
preachers .... and state legislatures"); see also ARENDELL, supra note 48, at 35 (explaining male
backlash as resistance to a loss of male dominance by those with "the most to lose.., the most
powerful members of the dominant group"' (citation omitted)).
161. FRUG, supranote 151, at vii.
162. BARTETT, supra note 151, at 1-2. The doctrinal reform proposed in this Article
incorporates this norm. See infra Part mII.C. While I am not suggesting that the lav "parent" family
members at divorce, see HAMNER & TURNER, supra note 6, at 16 (itemizing differences between
parenting and other roles), I am suggesting a more nurturing role for the law.
163. Cf. supra Part LA. (detailing the day-to-day practices of the unitary family). Separate
spheres ideology, as Professor Bartlett points out, "[draws] together the many bases for women's
subordination into a coherent whole." BARTEt, supranote 151, at 2.
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'6
political institutions, in the world of work, and in the family."'

Even if How to Talk is compatible with feminist theory, even if it
supports and promotes feminist conceptions of empathy, autonomy, and

problem solving, feminists have shown that analysis cannot stop there.
Rather, as Katharine Bartlett explains, it is necessary to directly address
the more concrete question presented by any proposed doctrinal reform:
How does How to Talk actually affect women in the specific context of
post-divorce nurturing? This section therefore concludes by "asking the

woman question.

'

1. Bottom Line Feminist Theory and How to Talk Practice
The family is the smallest social unit of the state and it has
frequently been described as a microcosm of the state,' 66 a "'little
commonwealth."" 67 Embeddedness, accordingly, is a pervasive theme
in family law. The politics and policies of the state are embedded in

family law, as Professors Olsen, Minow, and others have shown." The
norms of family law, in turn, are embedded within individual families.
Feminist theory has shown how these norms reflect and reinforce
gendered stereotypes. 69 Te unitary family, for example, normalizes and
legitimates women's role as caregiver outside, as well as within the
home."70
164. BECKER ET AL., supra note 140, at v. As Rena Uviller observed almost 20 years ago,
"Feminists of both sexes correctly perceive that unless the daily concerns of child rearing become
the shared responsibility of both father and mother, there is little chance that women with children
will achieve equality outside the home." Rena K. Uviller, Fathers' Rights and Feminism: The
MaternalPresumption Revisited, 1 HARv. WoMEN's L.J. 107, 109 (1978). The author concludes,
however, that the maternal presumption should be reinstated. See iL at 129-30; infra note 366.
165. Bartlett, supra note 156, at 837.
166. OKmN, supra note 40, at 17-22; see also Martha Minow, "Forming Underneath
Everything that Grows": Toward a History of Family Law, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 819, 819 (arguing
that family law's rules about roles and duties "historically and conceptually underlie other rules
about employment and commerce, education and welfare, and perhaps the governance of the
state"); Carol Weisbrod, Family Governance: A Reading of Kakfa's Letter to His Father,24 U.
TOL. L. REv. 689, 690-96 (1993) (describing the family as a micro legal system with intersecting
legal orders).
167. Marsha Garrison, A Contractarian Model for Children's Rights, at the International
Society of Family Law North American Regional Conference (June 13-15, 1996) (on file with the
author).
168. See Minow, supra note 166; Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of
Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1497 (1983); Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State
Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFoRM 835 (1985). As Nancy Chodorow puts it,
Sociologists tend to talk about "family" and "society" as if the family is separate from
society or an entity "inside" society, while the real, causal social structure, usually
meaning the economy, is outside the family .... Feminist theory [argues], that the
family-decomposed into gender and generational relations and hierarchy, into
political structures and emotional arenas, and in my case, into parenting
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Feminists exposed and challenged these embedded norms by
developing powerful and nuanced conceptions of autonomy, empathy,
and problem solving. They demonstrated how the embedded norms of
family law undermine women's autonomy and fail to empathize with
women by failing to recognize the actual circumstances of women's

lives. Feminists use problem solving to generate constructive
alternatives.
Just as How to Talk draws on empathy, autonomy, and problem
solving to reinvent relations within the family, feminist theory draws on
these concepts to reinvent family law. Just as How to Talk recognizes
that we can change our consciousness by changing our behavior,
feminists recognize that we can change our consciousness by changing
the law that governs our behavior. Like How to Talk, moreover,

arrangements-is a primary constituent of the male dominant social organization of
gender and, as such, is as fundamental a constituentfeature of society as a whole, of
"socialstructure"--asis the economy or the political orientation.
Lorber et al., supra note 23, at 501-02 (emphasis added).
169. As Linda Gordon notes, for example,
[Wife-beating] has been sanctioned and controlled through culture-religious
belief, law, and, most importantly, the norms of friendship, kinship, and neighborhood
groups. One assault does not make a battered woman; she becomes that because of her
socially determined inability to resist or escape: her lack of economic independence,
law enforcement services, and, quite likely, self-confidence.
LINDA GORDON, HERoEs OF THEIR OwN LivEs: THE PoLmcs AND HISTORY OF FAMILY VIOLENCE
3-4 (1988).
170. See OKIN, supra note 40, at 126. Norms may change, becoming controversial, with
reverberations at every level. No state, for example, exempts husbands from all liability for raping
their wives. See BARTLEt, supra note 151, at 521. See, e.g., People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567
(N.Y. 1984) (upholding the lower court's conviction of a husband who forcibly raped and
sodomized his estranged wife and removing the exemption for married men from the rape and
sodomy statute). Many states, however, treat rape outside of marriage and rape within marriage
differently. This norm, which assumes that a wife is always sexually available to her husband, is
embedded in state family law, like the law in Tennessee that criminalizes spousal rape only if there
is "serious injury" or if the couple is separated. SeeTENN. CODEANN. § 39-13-507(b)(1) (1991).
"Spousal rape" means the unlawful sexual penetration of one spouse by the other
where:
(A) The defendant is armed with a weapon or any article used or fashioned in a manner
to lead the victim to reasonably believe it to be a weapon;
(B) The defendant causes serious bodily injury to the victim; or
(C) The spouses are living apart and one (1) of them has filed for separate maintenance
or divorce.
Id. Such spousal rape law, in turn, is embedded in political rhetoric about deference to family
"privacy." See generally Lisa R. Eskow, Note, The Ultimate Weapon?: Demythologizing Spousal
Rape and ReconceptualizingIts Prosecution, 48 STAN. L. REV. 677 (1996) (examining the history
of the marital rape exemption and suggesting more effective ways to deal with marital rapists);
Jaye Sitton, Comment, Old Wine in New Bottles: The "Marital"Rape Allowance, 72 N.C. L. REV.
261 (1993) (urging no exemptions).
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feminists stress that this process must be subject to an ongoing critical

assessment. 7'
I am not suggesting, of course, that feminists say that women
should be treated like children. Rather, feminists say that women-and
men-should be treated like How to Talk says that children should be
treated, that is, with empathy and with respect for their autonomy and
their problem-solving capabilities. Nor am I suggesting that the specific
techniques set out in How to Talk have been adopted by feminists. It
would be absurd, and futile, for feminists to address sophisticated legal
audiences as they would address children. Rather, feminists recognize
that challenges to gendered norms demand a broad range of approaches.
The underlying substance of these approaches, however, is consonant
with the underlying substance of How to Talk. Put another way, the
substantive norms that drive How to Talk are embedded in feminist
theory. How to Talk reiterates, in terms even a child can understand,
what feminists have been saying for a long time.
a. Empathy
Like How to Talk, feminists value empathy and recognize its
special importance in relations between the powerful and the vulnerable.
Lynne Henderson describes empathy as a mode of understanding that,
unlike "[t]he 'normal' discourse of law," allows "the language of
emotion and experience."'7 According to Professor Henderson, empathy
captures three basic phenomenon: "(1) feeling the emotion of another;
(2) understanding the experience or situation of another, both
affectively and cognitively, often achieved by imagining oneself to be in
the position of the other; and (3) action brought about by experiencing
the distress of another ....
Like How to Talk, moreover, feminists recognize the crucial role of
empathy in establishing and sustaining intimate relationships. Robin
West describes the importance to women of intimate relationships,
deeply rooted in empathy, the ability to feel the emotion of another and

171. See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 156, at 846-47 (advocating the use of the "woman
question" as an effective method for exposing gender bias in workplace discrimination cases).
172. Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, in FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE 244, 245
(Patricia Smith ed., 1993).
173. Id. at 246.
174. See, e.g., BENJAMN, supra note 32, at 22-23 (discussing the need for "mutual
recognition" in mother-child relationships as well as other intimate relationships); CHODOROW,
FEMINISM AND PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY, supra note 23, at 167 (emphasizing that girls, unlike
boys, are taught early in their development to incorporate empathy into their sense of self).
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thereby understand the other's experience. 7 ' Professor West describes
the law's failure to value intimacy, and its denigration of women who

do. "[The 'fundamental contradiction' that characterize women's lives
are not reflected at any level whatsoever in contracts, torts,

constitutional law, or any other field of legal doctrine.... [Ihe Rule of
Law does not value intimacy ... .,,176 Feminists have also shown how
the law fails to recognize the costs of empathy to women, including
their actual financial sacrifices. As Professor West observes, "The

material consequence of this theoretical undervaluation of women's
values in the material world is that women are economically
impoverished. The value women place on intimacy reflects our
existential and material circumstance; women will act on that value

whether it is compensated or not. ' 7
Feminist theory also demonstrates how fathers and children suffer

from the law's lack of empathy at divorce. As Professor West notes,
"[S]eparation of the individual from his or her family, community, or
children is not understood to be a harm, and we are not protected against
it.' 7' As described above, fathers usually receive "liberal visitation" at

divorce. The law's assumption that this suffices denies the father's pain;
it makes no effort to understand his experience or situation. As fathers
soon learn, and as the emerging social science data increasingly

confirms, visitation is often stressful, 179 and it demands empathetic skills
that many fathers lack."O Perhaps more important, fathers have been
actively discouraged from acquiring these skills or even recognizing

175. See Robin West, Jurisprudenceand Gender,55 U. Cml. L. REv. 1 (1988).
176. Ik at 58.
177. Id. Justice Richard Neeley's claim that many women accept unfavorable settlements at
divorce rather than risk losing custody through adjudication has been challenged. See Mnookin et
al., supra note 54, at 71-74. But the mother who refuses to litigate because of the emotional cost to
her children is a clich6 in practice. In many cases, such mothers are probably right. See TRAFFoRD,
supra note 74, at 6 (citing Andrew 1. Cherlin, Sociology Professor at Johns Hopkins University,
who notes that "'continuing conflict really hurts children"'). The mother's empathy for her
children makes her all too able to "understand the experience or situation of [the child] ... both
affectively and cognitively." Henderson, supra note 172, at 246. The "action brought about by
experiencing the distress of another" in this context is often the mother's acceptance of less than
she would get otherwise. Id. For a rigorous and scholarly analysis of the frequency and forms of
custody/property trade-offs, see Altman, supra note 61.
178. West, supra note 175, at 59.
179. See Thompson, supra note 55, at 222-24.
180. See ARENDELL, supra note 48, at 177-78 (noting that few fathers in study had
"developed strategies for parenting and relating to their children," and thus many felt awkward,
frustrated, or guilty). "Most mothers describe ...bonds fathers have with their children [as]
simply not as strong." Becker, supra note 50, at 149 (quoting LOUIs GENmEvE & EVA MARGOLIEs,
THE MOTHERHOOD REPORT: How WOMEN FEEL ABOUT BEING MOTHERS 354 (1987)).
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them as skills worth acquiring. The law's failure, or inability, to
empathize with the father reduced to a "visitor" ironically recapitulates
the father's failure, or inability, to empathize with his children.
Most feminists would agree that empathy is gendered; i.e., that
women, in general, are more empathetic than men.' 8' Although they
disagree about the causes, most feminists would also agree that family
law lacks empathy, especially for women, and that empathy should be
more present in family law."
i. Recognizing Feelings
The techniques for cultivating empathy set out in How to Talk have
been well-mined by feminist critics of family law. Feminists have
shown, for example, that the law fails to "[llisten with full attention""' 3
to women." As Professor Becker points out:
Mothers' relationships with their children tend to be emotionally more
intense than fathers.' This is both myth and taboo in our society.
According to the maternal myth, all women find their greatest
emotional fulfillment in children, especially infants.... Mothers' love
is unconditional and nurturing ....Despite this powerful and

pervasive myth about motherhood, there is a taboo against realistically
181. This generalization is consistent with the analysis of the unitary family offered by object
relations theory. See discussion supra Part LB. But as a general, rather than a carefully qualified
proposition, it raises the question of essentialism. See infra note 332 (using empathy as an
example).
182. Because the law fails to recognize and value empathy, it fails to incorporate empathy
into legal process. Because the law recognizes and values "fairness," in contrast, fairness is viewed
as integral to legal process. Empathy is not.
183. FABER & MAZLISH, How TO TALK, supra note 95, at 9. Professor Roberts argues that
instead of persecuting drug-addicted mothers, "[tihe law should listen to the voices of poor Black
mothers and seek to eliminate their experiences of subordination." Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing
Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV.
L. REV. 1419, 1455 (1991). But see K Christopher Shen, Recent Development, The Lack of a
JudicialPolicy Addressing Maternal Drug Abuse Cases: Commonwealth v. Welch, 864 S.W.2d
280 (Ky. 1993), 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POt'Y 929 (1994) (criticizing a decision exonerating a
drug-abusing mother). Support for nurturing skills classes for drug-addicted mothers would be one
way in which the law could support these mothers. See supra text accompanying note 99. Such a
program, however, which cost New York City pennies a day per mother, was eliminated by Mayor
Rudolph Guiliani. See Telephone Interview with Andrea Remez, Ph.D., Psychotherapist (Oct.
1995).
184. The feminist metaphor of voice and silence acquires special poignancy in this context.
See MARY FIEL BELENKY Er AL-, WOMEN'S WAYS OF KNOWING: THE DEVELOPMENT OF SELF,
VOIcE, AND MIND 134 (1986) (noting that "silent" women tend to believe in the omnipotence of
external authorities). Their families are the center of many women's lives, and many desperately
want to be heard at divorce, only to be told by their lawyers that their stories are irrelevant to the
proceedings.
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exploring either the intense pleasures or the difficulties and the pains

of women's relationships with their children."

Feminist jurisprudes have drawn on proliferating studies by
feminist social scientists, "listen[ing] with full attention" to women's
diverse experiences with power relations within marriage, 8 6 battering,',
and custody mediation.'
Feminists also urged the law, and the courts interpreting the law, to
"acknowledge women's feelings," as How to Talk suggests. 9 Feminists
insisted that these feelings be acknowledged even when they are
contradictory, and even when they seem inconsistent with a previously
set bottom line." In the area of abortion, for example, there have been
briefs submitted by pro-life91 as well as pro-choice"9 feminists during
the litigation.
Like How to Talk, feminists have recognized the related but
distinct need to "give ... feelings a name."' 93 As Marie Ashe explains,
"[N]o escape from the incoherence of public discussion of pregnancy
and childbirth will be available without reference to the discourse of
185. Becker, supra note 50, at 136 (footnotes omitted). As feminist poet Adrienne Rich more
generally observes,
All human life on the planet is born of woman. The one unifying, incontrovertible
experience shared by all women and men is that months-long period we spend
unfolding inside a woman's body .... Yet there has been a strange lack of material to
help us understand and use it. We know more about the air we breath, the seas we
travel, than about the nature and meaning of motherhood.
RICH, supra note 11, at 11.
186. See Aafke Komter, Hidden Power in Marriage,3 GENDER & SOC'Y 187 (1989).
187. See BARTLETT, supra note 151, at 525-64; Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and SelfDefense: Myths and Misconceptions in Current Reform Proposals,140 U. PA. L. REV. 379 (1991)
(challenging the assertion made by many legal scholars that traditional self-defense does not apply
in cases where battered spouses kill their abusers); Symposium on Domestic Violence, 83 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1992) (discussing methodologies and analyses of studies of mandatory
arrest).
188. SeeFRuG, supranote 151, at 363-77.
189. FABER & MAZLISH, How TO TALK, supranote 95, at 9.
190. But see CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DiscoURsEs ON LIFE AND
LAW 205 (1987) ("I want you to remember your own lives. I also really want you on our side. But,
failing that, I want you to stop claiming that your liberalism, with its elitism, and your
Freudianism, with its sexualized misogyny, has anything in common with feminism.").
191. See Amici Curiae Brief of 250 American Historians at 1, Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
510 U.S. 1309 (1993) (Nos. 91-744 and 91-902) [hereinafter American Historians Brief]; BECKER
ET AL., supranote 140, at 364.
192. See Amici Curiae Brief of Feminists for Life of America at 1, Bray v. Alexandria
Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263 (1993) (No. 90-985); BECKER Er AL., supra note 140, at
369. But see MARILYN FRYE, THE Pourics OF REALITY: ESSAYS IN FEMINIST THEORY 100-02
(1983) (noting that "patriarchal loyalists" are threatened by abortion).
193. FABER & MAZIISH, HOW TO TALK, supranote 95, at 9.
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women who have, in our own bodies, experienced maternity." 94 This
process of "giving feelings a name" evolved into a rich practice of
narrative or storytelling, which many feminists view as a vital feminist
method. Like How to Talk, feminists explicitly link this practice to
empathy:
[M]any feminist scholars use narratives, or storytelling, to make public
and capable of redress what has too often been silenced and
ignored.... [B]y sharing experiences and making empathy possible,
storytelling attempts to cross the distance between subjective and
objective, the knower and the known.'95
How to Talk's last suggestion for recognizing feelings, "Give ...
wishes in fantasy,"' 96 is probably the most jarring for lawyers. This may
be translated into adult terms, however, as simply, "Express the parties'
wishes"; that is, this suggestion may be understood as a kind of
"naming," i.e., making explicit the parties' "wishes," their aspirations or
hopes for the future. In fact, the law is routinely called upon to serve
this function in actual family practice. In settlement agreements, for
example, provisions regarding visitation are routinely prefaced with
phrases such as, "To promote a strong, loving relationship between the
father and the children."'"
Feminists, similarly, recognized the need to articulate women's
"wishes," to speak aspirationally: "No political movement or ideology
could generate itself without an idealistic sense of political will and a
vision of a better future.""'9 Professor Czapanskiy offers a clear example
of such a vision in the specific context of gender neutral parenting:
The potential of the law to express a social norm as well as to make a

194. Marie Ashe, Law-Language of Maternity: Discourse Holding Nature in Contempt, 22
NEW ENG. L. Rnv. 521,526 (1988).
195. BECKER Er AL., supra note 140, at 57 (footnote omitted); see also Dailey, supra note

152, at 1285 (encouraging feminists to spread diverse stories of women from all walks of life). In
addition to telling their own stories, many feminists draw on fiction to bring depth and feeling to
legal analysis. See, e.g., ZORA NEALE HuRSTON, THEIR EYES vERE WATCHING GOD (1937)
(presenting a Black feminist analysis of domestic violence); Tillie Olsen, I StandHere Ironing, in
FAMILY MATTERS: READINGS ON FAItLY LIVES AND THE LAW 216 (Martha Minow ed., 1993). See
generally Carolyn Heilbrun & Judith Resnik, Convergences: Law, Literature,and Feminism, 99
YALE L.J. 1913 (1990) (seeking to incorporate feminist perspectives into a joint study of law and
literature).
196. FABER & MAZISH, How TO TALK, supranote 95, at 27.
197. RAOuL LIONEL FELDER, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MATRIMONIAL CLAUSES at V-1 to -20 (1997)
(1990).
198.

CONSTANCE

PENLEY,

THE

FuTURE

OF

AN

ILLUSION:

FILM,

FEMINISM,

AND

PSYCHOANALYSIS at xiv (1989).
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difference in people's conduct is substantial. By redefining parenthood
to focus on equality of responsibility and the comprehensiveness of
parental roles, the legal imagination can inspire individual people, and
the institutions in which they share, to change their conduct and move
forward to a time of greater equality and fairness.'"

Thus, "giving wishes in fantasy" corresponds to a widely
acknowledged feminist need to articulate direction, purpose, meaning,
to describe a more equal, more nurturing society and to galvanize us to
realize that vision. Indeed, without feminist theory
that gives us our
2
0
possible.
be
not
would
rest
the
fantasy,"
in
"wishes
ii. Engaging Cooperation
All of the methods set out in How to Talk for engaging cooperation
have been used by feminists in the context of family law as lawyers, as
lobbyists, and as critics. "Describe," says How to Talk, and feminists
2 2°
described the impact of the law on women. The Voices Brief,
submitted by feminists in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,m
for example, draws upon letters from almost three thousand women who
had abortions and more than six hundred friends of women who had
abortions, describing both the process through which they reached their
decisions and their actual experiences.2 "Give information," suggests
How to Talk,2 and feminists have done so, filling academic journals
25
and burying the courts in empirical data on domestic violence,
abortion,' and the economics of divorce.' "Say it with a word, 2 3 and
199. Czapanskiy, supranote 16, at 1481 (footnote omitted).
200. This explains the critical role of utopian feminist fiction in feminist theory. See, e.g.,
CHARLOTTE PERKINS GILMAN, HERLAND (1979) (describing a matriarchal utopia); URSULA K. LE
GuN, THE LEFr HAND OF DARKNESS (1969) (providing a science-fictional account of an
androgynous world). For the dark side, see MARGARET ATwOOD, THE HANDMAID'S TALE (1986)
(describing a futuristic world in which women have lost their independence). See generally
FRANCES BARTKOWSKI, FEMINIST UTOPIAS (1989) (analyzing Herland and The Handmaid'sTale).
201. See Amici Curiae Brief of Women Who Have Had Abortions at 1, Webster v.
Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (No. 88-605) [hereinafter Voices Brief].
202. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
203. See BECKER Er AL, supra note 140, at 391.
204. FABER & MAZLISH, HOW TO TALK, supra note 95, at 56.
205. See, e.g., MURRAY A. STRAUS Er AL., BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: VIOLENCE IN THE
AMERICAN FAMILY (1980); Lenore E. Walker, Battered Women and Learned Helplessness, 2
VICiMOLOGY 525 (1978-1979).
206. See American Historians Brief, supra note 191; Voices Brief, supra note 201; see also
ROSALIND POLLACK PETCHESKY, ABORTION AND WOMAN'S CHOICE: THE STATE, SEXUALITY,
AND REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM (1984) (cited by the Casey court).
207. See, e.g., THE CONSEQUENCES OF DIVORCE: ECONOMIC AND CUSTODIAL IMPACT ON
CHILDREN AND ADULTS (Craig A. Everett ed., 1991); WEITZMAN, supra note 80 (providing
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feminists have found words: "choice"; "battered woman syndrome, 2"
and "feminization of poverty." 21 How to Talk reminds parents to "talk
about ...feelings" to engage cooperation. 12 Feminists, too, "talk about
...feelings" as they try to engage the cooperation of the courts or
legislatures.2 3

Finally, How to Talk urges parents to "[w]rite a note., 214 Feminists,

too, also learned the importance of varying the medium. In addition to
litigation and scholarly writing, they have engaged in large-scale public
education efforts, including articles in state bar bulletins, 215 legislative
committee reports,2 16 and participation on panels, committees, and
boards in bar and academic associations. In fact, it is impossible to
practice, study, or enact family law without being importuned by

feminists.

statistical information on the different economic consequences for men and women resulting from
divorce); Sugarman, supra note 77, at 130 (analyzing the financial impact of no-fault divorce on
women and proposing policy considerations for remedying the financial imbalance caused by
divorce).
208. FABER& MAZLISH, How TO TALK, supra note 95, at 56.
209. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 15, at 1561 (referring to the rhetoric of choice and selfinterest); infra text accompanying notes 248-55.
210. Special Double Issue: Women's Self-Defense Law, 9 WOMEN'S RTS. L. RPR. 191 (1986)
(discussing the use of testimony from battered women in establishing a self-defense).
211. NANCY FRASER, UNRULY PRAcriCEs: POWER, DiscouRsE, AND GENDER IN
CONTEMpORARY SOCIAL THEORY 144 (1989) ("jT]he fiscal crisis of the welfare state coincides
everywhere with... a feminization of poverty."); Diana M. Pearce & Kelley Ellsworth, Welfare
and Women's Poverty: Reform or Reinforcement?, 16 J. LEGIs. 141, 142 (1990) ("The
combination of these two trends-decreased poverty among the elderly and two-parent families,
and the increased overall number of families maintained by women alone-has resulted in a
'feminization of poverty."').
212. See supra text accompanying note 121.
213. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, On the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderationsof the Aspirationsfor
Our Judges, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1877, 1923 (1988) ("How sure can we be that connection and care
are qualities we want for our judges?").
214. FABER & MAZLISH, HoW TO TALK, supranote 95, at 56.
215. See, e.g., Slezak, supra note 6 (discussing mandatory parent education for divorcing
parents); Tochiki, supra note 92 (examining the "Kids First" program designed to educate parents
and children involved in a divorce).
216. See Wendy W. Williams, Notes from a First Generation, 1989 U. O. LEGAL F. 99
(describing need for legislative reforms). See generally DEBRA L. DODSON & SUSAN J. CARROLL,
RESHAPING THE AGENDA: WOMEN IN STATE LEGISLATURES (1991) (discussing the results of a
study conducted by the Center for American Woman and Politics, focusing on the impact of
women in public office).
217. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, "Naturally" Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction, and the
FederalCourts, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1682, 1771 (1991) (reporting results of state committee reports
on judicial bias in the courts). See also Lynn Hecht Schafran, Gender Bias in the Courts, in
WOMEN AS SINGLE PARENTS, supra note 67, at 39 (describing the impact of gender bias on the
areas of the law affecting women as single parents).
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iii. Alternatives to Punishment
This section of How to Talk addresses children's unambiguous
transgressions. For example, a child repeatedly "forgets" to come home
in time for dinner or does not clean up his room or fails to do his
homework. In short, the need for some corrective action on the part of
the parent is not in dispute. A different approach may be required where
the need for corrective action is problematic or where it is legitimately
contested. Those cases in which an older child is making a principled
assertion of autonomy, arguing for a later bedtime or curfew, for
example, do not automatically trigger these alternatives. In practice, this
would presumably become clear during the process of "recognizing
feelings" or "seeking to engage cooperation."
Because, in part, of the law's failure to recognize women's feelings
or to "engage their cooperation," however, the law routinely and
unfairly punishes women. The law even punishes mothers for behavior
that it commends in fathers. In Burchard v. Garay,218 for example, the
trial court awarded custody of the two-and-one-half-year-old child to
the father, William Garay, under the "best interests" standard. 19
Although the child never lived with his father, the trial court granted the
father custody because he was financially better off and remarriede' and
agreed that the mother could have visitation."
The Supreme Court of California, reversed, adopting feminist
arguments. The concurrence summarized cases treating working
mothers as "by definition inadequate, dissatisfied with [their] role[s], or
more concerned with [their] own needs than with those of [their]
child[ren]." '
The concurrence specifically noted a decision
commending a working father because he "often prepared the child's
breakfast and dinner and picked her up from the day care center himself.
It is difficult to imagine a mother's performance of these chores even
attracting notice, much less commendable comment."' The Burchard
court refused to punish the mother in the instant case for working.
218. 724 P.2d 486 (Cal. 1986) (in bank).
219. See id at 487-88; see also GOLDSTEIN Er AL., supra note 52, at 53-65, 91-93, 151-54
(discussing the "best interests of the child" standard as applied in various cases).
220. See Burchard,724 P.2d at 488 (noting that the trial court had reasoned that "he 'and the
stepmother can provide constant care for the minor child and keep him on a regular schedule
without resorting to other caretakers"').
221. See id. (noting that the trial court "referred to William providing the mother with
visitation, an indirect reference to Ana's unwillingness to permit William visitation").
222. Id. at 495.
223. Id. at 495 n.6 (Bird, CJ., concurring) (citation omitted) (citing In re Marriage of Estelle,
592 S.W.2d. 277, 278 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979)).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol26/iss2/3

50

Stark: Guys and Dolls: Remedial Nurturing Skills in Post-Divorce Practic
1997]

REMEDIAL NURTURING SKILLS

Instead, as How to Talk and feminists urge, it "point[ed] out [ways for
the law] to be helpful" and the majority explained how the law can
"give [women] a choice" :24 "If in fact the custodial parent's income is

insufficient to provide a proper care for the child, the remedy is to
award child support, not to take away custody."'

Courts continue to penalize working mothers for their economic
disadvantages, however, and feminists continue to criticize their

decisions.2 In addition to urging alternatives to punishment for women
who have done nothing wrong, '7 feminists also urged alternatives to
punishment because it is ineffective. Thus, for example, although jailing

wage-earning fathers has been shown to improve their compliance with
child support orders,

judges remain reluctant to impose this

punishment. Rather, mandatory wage withholding has proven to be a
better alternative.2'9
iv. Spiraling Out
Feminists' exposure of, and challenges to, the lack of empathy in
family law have gone far beyond the post-divorce context2 0 Ann
224. FABER & MAZLISH, HOW TO TALK, supra note 95, at 94 (describing seven alternatives to
punishment).
225. Burchard,724 P.2d at 492. As Chief Justice Rose Bird noted in a separate concurring
opinion:
I write separately to underscore that the trial court's ruling was an abuse of
discretion... in its assumption that there-is a negative relation between a woman's lack
of wealth or her need or desire to work and the quality of her parenting. As this case so
aptly demonstrates, outmoded notions such as these result in harsh judgments which
unfairly penalize working mothers.
Id. at 493.
226. See, e.g., Krista Carpenter, Comment, Why Are Mothers Still Losing: An Analysis of
GenderBias in Child Custody Determinations, 1996 Dsr. C.L. REV. 33, 34-35 (criticizing Ireland
v. Smith, No. 93-0385-DS 5 (Macomb County Cir. Ct. July 27, 1994) (awarding custody to father
because mother was a full-time student)); see also Elizabeth Kastor, The Maranda Decision: It
Was an OrdinaryCustody Fight, Until Day Care Tipped the Scales of Justice, WASH. POST, July
29, 1994, at D1 (discussing the Marandadecision, criticizing it as an "assault on single parents
and day care in general").
227. Courts have been particularly willing to punish drug-addicted mothers for economic
disadvantages. See Roberts, supra note 183, at 1420-28.
228. This was shown by Professor Chambers in his influential study. See CHAMBERS, supra
note 84.
229. See ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 415-18. Child support remains a serious problem,
however, in part because child support guidelines remain so uniformly low. See id. at 402-05. As
Professor Chambers reminds us, "After twenty years of effort, more fathers pay more money than
ever before, but over half of all children with an absent parent still receive no support." David L.
Chambers, Fathers,the Welfare System, and the Virtues and Perils of Child-SupportEnforcement,
81 VA. L. REV. 2575, 2588 (1995) (footnote omitted).
230. "Many writers have called for changes in family law so that it will provide greater
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Shalleck,2t Jane M. Spinak,22 and Barbara Bennett Woodhouse 3
demonstrated how empathy for a family law client can bring legal

education to life for clinic students. Martha Field argued for empathy
for handicapped newborns.2

Marsha Garrison drew on empathetic

imagination to bring John Rawls's "original position" closer to
women's real lives, transforming it from an abstract paradigm to a
valuable tool for feminist analysis.25 Professor Woodhouse deepened a

rigorous analysis of constitutional law doctrine with empathetic
descriptions of the actual experience of children left vulnerable by that
doctrine2 6 While they address different problems in family law, each
analysis is informed and enriched by the author's demand that the law
show empathy, that it recognize the feelings of the parties, focus on
engaging their cooperation, and consider alternatives to punishment. 7

b. Autonomy
i. Feminist Ambivalence
Feminists remain ambivalent about autonomy. In part, this reflects
the variety of contexts in which the term has been used and the purposes
to which it has been put.25 Autonomy has been used to refer to family
autonomy, understood as the law's deference to the unitary family.29 It
has also been used to refer to women's autonomy, their freedom to
make meaningful choices, both within marriage and at divorce.40
support for the qualities that foster meaningful family life: responsibility, connection, caring."
Estin, supra note 47, at 802.
231. Shalleck, supra note 60; Ann Shalleck, Constructions of the Client Within Legal
Education, 45 STAN. L. Rev. 1731 (1993).
232. Jane M. Spinak, Reflections on a Case (of Motherhood), 95 CoLuM. L. REV. 1990
(1995).
233. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Mad Midwifery: Bringing Theory, Doctrine, and Practice
to Life, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1977 (1993).
234. Martha A. Field, Killing "the Handicapped"--Before and After Birth, 16 HARV.
WoiMEN's LJ. 79 (1993).
235. See Garrison, supranote 167, at 724-39.
236. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer and Pierce and the
Childas Property, 33 WM. & MARYL. REV. 995 (1992).
237. See supra Part II.A.1.
238. See Linda C. McClain, "Atomistic Man" Revisited: Liberalism, Connection, and
FeministJurisprudence,65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1171, 1190 (1992).
239. See, e.g., SCHNEIDER & BRINIG, supra note 3, at 121-23 (identifying family autonomy as
a "pervasive theme" in family law doctrine); Margaret J. Chriss, Troubling Degrees of Authority:
The Continuing Pursuitof UnequalMaritalRoles, 12 LAW & INEQ. J. 225, 226, 249, 253 (1993)
(criticizing law for promoting hierarchical marital roles).
240. Cf. Woodhouse, supra note 103, at 256 ("I share [Martha Minow's] ambivalence about

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol26/iss2/3

52

Stark: Guys and Dolls: Remedial Nurturing Skills in Post-Divorce Practic
19971

REMEDIAL NURTURING SKILLS

Feminists have shown how the law's deference to the notion of an
autonomous, unitary family hurts women. It inhibits the law from taking

a more constructive role in divorce mediation, for example, allowing
pre-existing dynamics of male domination and female subordination to
reassert themselves. 4'
In addition, the promise of individual autonomy at divorce-to be
"freed from the bonds of matrimony"--undermines women's autonomy
as a practical matter because it undermines their continuing financial
claims against their former husbands, even when those claims are on
their children's behalf. As June Carbone points out, "[The law does not
recognize a continuing obligation from one spouse to the other
following divorce and that it does not meaningfully enforce the
obligation it does recognize-the one to the children."' 2 This obligation
is often difficult to separate out from those obligations no longer owed
the former spouse.24 Child support payments, for example, may be
applied toward housing expenses which also benefit the custodial
spouse.
While feminists distinguish between the different contexts in which
claims of autonomy are made by various family members, they also
recognize the often complicated relationships among these claims.
Professor Woodhouse, for example, points out the tension between the
child's claim for autonomy and the parents' claims at the time of
divorce: "For children, connection to others is a precondition to
autonomy and individuality. From this truth flows a paradox: Can we
give adults the autonomy to define and restructure their families without

undermining family stability-the very stability that nurtures a child's
growth into an autonomous adult?" 24 Janet Dolgin recognizes a similar
the values of privacy. The veil of family privacy, as battered women and abused children know,
can exclude not only prying eyes but lifesaving interventions." (footnotes omitted)).
241. See Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation and the Politicsof Power,
40 BuFF. L. REv. 441, 494-95 (1992); see also Jane W. Ellis, Surveying the Terrain: A Review
Essay of Divorce Reform at the Crossroads,44 STAN. L. REv. 471, 476 (1992) (book review)
(arguing that mothers are especially vulnerable because they often put their relationships with their
children above all other considerations); Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers
for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545, 1595 (1991) (stating that feminists have shown that women are
more likely to make financial sacrifices in order to maintain relationships).
242. Carbone, supra note 53, at 189; see also Thompson, supra note 55, at 213 (favoring a
changed post-divorce relationship between parents rather than the traditional "clean break").
243. See SCHNEIDER & BRINIG, supra note 3, at 124 ("When we consider questions of
divorce, alimony, and marital property, we may find that applying the principle of autonomy can
become quite complex, since more than one person's autonomy is at issue.").
244. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Children's Rights: The Destruction and Promise of
Family, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REv. 497, 498; see also Weisbrod, supra note 166, at 696 ("A central
question for the.., official legal system is how and whether to protect [the child's potential

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1997

53

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 3
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:293

tension on the societal level:
[I]ndividuals are no longer tightly bound by family hierarchy, which
for centuries in one form or another defined women and children as
less than fully human. But, at the same time, the enduring connections
that anchored people to one another within the family become, like the
connections of the market, the contingent connections of negotiation
and choice.24
Thus feminists, like How to Talk, recognize that autonomy is
problematic and demands the most careful case-by-case analysis. Like
How to Talk, feminists stress the importance of autonomy in
conjunction with, rather than in opposition to, empathy. This
distinguishes it from the more traditional, liberal notion of autonomy,
which stresses individualism and privacy.2 6 Feminists, in short, have
been "reconceiving autonomy.''4'
ii. Feminist Versions of How to Talk Techniques
Like How to Talkm feminists begin with "choice" to develop
autonomy. An autonomous self is developed through the exercise of
autonomy] right since it is on that psychological capacity, created in the family, that all other
capacity would seem to depend."); supra Part III.A.2.
245. Janet L. Dolgin, The Family in Transition: From Griswold to Eisenstadt and Beyond, 82
GEO. LJ.1519, 1571 (1994).
246. See BARTLETr, supra note 151, at 672 ("[T]he meaning of autonomy has been
expanding beyond the right to be free from interference by others to include the ability to flourish
among and in relation to others."). While this text explores autonomy in a series of cases focusing
on other issues, it includes a section on the autonomy of the custodial parent. See id. at 841-49; see
also BENJAMIN, supra note 32, at 187 ("Feminist theory has already exposed the mystification
inherent in the idea of the autonomous individual ...[as based on] the paternal ideal of separation
and denial of dependency. The feminist critique of the autonomous individual closely parallels the
Marxian critique of the bourgeois individual ..."(footnote omitted)).
247. Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities, 1
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 7 (1989). As Professor Nedelsky concludes, "[A] new conception of
autonomy is not likely to spring full-blown from theory.... but in the meantime we cannot cede
to liberal convention a monopoly on the value of autonomy." Id. at 36. This article is cited by
Professor Bartlett to describe an important emerging conception in feminist theory. See BARTLETr,
supranote 151, at 868-69.
248. See supra text accompanying note 132.
249. "Choice," of course, is the buzz word for reproductive rights, particularly abortion. For a
cogent history of the relationship between women's control over their own reproduction, and their
political and social autonomy, see LINDA GORDON, WOMAN'S BODY, WOMAN's RIGHT: BIRTH
CONTROL IN AMERICA at xix-xxi (rev. ed. 1990). See also Reva Siegel, Reasoningfrom the Body:
A HistoricalPerspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L.
REV. 261 (1992) (providing an historical analysis of abortion-restrictive legislation). Each of the
feminist texts offers extended discussions of the major cases along with excerpts from the
exhaustive feminist commentary on the subject. See, e.g., BARTLETr, supra note 151, at 739-99
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choice. As understood by contemporary feminists, autonomy
incorporates "a practical observation that choice is a relative concept,
and that, in some matters at least, more is better than less." ' 0 Thus,
feminists criticize laws that allow fathers to control the post-divorce
choices of custodial mothers,"1 including their choice of where to live. 2

Allowing mothers to make choices based upon their own interests,
rather than those of their children, is in obvious tension with the ideal of
selfless mothers.23 As Carol Sanger sharply observes, "In this culture
mothers are asked to give up many things in the interests of maternity:
sleep, the fast track and sexuality are three examples."
To the extent that women are expected to internalize a norm of
selflessness, Joan Chalmers Williams explains, they are disadvantaged
as an interest group competing against other interest groups in a liberal
"republic of choice." 5 At the same time, however, she criticizes the

gendered assumptions of that "republic of choice," such as its failure to
value relationships, and warns how feminist adoption of the rhetoric of
"choice" undermines that criticism.2 6 Like How to Talk, Professor
(providing extended excerpts and a careful analysis of Casey, including discussion of race and
class dimensions of unwanted pregnancy); BECKER Er AL., supra note 140, at 364-413 (providing
historical accounts, followed by excerpts from Roe to Casey, and descriptions of women's
experience with abortion); FRUG, supra note 151, at 433-99 (seeking analytic and political
strategies to characterize the abortion dispute); see also, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 876 (1992) (affirming women's right to abortion without "undue burden"); Akron v.
Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 437-38 (1983) (striking ordinance requiring all
post-trimester abortions to be performed in a hospital); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S.
678, 690-91 (1977) (striking a New York statute criminalizing the sale and distribution of
contraceptives to minors and restricting distribution of contraceptives to pharmacists); Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 78-79 (1976) (striking statute prohibiting saline
amniocentesis as a method of abortion after the first trimester).
250. BARTL=rT, supra note 151, at 672. For a critique of a prosecutorial practice which
further reduces the choice of battered women "for their own good," see Cheryl Hanna, No Right to
Choose: Mandated Victim Participationin Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV.
1849, 1850 (1996).
251. See, e.g., Jarrett v. Jarrett, 400 N.E.2d 421,423-24 (111. 1979) (changing custody of three
daughters from mother to father because of mother's cohabitation with her boyfriend).
252. See, e.g., Katherine C. Sheehan, Post-Divorce Child Custody and Family Relocation, 9
HARV. WOMEN'S LI. 135 (1986) (criticizing court reliance in relocation cases on outdated notions
of the roles of divorced men and women in a family). See also In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d
473, 476 (Cal. 1996) (holding that relocating parent need not prove necessity); Tropea v. Tropea,
665 N.E.2d 145, 150 (N.Y. 1996) (rejecting a mechanical, tiered analysis in favor of fact-sensitive
inquiry, including parental reasons for move, and the impact on child).
253. Cf.Barbara Welter, The Cult of True Womanhood: 1820-1860, 18 AM. Q. 151 (1966)
(describing the nineteenth-century ideology of submissive, "pure," selfless women).
254. Sanger, supra note 11, at 40 (footnote omitted).
255. Williams, supra note 15, at 1562 (referring to the title of a recent study conducted by
Lawrence Friedman).
256. See id. at 1594, 1634.
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Williams and other feminists realize that autonomy must be understood

in terms

of relationships.

Cultivating autonomy,

accordingly,

necessarily involves struggle-externally, in social relationships, as
well as internally, among internalized norms.

How to Talk counsels "respect for [that] struggle."'

7

This may best

be expressed, paradoxically, by silence, by not "ask[ing] too many

questions" or "rush[ing] to answer questions."25 Instead, by allowing
the child to decide for herself what questions to ask and to find her own
answers, How to Talk enables the child to set her own parameters, to
define and determine the scope of her own autonomy.
Feminists similarly recognize that developing autonomy requires

women to articulate their own questions and to find their own answers.
They also recognize that developing autonomy is an organic process,
which by definition requires that the individual be allowed to find her
own way. Through the process of doing so, women identify their own
interests." Because in part of historical restrictions on women's
autonomy, many women found it hard to identify their own interests as
women,m and thus to promote them. 26' Women's interests become
increasingly clear as women painstakingly find their own way, 62 as
individuals and as a group.263
257. FABER & MAZUSH, How TO TALK, supra note 95, at 139.
258. Id.
259. See BOSTON WOMEN'S HEALTH COLLEC'rIVE, OUR BODIES, OURSELVES (1970); Sara
Rimer, They Talked and Talked and Then Wrote a Classic, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1997, § 14, at
27.
260. See CHODOROW, FEMINISM AND PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY, supra note 23, at 7
(acknowledging "many women's very difficult problems with establishing differentiated selfhood,
autonomy, and an agentic subjectivity"); see also Catharine A. MacKinnon, From Practice to
Theory, or What Is a White Woman Anyway?, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 13, 21-22 (1991)
("[P]eople feel more dignity in being part of any group that includes men... if your oppression is
also done to a man, you are more likely to be recognized as oppressed, as opposed to inferior.").
261. 'Women have been conspicuously more successful in promoting the interests of others.
For a historical account of the role of "matemalism politics" in shaping the American conception
of public welfare, see MOTHERS OF A NEw WORLD: MATERNALIST POLITICS AND THE ORIGINS OF
'WELFARE STATES (Seth Koven & Sonya Michel eds., 1993).
262. For a provocative critique of the lack of respect for "other" women's autonomy shown
by Western feminists, see Karen Engle, Female Subjects of Public InternationalLaw: Human
Rights and the Exotic Other Female, 26 NEw ENG. L. REV. 1509 (1992); Isabelle R. Gunning,
ArrogantPerception, World-Travelling and MulticulturalFeminism: The Case of Female Genital
Surgeries,23 COLuM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 189 (1991-1992).
263. See BENJAMIN, supra note 32, at 79-84; see also PEGGY ORENSTEIN, SCHOOLGIRLS:
YOUNG WOMEN, SELF-ESTEEM, AND THE CONFIDENCE GAP (1994) (describing eighth-grade girls
at two co-educational schools, one mostly low-income, minority students and the other mostly
middle-class, white students and explaining how young women lose their self-esteem and how its
loss impedes their development). Linda McClain describes the long hard work of feminists to
develop autonomous selves in order to be recognized, and to participate fully, in a liberal
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How to Talk also urges parents to "[e]ncourage children to use
sources outside the home. 264 The development of sources outside the
home has been a major feminist project for the past twenty-five years.
Feminists realized early on that women could not be independent unless
they had-and were able to use-"sources outside the home," especially
sources of income or support. As feminist historian Gerda Lerner has
pointed out, economic dependence on men has been most women's only

alternative to poverty for the past 300 years of Western civilization:
"Fully developed feminist consciousness rests on the precondition that

women must have an economic alternative for survival other than
marriage' ' and that there exist large groups of single, self-supporting

women.

In many cases there have been no such sources outside the home
for women to use, and feminists had to create them. In 1970, for
example, there were no shelters for battered women. Seventeen years
266
later feminists and others had established more than 700 such shelters.
Finally, and crucially, How to Talk advises parents, "don't take
away hope." This is related to "giv[ing] ...wishes in fantasy,"2'67 but it
is distinct. Rather than articulating aspirations for someone else, this
allows a person to articulate her own, even if they seem hopeless to
others. Feminists, too, realize that autonomy requires "hope."26 Thus,
dismissing Senator Moynihan's dire predictions, 2 9 Professor Dowd
boldly affirms that "[s]ingle-parent families may represent the frontier

of reconstructing family in a non-dominating mode." 270 Professor

democracy. See McClain, supra note 238 (discussing the concepts of responsibility and an ethic of
care as a basis for legal reform).
264. FABER & MAZLISH, HOW TO TALK,supra note 95, at 139.
265. GERDA LERNER, THE CREATION OF FEMINIST CONSCIOUSNESS: FROM THE MIDDLE AGES
TO EIGHTEEN-SEVENTY 276 (1993).
266. See Naomi R. Cahn, Civil Images of Battered Women: The Impact of Domestic Violence
on Child Custody Decisions, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1041, 1048 (1991). There are still not enough
shelters to cope with the more than half a million incidents a year in which women are physically
abused by husbands or boyfriends. See Pam Belluck, Shelters for Women Disclosing Their
Locations, in Spite of Risk, N.Y. THIES, Aug. 10, 1997, at Al. For a comprehensive introduction
on the subject of domestic violence, see Joan S.Meier, Notes from the Underground:Integrating
PsychologicalandLegal Perspectives on Domestic Violence in Theory and Practice,21 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 1295 (1993). See also authorities cited infra notes 376-79, 388.
267. See supra text accompanying notes 196-200.
268. See FABER & MAZLISH, HOW TO TALK, supra note 95, at 139. As Ruth Colker explains,
"Not all feminists agree that we need to speak aspirationally.... By articulating their visions and
seeking a common ground, feminists might be able to move beyond their differences and work
together toward goals upon which all feminists can agree." Ruth Colker, Feminism, Theology, and
Abortion: Toward Love, Compassion,and Wisdom, 77 CAL. L. REv. 1011, 1018-19 (1989).
269. See OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING & RESEARCH, supra note 5.
270. Dowd, supra note 57, at 82.
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Roberts, similarly, applauds the strength, resiliency, and determination

of single Black mothers. 2 '
iii. Spiraling Out
In addition to demonstrating how women's autonomy is threatened

at divorce, feminists have shown how family law impedes women's
autonomy in other contexts. Professors Roberts'
Dowd" and
Fineman 74 defend the autonomy of never-married mothers, rejecting
arguments that single mothers are "insufficient" as heads of households;
that single mothers are irresponsible; that single mothers do not want to
work; and that single mothers are even "pathological."" Instead, they
have shown how the difficulties confronting single mothers are better
attributed to a legal culture which stigmatizes them, a welfare system
that denigrates them, racism, and the lack of affordable child care,
flexible work schedules, and safe public housing.2 6
Elizabeth Bartholet extended the concept of autonomy to adoptive

families that do not attempt to simulate a biological family, but instead
respect and acknowledge the particular cultural and ethnic attributes of
each family member.2" Twila Perry, in contrast, argues that transracial

271. See Dorothy E. Roberts, The Value of Black Mothers' Work, 26 CONN. L. REV. 871
(1994). In an interview with NPR's Terry Gross, John Singleton, director of Boys 'N the Hood,
explained that he included a strong father in the film because young boys needed father figures.
Asked why mothers were not sufficient, he explained, as if he were speaking to a child, that boys
needed to model themselves after men. See supra Part lI.B.
272. Roberts, supra note 271.
273. NANCY E. DowD, IN DEFENSE OF SINGLE-PARENT FAMILIES (1997); LINDA GORDON,
PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY OF ,VELFARE 1890-1935 (1994).
274. Martha A. Fineman, Images of Mothers in Poverty Discourse, in MOTHERS IN LAW,
supra note 14.
275. See OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING & RESEARCH, supra note 5.
276. See, e.g., FINEMAN, supra note 24, at 221-22 n.7 (summarizing evidence that child
support, especially from low-income fathers, does not solve the problems of single mothers);
Dowd, supra note 57, at 30-35 (explaining why many single mothers have no alternative to
welfare and why they remain poor); Roberts, supra note 183, at 1481 ('The state's decision to
punish drug-addicted mothers [typically poor women of color] rather than help them stems from
the poverty and race of the defendants and society's denial of their full dignity as human beings.");
see also Pearce & Ellsworth, supra note 211, at 143 (arguing that much of women's poverty is
attributable to two main factors: "the economic burdens associated with having the primary
responsibility for children" and the labor market where "women experience discrimination,
harassment, and confinement to low-paying and dead-end jobs often because they are women").
277. See ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS: ADOPTION AND THE POLITICS OF
PARENTING 36 (1993) (criticizing an adoption paradigm which privileges two-parent marital
families); see also Naomi R. Cahn, Family Issue(s), 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 326-27 (1994) (reviewing
BARTHOLET, supra) (exploring "cultural assumptions about biological family relationships and
adoption"); Nancy E. Dowd, A Feminist Analysis of Adoption, 107 HARv. L. REV. 913 (1994)
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adoption of Black children infringes on their cultural autonomy as Black

people.27
As with empathy,279 while feminists apply the concept of autonomy
in very different contexts, each draws on a bottom line conception of

autonomy consistent with the notion of autonomy developed in How to
Talk. Consensus diminishes as the concept is applied in new and
controversial contexts. This is part of the political process of consensusbuilding as well as the legal process of doctrine-refining. It also reflects
bottom line feminist endorsement of the idea that complex problems

often demand multiple solutions. This is also consistent with bottom
line feminist endorsement of problem solving.
c. Problem Solving
i. Problem Solving at Divorce
The problem-solving skills outlined in How to Talk are a simplified
version of the contextualized problem-solving skills broadly endorsed
by feminists.2" Problem-solving skills have also been broadly accepted
by the practicing bar, and taught in law schools under the rubric of
ADR.!' Mediation or negotiation are the overwhelming choice of

(reviewing BARTHOLET, supra) (supporting Bartholet's approach as conducive to diversity).
278. See Twila L. Perry, The TransracialAdoption Controversy: An Analysis of Discourse
and Subordination,21 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 33 (1993-1994). But see Julie C. LythcottHaims, Note, Where Do Mixed Babies Belong? Racial Classification in America and Its
Implicationsfor TransracialAdoption, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 531 (1994) (criticizing race
matching in adoption).
279. See supraPart IMA.1.
280. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a
Woman's Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39 (1985) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow,
Portia in a Different Voice] (encouraging the acceptance and integration of female problemsolving strategies in the traditional legal system); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View
of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REv. 754 (1984)
(advocating a "systematic approach to legal negotiation" that is premised on mutual problem
solving rather than winning or gaining a substantial advantage). All three feminist texts cite
Menkel-Meadow's work, Portia in a Different Voice, as support for the proposition that women
will alter the legal profession by utilizing feminist problem solving techniques. See BARTLETr,
supra note 151, at 595-96; BECKER ETAL., supra note 140, at 828 n.19; FRUG, supra note 151, at
40-52. Feminist problem solving also incorporates what Professor Bartlett describes as "'feminist
practical reasoning,"' i.e., "probing the context of a legal problem to identify factors that ought to
be relevant to its resolution that abstract legal principles may otherwise leave unexamined."
BARTLETT, supra note 151, at 634.
281. See, e.g., JOHN S. MURRAY E" AL., PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ROLE OF
LAWYERS (2d ed. 1996); LEONARD L. RISKIN & JAMES E. WESTBROOK, DisPutE RESOLUTION AND
LAWYERS (1987).
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process in family law.2 In her groundbreaking work, Portia in a
Different Voice,2 Carrie Menkel-Meadow describes the alternative:
The basic structure of our legal system is premised on the
adversarial model, which involves two advocates who present their
cases to a disinterested third party who listens to evidence and
argument and declares one party a winner. In this simplified
description of the Anglo-American model of litigation, we can identify
some of the basic concepts and values which underlie this choice of
arrangements: advocacy, persuasion, hierarchy, competition, and
binary results (win/lose). The conduct of litigation is relatively similar
(not coincidentally, I suspect) to a sporting event-there are rules, a
referee,
an object to the game, and a winner is declared after the play is
2.84
over.
How to Talk suggests a very different model for dispute resolution,
or "problem solving," between a parent and a child. The model
resonates with what Professor Menkel-Meadow identifies as a "different
voice" approach 6 adopted by many women lawyers (whom she
personalizes as "Amy and H-ilary")m particularly in the context of
divorce.
282. SeeELLmANETAL., supra note 3, at 688-93.
283. See Menkel-Meadow, Portiain a Different Voice, supranote 280.
284. Id. at50-51.
285. The shift in terminology is deliberate. By focusing the parties on problems to be solved,
rather than disputes to be resolved, How to Talk emphasizes a joint, cooperative project, rather
than the parties' conflicting views of it. See supra note 135.
286. This refers to Carol Gilligan's ubiquitous work, INADIFFERENTVOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL
THEORY AND WOMEN's DEVELOPMENT (1982), cited in Leslie Bender, From Gender Difference to
Feminist Solidarity: Using Carol Gilligan and an Ethic of Care in Law, 15 VT. L. REV. 1, 1
(1990) (prominently explaining the differences in women's values and moral reasoning). See also
BECKER Er AL., supra note 140, at 827-28 ("Some claim that women will substantially change the
legal profession ... by contributing a 'different voice' to lawyering: a more collaborative,
cooperative and contextual approach, with a preference for non-adversarial modes of dispute
resolution, such as mediation."); Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice, supra note 280, at
49-55 (arguing that women's "different voice" in moral reasoning affects the choices made in the
values underlying today's legal structures). For a cogent introduction to "cultural feminism,"
which endorses the view that women have special aptitudes for nurturing, see JOSEPHINE
DONOVAN, FEMINIST THEORY: THE INTE ECuAL TRADTONS OF AMERICAN FEMINISM 31-68
(1985). See also The Question of Different Voice: Care, Justice, and Rights, in FEMINISM &
POLmCAL THEORY 15-113 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 1990) (providing essays which attempt to
support Carol Gilligan's view that the moral development of young girls is different from that of
young boys). But see MAcKINNON, supra note 190, at 39 ("For women to affirm difference, when
difference means dominance, as it does with gender, means to affirm the qualities and
characteristics of powerlessness.").
287. Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice, supra note 280, at 46-47, 51-54. "Amy"
comes from Gilligan's famous re-interpretation of Kohlberg's moral reasoning hypothetical, in
which a man's wife is dying and he cannot afford the drug that will save her. See GILLIGAN, supra
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First, How to Talk instructs parents to "[t]alk about the child's
feelings and needs" and "your feelings and needs." ' Women lawyers,
similarly, tend "to personalize and contextualize problems," according
to Professor Menkel-Meadowf 9 Feminists have shown how this focus
on context allows the parties to take perspectives into account that the
law would otherwise ignore.2'
How to Talk then urges parents to "[b]rainstorm ... to find a
mutually agreeable solution. 29'
[Similarly, Amy] tries to account for all the parties' needs, and
searches for a way to find a solution that satisfies the needs of
both ....

In short, she won't play by the adversarial rules. She searches

outside the system for a way to solve the problem, trying to keep both
parties in mind. 29
Feminists also continue to search outside the system for ways to
solve the problems of family law, from the most specific suggestions for
improving male nurturing skills293 to the more general, far-reaching
demand that "men ... become feminists.'
In How to Talk, resolution is reached by the parent and child who,
together, "[d]ecide which suggestions [they] like." 295 Professor MenkelMeadow's prototypical woman lawyer, similarly,
"belie[ves] in communication as the mode of conflict resolution and [is
convinced] that the solution to the dilemma will follow from its
compelling representation .... " If the parties talk directly to each
other, they will be more likely to appreciate the importance of each

note 286, at 25-26. Kohlberg gave the highest score to those who answered that the man should
steal the drug, because life is more important than property. See id at 26. Gilligan explained why
boys ("Jake" in her study) were more likely to reach this conclusion than girls ("Amy"), who were
more likely to seek resolution in relationship, that is, talking with the druggist. See id at 29-32.
"Hilary" was the name of a female lawyer in another study. See id at 135-36.
288. FABER & MAZLISH, How TO TALK, supra note 95, at 102. Feminists, similarly, have
noted that ADR allows feelings to be taken into account better than litigation. But see GriUo, supra
note 241, at 1581-94 (criticizing mandatory ADR).
289.

Menkel-Meadow, Portiain a Different Voice, supra note 280, at 58.

290. See BARTLErr, supra note 151, at 634. For a rigorous analysis showing how this focus
also makes it possible to take the perspective of other oppressed groups into account, see Martha
Minow, Foreword: JusticeEngendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10 (1987).
291. FABER & MAZUSH, HOW TO TALK, supra note 95, at 102.
292. Menkel-Meadow, Portiain a Different Voice, supra note 280, at 51.
293. See supra Part flI.A.
294. Levit, supra note 10, at 1040. But see Singer, supra note 122,.at 1545 (stating that
mediation proponents go "outside the system" in matters involving custody and visitation where
"prevailing legal standards are perceived to favor women" (footnote omitted)).
295. FABER & MAZLISH, HoW TO TALK, supra note 95, at 102.
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other's needs [and recognize] that two apparently conflicting positions

can both be simultaneously legitimate, and there need not be a single
victor.296

Many feminists appreciate the need for "communication as the
mode of conflict resolution," as opposed to the adversarial model, in the
post-divorce parenting context. While recognizing that such
communication is difficult in many situations, and impossible in some,
feminists recognize that in most situations, ongoing parenting requires
ongoing communication.Y
Feminist bottom line consensus in this context includes two
important caveats. First, feminists generally condemn reliance on
problem-solving approaches in cases involving abuse. 9' The lack of
process protections, a third party decision-maker, and clear guidelines in
problem-solving approaches such as mediation or negotiation make it
too easy for victims of domestic violence to be further victimized.2'
Second, related but distinct, feminists argued that ADR should not
be mandatory. As Trina Grillo explains:
[While] mediation can challenge the hierarchical, professionalized way

that family law is usually practiced[,] [t]his dynamic is fundamentally
altered when mediation is imposed rather than sought or offered.

When mandatory mediation is part of the court system, the notion that
parties are actually making their own decisions is purely illusory. First,

the parties have not chosen or timed the process according to their
ability to handle it. Second, they are not allowed to decide themselves

how much their lawyers should participate .... Finally, they are not
permitted to choose the mediator, and they often cannot leave without
endangering their legal position even if they believe the mediator is
biased against them.3

296. Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice, supra note 280, at 51-52 (third alteration
added) (footnote omitted).
297. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 122, at 1506 (stating that mediation proponents view
divorce as "restructuring of an ongoing personal and family relationship" (footnote omitted)); see
also, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 257-58 (arguing that sometimes silence is the best way
to respect the struggle in social relationships); infra note 381 (arguing that abusive relationships
require specially tailored approaches, in which the safety of the victim must be the paramount
concern).
298. See BARTLETT, supra note 151, at 535-38; BECKER Er AL., supra note 140, at 866.
299. See Singer, supra note 122, at 1548. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describing and
Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering, 9
WoMEN's RTS. L. REP. 195 (1986) (warning of the dangers of characterizing battered women
exclusively as victims); Walker, supra note 205, at 525-32 (describing the process through which
a woman's self-esteem is destroyed and her capacity for defending herself dangerously impaired).
300. GriUo, supra note 241, at 1581-82 (footnotes omitted).
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Even feminists who might condone mandatory mediation in some

contexts, moreover, reject it in the context of custody disputes."' The
major concern here is that power imbalances will resurface and remain

uncorrected in the less formal mode. In addition, as Professor Grillo has
pointed out, the promise of mediation to contextualize problem solving
is broken by mediators who "[eliminate] discussion of the past."' ' r

In short, where there is no history of abuse, most feminists
consider voluntary ADR a better option than the adversarial process in
this context. As Professor Bartlett concludes, "[The answer [for many
feminists] is not to abandon mediation alternatives but to attempt to
implement them in ways sensitive to the dangers of male manipulation
and to 30the
ways in which mediation might empower the weaker
3
spouse.5

ii. As Feminist Metadiscourse
The basic tenets of problem solving set out in How to Talk also

serve the function of metadiscourse in feminist family law theory; that
is, feminists draw on problem-solving approaches, broadly understood,

as the process through which they seek consensus in this context.
Overall, feminists eschew the language of rights, arguing instead in
terms of the needs and feelings of family members, particularly the less
powerful. Feminists generate options, tailored to particular contexts.
They seek resolutions acceptable to everyone involved, where possible.
This is exemplified by feminist approaches to child custody. The
feminists approach to this issue may be usefully understood as a form of

301. See BARTLETT, supra note 151, at 537.
302. Grillo, supra note 241, at 1564; see also Singer, supra note 122, at 1544 ("The problem
[of mediators driving couples to joint custody] is exacerbated by the fact that mediation theory
generally disapproves of focusing on a couple's past behavior." (footnote omitted)). Professor
Grillo provides a chilling example: a father told a mother that their young child would be cared for
in the home by his new wife, but in fact the child was placed in unlicensed daycare, where he was
subject to corporal punishment. See Grillo, supra note 241, at 1563. "The mediator does not allow
[Linda] to make these points. Instead, she says that the past is not to be discussed .... The
mediator tells Linda that she must recognize that the parent who has the child is responsible for
choosing daycare." Id. (emphasis omitted).
303. BARTETTr, supra note 151, at 538 (citing, among others, Grillo, supra note 241, at 1610;
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innovation Coopted or "The Law of ADR," 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1 (1991); Janet Rifkin, Mediationfrom a
Feminist Perspective: Promise and Problems, 2 LAW & INEQ. J. 21 (1984)); see also Diane
Neumann, How Mediation Can Effectively Address the Male-FemalePower Imbalancein Divorce,
9 MEIATION Q. 227 (1992) (discussing the role of mediation in disputes between divorcing
spouses).
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collective, contextualized problem solving, 4 reflecting both the range
of contexts and the range of feminist thinking on the issue. Even though
feminists' approaches are in flux, contested, bottom line feminist
acceptance of problem solving shapes the process through which
consensus is sought as well as the substance of the emerging consensus.
While feminists argue in favor of mothers in the post-divorce
custody context, few argue in favor of mothers' rights."5 Martha
Fineman, for example, who has forcefully shown how mothers' rights
are suppressed by the "dominant discourse,"' nevertheless refuses to
"reduce family policy to mere discussions of individual rights. 307
Instead, she builds on the "cultural power of the Mother/Child dyad" to
reinvent our "concepts of family and intimacy. 303 Professor Becker,
similarly, urges a maternal deference standard, requiring courts to defer
to the custody claims of fit mothers,O' to rectify the law's failure to take
into account the powerful emotional bonds between mothers and
children. Professors Fineman and Becker, like most feminists, urge
approaches to custody that best take the needs and feelings of family

members, particularly mothers and their children, into account.
Most feminists also prefer a process that allows family members to

generate their own options. Thus, they criticize presumptions that
interfere with the "private ordering" that results in maternal custody in
the overwhelming number of cases.31 Most feminists oppose the joint
custody presumptions which have swept across the country, and indeed
oppose any court-ordered joint custody unless both parents want it."'
304. Cf. Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice, supra note 280, at 55 (describing the
"participatory decision-making" by women lawyers and the odd contrast between their product
and process).
305. Feminists agree, of course, that women should not have fewer rights than men. They
have argued, for example, that courts should apply gender neutral standards in a gender neutral
fashion, treating mothers who work full time like they treat fathers who work full-time. See, e.g.,
Burchard v. Garay, 724 P.2d 486 (Cal. 1986) (in bank) ("The essence of the [lower] court's
decision is simply that care by a [working] mother ... is per se inferior to care by a father who
also works, but can leave the child with a stepmother at home. . . . Mhis reasoning is not a
suitable basis for a custody order."). Cf.Ireland v. Smith, No. 93-0385-DS 5 (Macomb County Cir.
Ct. July 27, 1994) (denying custody to the mother who was a full-time student, in favor of the
father, where the father's mother would be taking care of the child).
306. Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, ProfessionalLanguage, and Legal Change in
Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727,736 (1988).
307. FINEMAN, supranote 24, at 201.
308. Id. at 199-200.
309. See Becker, supra note 50, at 203. But see Singer, supra note 122, at 1543-45
(describing how mediators pressure mothers to accept "shared parenting").
310. See Mnookin et al., supranote 54, at 71-74.
311. See BARTet, supra note 151, at 373. As Professor Younger notes, joint custody
"unfairly rewards fathers who, during the marriage, were not the primary caretakers of the children
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While joint custody in theory is not without appeal for some feminists,

312

most recognize that joint custody presumptions squeeze all families into
a framework that actually works for very few. s13 Even presumptions that
seem likely to favor women are generally rejected. Few feminists argue
in favor of the "tender years doctrine";" 4 few would willingly return to a
time when gender could serve as an unexamined "proxy for need" 315 or
nurturing. While some feminists initially supported a "primary
caretaker" presumption,3 6 Professor Becker demonstrated how this
presumption in fact "tilts" against women.1 7 Elizabeth Scott suggests a
promising variation, that is, that custody determinations focus on the
"past relationship of each parent to the child."3

and gives them leverage at divorce to wring concessions from their wives." Judith T. Younger,
Responsible Parentsand Good Children, 14 LAW & INEQ. J. 489, 517 (1996) (footnote omitted);
see also Schafran, supra note 217, at 59 ("Fathers often use imposed joint custody as a means to
continue harassing their former wives, and much repeat litigation is generated, as mothers must
seek court approval for everything from braces to special education.").
312. See, e.g., Uviller, supra note 164, at 110-11 (explaining feminists' perception that
women cannot participate in the public sphere unless men assume greater responsibilities in the
private sphere); infra text accompanying note 366.
313. See, e.g., BECKER ETAL., supra note 140, at 624 (suggesting that some questions must be
asked in order to assess the propriety of joint custody: "Under what circumstances is joint custody
likely to be successful? How common are these circumstances?"); Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism,
ParentalPreference, and Child Custody, 80 CAL. L. REV. 615, 625 (1992) ("Most mothers and
fathers ... are not co-primary parents, and thus the case for joint physical custody cannot be made
on the ground that this arrangement reflects the typical allocation of parental roles in
contemporary marriage."). See generally ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN,
DvIDING THE CHILD: SocIAL AND LEGAL DILENMAs OF CUSTODY (1992) (stating that parents
typically share custody as if one parent has sole custody, notwithstanding formal legal
arrangements for joint custody).
314. This doctrine, rejected in the vast majority of states, assumes that it is in the best
interests of children of "tender years" (usually under ten) to be in their mother's custody. See
ELLMiAN Er AL., supra note 3, at 503; see also Scott, supra note 313, at 620 ("Although feminists
later came to distrust the best interests standard, they initially supported the innovation because the
tender years presumption seemed to reinforce stereotyped gender norms." (footnote omitted)).
315. Orr v. Or, 440 U.S. 268, 281 (1979) (striking alimony statute that used "sex as a proxy
for need").
316. The primary caretaker presumption was first set out by Justice Neeley in Garska v.
McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 362-63 (W. Va. 1981). See also supra notes 50-51 and accompanying
text. For a feminist analysis of the presumption in Minnesota and West Virginia, see Laura Sack,
Women and Children First: A Feminist Analysis of the Primary Caretaker Standard in Child
Custody Cases, 4 YALE J.L. & FEfNISM 291, 300-16 (1992). For a thoughtful comparison of the
primary caretaker presumption and the tender years doctrine, see Bookspan, supranote 50.
317. See Becker, supra note 50, at 139-40, 190-203 (providing an analysis of West Virginia
cases and showing that there is little benefit for women when the primary caretaker presumption is
applied). For a description and feminist critique of state law that incorporates a primary caretaker
standard, while allowing some discretion in its application, see Jane W. Ellis, The Washington
State ParentingAct in the Courts: Reconciling Discretion andJustice in ParentingPlan Disputes,
69 WASH. L. REv. 679 (1994).
318. Scott, supra note 313, at 617; cf Nancy Goldhill, Ties That Bind: The Impact of
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While feminists focused on the law's failure to seek a resolution
acceptable to mothers in this context, feminists are also concerned that
the law assures resolutions acceptable to children. 19 A few even argued
that custody should be resolved in a manner acceptable to men. As a
practical matter, this may benefit women and children by reducing
future conflict. Equally important, some feminists recognize that gender
stereotypes harm men as well as women, and that tolerance of such
harm is incompatible with feminism: 2°

Although some feminist approaches may cancel each other out,
most feminists are likely to find more than one acceptable, depending
upon the particular context.3 2 One may endorse a strong primary
caretaker presumption for younger children, for example, while urging a
weaker presumption when older children are involved to allow them to
participate in the process.3 " This reflects broad feminist acceptance of
problem solving to generate multiple resolutions, as opposed to a quest
for a single right answer. It also reflects the ongoing vigorous debate on
Psychological and Legal Debates on the Child Welfare System, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 295, 297 (1996) ("[Psychological parenting theory has never taken root as a viable
framework in divorce cases, despite its enthusiastic endorsement in the foster care arena."
(footnote omitted)). For a well-supported argument that the "uninterrupted nurturance of one
psychological parent" should not be the paramount consideration in determining child placement,
see Peggy Cooper Davis, The Good Mother: A New Look at Psychological Parent Theory, 22
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 347, 349 (1996).
319. See, e.g., Fitzgerald, supra note 59, at 19, 21 (proposing that the law should "validate
children's personhood by recognizing their perspectives" and examining this "model of
personhood" in the context of child custody law); Woodhouse, supra note 236 (arguing that the
law denies the child her own voice and identity and merely permits the child to act as a conduit for
the parent's voice and choice). Cf Elizabeth S. Scott, Judgment and Reasoning in Adolescent
Decisionmaking, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1607, 1610-11 (1992) (urging a "richer understanding of
adolescent decisionmaking [to] inform legal policy").
320. See Levit, supra note 10, at 1079-80. See, e.g., Dailey, supra note 152, at 1285
("[F]eminists must consider the perspectives of men as well as nonfeminist women."); Harris,
supra note 155, at 612 ("[Mien will cease to be a faceless Other ....
");Susan H. Williams &
David C. Williams, A Feminist Theory of Malebashing, 4 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 35, 69 n.145
(1996) ("Feminists are, of course, committed to listening to women, but they should also be
concerned with listening to men's accounts of their experience.... Whe basic demand to take
seriously people's accounts of their own experience arises from a simple notion of respect for...
men as well as women.").
321. Cf Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice, supra note 280, at 59 (referring to
women's "difficulty in perceiving one right answer"). Feminist theory in the context of family law
may be usefully understood as an ongoing dynamic process, which draws on a broad consensus
regarding autonomy, empathy, and problem solving, to develop a rich range of options across a
wide range of contexts. Professor Taub has described the evolution of feminist jurisprudence, in
general, as a similarly rich collective project, showing a deep appreciation for the work that has
built on her own, even as it has rejected parts of it. See Nadine Taub, Thoughts on Living and
Moving with the RecurringDivide, 24 GA. L. REv. 965 (1990).
322. See Fitzgerald, supra note 59, at 92-98; Scott, supra note 319, at 1660-63.
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this issue, which is made possible, in part, by feminist commitment to
basic problem-solving approaches.
iii. Spiraling Out
Again, feminists have used problem solving in a proliferating range

of contexts to transform family law. Professors Minow and Rhode, for
example, have shown how family law fails to take into account the

feelings and needs of poor women. They have "brainstormed" to show
how divorce reforms that address the public sector benefits system,3z as
well as continuing marketplace discrimination against women, would be
more effective and fair.3 4 Margo Melli argues that the needs of children
would be better addressed by more specific child support guidelines,
geared to their ages and other circumstances 3 ' Sarah Ramsey seeks a
better understanding of the parties' feelings and needs through a fresh

examination of social science research.3 6 Cynthia Starnes "brainstorms"

by drawing on partnership law to generate options at divorce. 327 Again,
these feminists used problem-solving skills and urged the incorporation
of such skills in legal doctrine for divergent ends. This varied body of
work is nevertheless grounded in the basic skill taught in How to Talk.
2. "Asking the Woman Question"

Professor Bartlett describes "asking the woman question" as a vital
element of feminist legal method. She explains that it actually refers to
a series of questions intended to expose and correct the "gender
implications of a social practice."3 These questions examine how the
323. See Deborah L. Rhode & Martha Minow, Reforming the Questions, Questioning the
Reforms: Feminist Perspectiveson Divorce Law, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS, supra
note 54, at 191; see also Dorothy E. Roberts, Irrationalityand Sacrifice in the Welfare Reform
Consensus, 81 VA. L. REv. 2607, 2608 (1995) (concluding that political coalitions of welfare
reformers should unite to implement "an inclusive and dignified welfare program").
324. See Rhode & Minow, supra note 323, at 191; see also THE BLACK FAMILY, supra note
5, at 61; Dowd, supra note 57, at 33 ("Poverty has a very negative impact on parenting behavior,
the worst risk being a greater likelihood of child abuse or neglect. Studies indicate that
impoverished men experience negative mental health more strongly, because poverty means that
they have failed to fulfill the stereotypical male economic provider role." (footnotes omitted)).
325. Marygold S. Melli & Judith A. Seltzer, Keeping in Touch: Developing Standards for
Visitation, at the International Society of Family Law North American Regional Conference (June
13-15, 1996) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
326. See Sarah H. Ramsey & Robert F. Kelly, Using Social Science Research in Family Law
Analysis and Formation:Problems and Prospects,3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 631 (1994).
327. Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the DisplacedHomemaker: A Discourse on Playing with
Dolls, PartnershipBuyouts and Dissociation Under No-Fault, 60 U. Cm. L. REV. 67 (1993)
(modeling marriage after contemporary partnership law).
328. Bartlett, supra note 156, at 837. For a thought-provoking effort to "ask the woman
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law and existing legal standards fail to properly account for the
experiences of women.1 9 Drawing on Elizabeth Spelman's groundbreaking work on essentialism,33 ° Professor Bartlett stresses that there is
no universal "women's experience." Rather, there are multiple

experiences, varying as a function of race, class, age, sexual orientation,
and innumerable other factors, depending upon the particular context.3 '

An assumption that women are more empathetic than men, for example,
may well break down if the contest is between a Black man and a White

woman, and the
issue is empathy for a Black teenage boy hitchhiking on
33 2

a rainy night.
For present purposes, "asking the woman question" means making
the assumptions of How to Talk explicit and testing them against
women's actual and varied experiences. As explained above, How to
Talk assumes first that nurturing skills can make a constructive and
dramatic difference in parent/child relations.333 Second, How to Talk
assumes that these nurturing skills can be learned and improved upon,
by both men and women.
The first proposition, that nurturing skills are good for parent/child

relations, is not controversial. As Professor Amato notes, "Almost all
question" on behalf of men, see Levit, supra note 10.
329. See Bartlett, supra note 156, at 837 n.24 (citing Heather Ruth Wishik, To Question
Everything: The Inquiries of Feminist Jurisprudence, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 64, 72-77
(1985)).
330. See SPELMAN, supranote 38.
331. See Bartlett,supra note 156, at 848. As Kay Deaux and Brenda Major have noted:
A person may think of herself not only as a woman, but as a Black, a professor, an
Easterner, or any of numerous other identities. These various senses of self may exist as
independent units having little implication for each other. Or two identities may have
different implications for action in the same setting and hence prove contradictory.
Which identity is dominant in a situation in which both might be accessible depends
both on the individual... and on the situation ....
Deaux & Major, supra note 101, at 94. As Professor Carbone has observed, "Feminism generally
is defined not in terms of a particular position or set of positions, but by an insistence that
women's experiences, varied as they are, be taken into account. Accordingly, feminist perspectives
on divorce focus on the implications of divorce for the lives of women and their children."
Carbone, supra note 53, at 183 (footnote omitted). For an illuminating statistical summary
showing the growing diversity among mothers, see Chira, supra note 72, at 1.
332. As Professor Bartlett concludes:
Will this expanded inquiry dilute the coherence of gender critique? Far from it. As
[Elizabeth] Spelman writes, fine-tuning feminism to encompass the breadth and
specificity of oppressions actually experienced by different women-and even some
men--can only make feminism clearer and stronger. Coherence, or unity, is possible
only when feminism's underlying assumptions speak the truth for many, not a
privileged few.
Bartlett, supra note 156, at 849 (footnotes omitted).
333. See supraPart I.A.
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studies show that children are better adjusted when the custodial parent
is in good mental health and displays good child rearing skills."3 " The
more specific question presented here is whether the particular skills set
out in How to Talk are in fact useful to women from different
backgrounds, applying these skills in different contexts.
The second proposition, that nurturing skills can be learned, is also
widely acknowledged. The substantial shelf space devoted to parenting
guides in every mall bookstore, as well as the widespread availability of
parenting courses, suggests that the American penchant for selfimprovement extends to nurturing skills.... Even our courts and
legislatures believe that these skills can be learned and improved.
Courts routinely require parents to improve their nurturing skills in
abuse and neglect cases. 36 A growing number of state legislatures, as
noted above, require mandatory parent education at divorce.337 The more
specific question here is whether the assumption that these skills can be
learned by men as well as by women comports with women's actual
experience.
a. How to Talk May Be Useful for Some Women
Although there are no formal studies regarding the efficacy of How
to Talk, the first person accounts and testimonials throughout the book,
updated with each edition, indicate that many parents, including
mothers, find it useful.338 The authors note that these highly successful
childcare methods are currently used by many groups around the
world. 339 According to a source at the publisher, it remains one of their
334. "In principle, therapeutic interventions that improve parental child-rearing skills or
decrease the level of conflict between parents should benefit children, although this effect has not
yet been demonstrated." Amato, supra note 5, at 156.
335. See supra note 92. As a culture we invest enormous resources in skills training and in
self-improvement in general.
336. See ELLMAN Er AL., supra note 3, at 1111-1218. See generally Michael Wald, State
Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: A Search for Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L.
REv.985 (1975) (examining the neglect jurisdiction of juvenile courts and proposing limitations
requiring parents to improve their nurturing skills).
337. See supranotes 6, 92.
338. See HAIA NER & TuRNER, supra note 6, at 26 (noting lack of "convincing evidence that
one particular program is significantly more effective than another," but that overall, programs
utilizing "personal-meaning" approaches in which parents are "asked to describe their
understanding of a concept and encouraged to develop their own wording and judgment," are more
effective). For a thoughtful analysis of the need for, and problems raised by, social science
research in family law reform, see Ramsey & Kelly, supra note 326. See also David Chambers,
Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REv. 477, 514
(1984) (warning that research can "deceive us into inappropriate conclusions").
339. FABER & MAZLSH, How TO TALK, supra note 95, at vii-ix. The authors' "parenting
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consistently best-selling parenting guides.'
This does not mean, however, that How to Talk is useful for every

post-divorce mother, or even most post-divorce mothers. Some mothers
may feel no need to improve their skills; indeed, they may feel that they
already have excellent skills. Given the time and energy that many
mothers have already spent honing their nurturing skills, the

disproportionate numbers of women in nurturing work (such as
teaching, nursing, and childcare)

who already received related

professional training, the proliferation of parent training programs
already in place, and the numbers of mothers who already have their
own collections of parenting guides, it is not surprising that many
mothers already nurture well. Even those who do not may have more
urgent needs, or may simply need a break after divorce to recoup. Thus,
How to Talk may well be useful to some women, but not all mothers can
or should be expected to improve their nurturing skills at divorce."
workshops, based on their books ... have been used by over 20,000 groups worldwide." FABER &
MAZLISH, BROTHERS & SIsTERs, supranote 95 (book jacket).
340. Telephone Interview with Laura Mullen, Marketing Representative, Avon Books (Feb.
12, 1998). I have attended a How to Talk parenting class run by the facilitator for the Knox County
Schools, who says that the book is used throughout the school system. The comments of the
participants were remarkably similar to the comments quoted in the book. I have also relied on the
methods in How to Talk with my own daughter, now ten, with surprisingly effective results.
In presenting early drafts of this paper before two groups of law school faculty, moreover,
many were familiar with it from their other lives as parents. The only negative response I have
heard was from a law professor/mother who said it "nauseated her" to hear mothers at the
playground telling their bleeding children (in sugary tones), "Ooh! That must really hurt!" A How
to Talk facilitator responded, "Any skill applied in an unauthentic way will ring false-to children
as well as to adults."
One of the advantages of joining a parenting group, rather than reading the book or
watching the videos alone, is that other parents can serve as sounding boards, as reality checks,
helping each other avoid such unauthenticity: Cf Woodhouse, supranote 103, at 263 ("[Families
cannot thrive-unless they are embedded in neighborhoods and communities. They cannot be
immunized against disaster or taught to parent in thirty-six hours in the hospital, but instead need
ongoing external networks of support."). In some communities, such networks of support are
provided by extended kinship systems. See, e.g., STACK, supra note 28, at 90-106.
Finally, I have observed parents who have three or four children use techniques from the
book, such as responding to a child's complaint "with a word." FABER & MAZLISH, How TO TALK,
supra note 95, at 56 Few of these parents have ever heard of How to Talk. Instead, they said they
learned these techniques from their first child or their first two. How to Talk may be particularly
useful for parents in smaller families, who have fewer children from whom to learn. See also
HAMNER & TURNER, supra note 6, at 16-17 (summarizing the characteristics of contemporary
parent roles).
341. See Braver et al., supra note 7, at 54 ("Many putatively voluntary programs have high
attendance because judges make strong 'recommendations' that parents attend. This
recommendation istypically taken nearly as seriously as a mandate." (citation omitted)). Because
of the proliferation of mandatory programs, moreover, some parents might be more open to the
idea of skills training. But see Arbuthnot & Gordon, supra note 105, at 73 (stating that in a recent
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b. Nurturing Skills Can Be Learned by Some Men
The second assumption, that nurturing skills can be learned and
improved upon by men as well as women, is in obvious tension with the
ubiquitous cultural messages that link these skills to gender, i.e., that
link empathetic nurturing with women ("playing in the house with their
dolls")142 and autonomy with men ("run[ning] around fighting wars"). 3
This cultural paradigm is confirmed by the rhetoric of the unitary family
and by the legal doctrine that incorporates that rhetoric.3'
These messages start early and they are unrelenting. Gendered
linkages are "overdetermined"; 3" that is, they are redundantly reinforced
in language,3 in gendered space, 7 in social experience,'
in
3
"
3
0
education,
and in internalized constructs.
Because of overstudy, only 35 parents out of 124 indicated an interest in acquiring further skills). In addition, even
parents who might not choose to participate in a How to Talk program at the time of divorce may
pick up the book later on their own, if it has been recommended.
342. Keillor, supra note 2, at Eli. How to Talk does not suggest that men are as empathetic
as women; rather, it focuses on improving whatever skills a person has.
343. Id.; see also Carbone, supra note 53, at 186 ("[There is little dissent regarding the fact
that gender differences exist in parents' relationships with their children; at the same time, there is
considerable controversy over the cause and the implications." (footnote omitted)).
344. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Of Babies, Bonding, and Burning Buildings:
Discerning Parenthoodin IrrationalAction, 81 VA. L. REV. 2493, 2494 (1995) (stressing "the
effects of legal rhetoric in shaping extralegal cultural norms"); supraPart I.
345. The term is Freud's. See, e.g., THE FREUD READER 203 (Peter Gay ed., 1989) ("[A]
complication of motives, an accumulation and conjunction of mental activities-in a word,
overdetermination-is the rule."). The plentiful counter examples support the point made, that
feminism has already made substantial inroads. See, e.g., Vivian Gornick, Who Says We Haven't
Made a Revolution?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1996, § 6 (Magazine), at 135 ("What's astonishing, I
think, is how much we have accomplished this time around: how penetrating has been the analysis,
how far-reaching the response."). For a compelling account of family law as a series of
overdetermined "intersecting legal orders," see Weisbrod, supra note 166.
346. See, e.g., DEBORAH TANNEN, GENDER AND DIscoURsE 5 (1994) (engaging in "discourse
analysis," which focuses on language "beyond the sentence," and analyzing the differences in
which women, as opposed to men, signal meaning in conversation).
347. See, e.g., YOUNG, supra note 33, at 7 (arguing that "gender blindness ... presumes
something patently untrue .... [I]t is undeniable that in contemporary society the socialization of
women does often produce in us skills, expectations, and temperaments that are different from
men's").
348. See, e.g., ARENDELL, supra note 48, at 29 ("'Worldliness, dominance, aggressiveness,
and nonemotionalism are considered to be components of masculinity in America, while
talkativeness, gentleness, dependence, and expressiveness are perceived by many as feminine
traits.' Masculinity remains valued more highly than femininity ....
(citation omitted)).
349. See, e.g., LYN MIKEL BROWN & CAROL GILLIGAN, MEETING AT THE CROSSROADS:
WOMEN'S PSYCHOLOGY AND GusS' DEVELOPMENT (1992) (engaging in studies designed to gauge
women's psychological development and improve girls' education); MYRA & DAVID SADKER,
FAILNG AT FAIRNESS: How AmmRICA'S SCHOOLS CHEAT GIRLS (1994).
350. See, e.g., JOHN BERGER E1 AL., WAYS OF SEEING (1977) (explaining how women as well
as men internalize "the male gaze," which objectifies women); Barbara Stark, Divorce Law,
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determination, it is neither probative nor surprising that much of our
own experience is consistent with these gendered cultural messages.
Many women find it "natural" to feel and express empathy and difficult
" ' Indeed, empathetic skills may
to model and encourage autonomy.35

make it more difficult for mothers to encourage autonomy. Because the
mother "respond[s] to a child who is in distress,"352 she may act before
the child, struggling to "[l]isten with full attention" and "[a]cknowledge
' The
[the child's] feelings .... " and "[g]ive their feelings a name."353
mother can then herself take action.3 4 This is exacerbated, of course, by
the habits developed by the mother during the child's earlier, more
dependent years.
There are as many causes of this overdetermination as there are
gendered linkages.355 Feminist psychoanalysts have described the impact

of our own early gendered nurturing.3 6 Professor Czapanskiy has shown
that cultural expectations make men "volunteers" while women are
"draftees" and explained how these expectations are reinforced by
family law. 57 Social taboos also play an important role. As Carolyn
Heilbrun pointed out, baby girls are dressed in every color, but baby

boys do not wear pink. 38 Members of the subordinated group may adopt
characteristics of the dominant group without stigma; 359 girls can be
Feminism, and Psychoanalysis:In DreamsBegin Responsibilities,38 UCLA L. REV. 1483, 14981503 (1991) (arguing that a woman's need to nurture is not innate but is formed by the child's
experiences of intimacy when cared for by mothers or other women); see also, e.g., Ann Scales,
DisappearingMedusa: The Fate of Feminist Legal Theory?, 20 HARV. WoMEN's L.J. 34, 35
(1997) (describing how Medusa, by turning men to stone, "prevented 'the male gaze,' thus
denying the possibility that women could be defined by men" (footnote omitted)).
351. As Professor Czapanskiy notes, "[Autonomy and self-direction] are also more a part of a
man's life than a woman's life. Examples abound. Men have more realistic occupational choices
than do women. They make more money. They are less subject to violence and intimidation by
intimate partners at home." Czapanskiy, supranote 16, at 1459 (footnotes omitted).
352. FABER & MAZLISH, HowTO TALK, supra note 95, at 9.
353. Id.
354. Thus, for example, I saw a mother at a soccer game drop a sweater over her six-year-old
daughter's shoulders. "I'm cold," said the mother. See supra Part III.A.2. (explaining how parents
can avoid such behavior).
355. In addition to those causes suggested here, see BARTL=T, supra note 151, at 597-602
(pros and cons of biological thesis); id. at 602-05 (pros and cons of sociobiological thesis). As
Kathryn Abrams notes, moreover, "[G]iven the rigidity of familial patterns and workplace
structures, many men have never been given the opportunity to develop [nurturance]." Kathryn
Abrams, Social Construction, Roving Biologism, and Reasonable Women: A Response to
ProfessorEpstein, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 1021, 1027 (1992).
356. See supra Part. I.B.; see also Czapanskiy, supra note 16, at 1457 n.153 ("[M]en are still
being taught that masculinity does not encompass childcare.").
357. See Czapanskiy, supra note 16, at 1457-63.
358. See Carolyn Heilbrun, Address at Columbia Law School (Spring 1990).
359. This does not mean that they can do so without threat of reprisal, as the young women

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol26/iss2/3

72

Stark: Guys and Dolls: Remedial Nurturing Skills in Post-Divorce Practic
1997]

REMEDIAL NURTURING SKILLS

tomboys, for example. But members of the dominant group risk ridicule
or worse if they adopt characteristics of the subordinated group; boys
cannot play dress-up.3' 6 Many men resist nurturing, like boys resist
playing with dolls, because they think of nurturing as characteristic of
women and girls. They believe that nurturing carries a stigma. For all of
these reasons, even if men can learn to nurture, many are reluctant to do
so. While I disagree with Elizabeth Iglesias that "it is extremely
unlikely that Latin men will ever 'do diapers, ' ' ' 161 many men obviously

still resist nurturing.
Challenging one isolated linkage is not likely to alter that
resistance, as feminists who try to give their sons dolls often discover.
Even three- or four-year-old boys reject dolls. They are children of their
culture, and they know from television, from other children, and from
their grandparents that "dolls are for girls," even if their parents do
not. 62 This kind of failure may be mistaken for confirmation of the

who entered The Citadel soon discovered. For a description by her lawyer of the hostility Shannon
Faulkner faced, and the pressure she endured until she left The Citadel, see Valorie K. Vojdik, At
War: Narrative Tactics in the Citadel and VMI Litigation, 19 HARV. WOMIEN'S L.J. 1, 20-21
(1996). See also Faulkner v. Jones, 858 F. Supp. 552 (D.S.C. 1994), aff'd, 51 F.3d 440 (4th Cir.
1995) (upholding the lower court's ruling that South Carolina and The Citadel denied plaintiff
equal protection of the laws and ordering the defendants to formulate a remedial plan). For another
feminist analysis, see Susan Faludi, The Naked Citadel, NEw YORKER, Sept. 5, 1994, at 62
(providing an "unexpected explanation" of why male cadets feared the presence of a female
student). "In January 1997, two female cadets resigned from The Citadel, describing how they had
been battered, doused with flammable liquid and set on fire, and subjected to death threats."
Scales, supra note 350, at 43. But where adoption of dominant characteristics is allowed by the
dominant group, it is taken for granted that the subordinated group will aspire to dominant norms.
See Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender,
1991 DuKE LJ. 365.
360. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Democracy,Kulturkampf and the Apartheidof the Closet,
50 VAND. L. REV. 419 (1997). Fashion designer Isaac Mizrahi did play dress-up as a child, which
he feels contributed significantly to his later success. See Audre Lorde et al, Raising Sons: We
Know Our Dreamsfor Our Daughters. What About Our Sons?, Ms., Nov.-Dec. 1993, at 34, 37
("We've watched women refuse to 'inflict' the insights of feminism on their sons out of
homophobic ignorance and terror that a sensitive male will turn out 'effeminate' or gay .... ).
361. Iglesias, supra note 5, at 906 n.89; see also Schwartz, supra note 5, at 97 (emphasizing
that in traditional Latino families, the male is the "unchallenged head" of the household and
expects to be obeyed, while the female works behind the scenes). As Maria Schwartz points out,
however, "Latino families" encompasses a very broad group. See Schwartz, supra note 5, at 95.
Some Latino men change diapers. Changing diapers is an apt example of nurturing avoided by
men because it is a form of "dirty" work, which the more powerful husband can foist off on the
less powerful wife. See M. Rivka Polamick, Why Men Don't Rear Children:A Power Analysis, in
MOTHERING: ESSAYS INFEMINIST THEORY 23 (Joyce Trebilcot ed., 1983).
362. Jean Tepperman, Guys and Dolls, SAN FRANcIsCo BAY GuAmIAN, Jan. 5, 1994, at 22;
see also Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role
Stereotypes, and Legal Protectionfor Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511, 633
(1992) ("To be blunt, we hardly can expect that boys who learn that their peers who cry or play
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gendered linkage it challenges.
But a few boys love their dolls, at least for awhile, and other
feminists are able to give their sons other experiences of nurturing that

are not so culturally loaded. Although they reject dolls, for example,
some boys happily play with stuffed animals. 3 s3 Their rejection of dolls
is accordingly better understood as evidence of the deep roots and
complexity of these gendered linkages and their social reinforcement

than as proof of their immutability.
The ostensible immutability of these gendered linkages is further
undermined by the experience of women who have known empathetic
and nurturing fathers, husbands, sons, teachers, and friends."' The
linkage of empathetic nurturing exclusively to women falls to comport
with their experience. How to Talk validates and builds on that
experience and shows how seemingly minor challenges to internalized
constructs of gender, like giving boys stuffed toys, accrue. In
connection with other, more direct challenges, including legal
challenges, they subvert gendered linkages over time.363

Some feminists argue that meaningful change will come only when
there is a shift in the critical mass of gendered rights and obligations. As
Rena Uviller explains: "Not until men regularly are willing to leave the
office early to attend to their children's needs will it be regarded as
legitimate for women to do so. Only when... 'working father' takes on
the same connotation as 'working mother,' will employed women not
be penalized for bearing children." 3" But how is this critical mass to be
achieved? The question thus becomes: Which changes are most likely to

with dolls are sissies and faggots will grow into men interested . . . in taking on child-care
responsibilities."). But see Lorde et al., supra note 360, at 35 ("My daughter would come home
with four dolls and my son with five trucks.... But maybe if I fought it things would have turned
out worse: 'No, you can't have that truck, you have to play with that doll.'... Had I been terribly
fierce about it, it might have been worse."). See generally Becker, supra note 50, at 180 n.187
("Lesbian mothers are... 'more supportive of girls developing independence and boys developing
nurturance."').
363. They may be particularly receptive to stuffed animals driving trucks. See Tepperman,
supra note 362.
364. For descriptions of "innovative, nurturing fathers," see ARENDELL, supra note 48, at
219-47; see also S. M. Miller, The Making of a Confused Middle-Class Husband, 2 SOC. POL'Y 33
(1971) (describing his own experiences with nurturing his child).
365. For a summary of some of the circumstances that lead to equal parenting, see GERSON,
supra note 65, at 229-37. Cf. Lorber et al., supra note 23, at 485 ("(Chodorow's] solution ... is
shared parenting. But if most men have developed nonaffective personalities and strong ego
boundaries, where are you going to find enough men with psychological capabilities to parent well
and thus break the general pattern of the emotional primacy of the mother?").
366. Uviller, supra note 164, at 110-11 (footnote omitted).
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lead to further changes?367 This is a complex question and the answer
obviously varies, depending upon the individual, the specific context,

and the combination of changes in play. An innovation that may be
transformative for some men, moreover, may merely inspire backlash in
others. Ongoing experimentation, in connection with critical reflection
based upon that experimentation, accordingly becomes critical.3
In part because of effective incremental challenges over the past
twenty years, the stigma associated with male nurturing is decreasing,369
and increasing numbers of men are spending more time nurturingY0° At
367. Cf. Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatistand the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1699,
1699-1700 (1990) (describing the "double bind," that is, the dilemma when either choice presents
a risk of harm to women, a dilemma Professor Radin attributes to "the fact of oppression").
368. As Professor Radin suggests: "[G]iven where we now find ourselves, what is the better
decision? In making this decision, we think about what actions can bring us closer to ideal
justice.... [Tihere is no general solution; there are only piecemeal, temporary solutions." Id. at
1700-01.
369. See, e.g., Stephanie B. Goldberg, Make Room for Daddy, ABA J., Feb. 1997, at 48, 49
(focusing on the recent fathers' rights movement and the attention being paid to "'fatherless
America"'). National magazines have featured articles on the "new fatherhood." See, e.g., Jerry
Adler, Are You a Better Fatherthan Your Father?,NEWSWEEK, June 17, 1996, at 58 (discussing
whether better, more caring, sensitive fathers are what kids really need); What's a Fatherto Do?,
TIME, June 28, 1993, at 54 ("America finds its stereotypes [about fathers] crushed in the collision
between private needs and public pressures.").
In a recent study, married women reported that their husbands' share of housework
remained low, but that their participation in child care was much higher, averaging just
over 40 percent of the total ....Among married couples with an employed wife, 12
percent of the women reported in 1988 that the father provided the primary care for
their children when the mother was at work. Among those with a child under five, 17.9
percent reported relying on the father as the primary caretaker.
GERSON, supra note 65, at 8 (footnotes omitted). "Women's" magazines now regularly include
parenting stories by or about fathers. See, e.g., Debra Kent, Two Men and Their Babies, WORKING
MOTHER, June 1995, at 24 (recounting the stories of two fathers who elected to take paternity
leave and the effect it had on their relationship with their children). But see Sean Elder, Dabbling
Dads, N.Y. TIMEs, June 11, 1995, § 6 (Magazine), at 30 (describing "Gentlemen Fathers" who
parent on weekends, unlike the author, who is a primary caretaker father). This is not a media
invented phenomenon. While waiting for my car to be serviced, I overheard two male mechanics
talking about the difficulty of disciplining their children, especially in front of others, without
hurting the children's self-esteem.
370. See Tamar Lewin, Workers of Both Sexes Make Trade-Offs for Family, Study Shows,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1995, at 25 (noting a study of more than 6,000 professional and
manufacturing workers where "only slightly more women than men-have made career trade-offs
to try to balance their work and family life"); see also Susan Alexander, Stay-At-Home-Dads,
KNOXVILLE NEws-SErNiNEL, Aug. 11, 1995, at B1 (citing a U.S. Census estimate that "there were
about 2 million at-home fathers in 1991" and predicting that "by the year 2000 one-third of athome parents will be dads"); Patrice Duggan Samuels, Dads to the Rescuefor Child-CareNeeds,
N.Y. Tlms, Feb. 12, 1995, at F23 (noting that many women have "enormous ambivalence" about
the role change); Sue Shellenbarger, Chicago Couple Finds Rewards in Defining New Family
Roles, WALL ST. J., Aug. 16, 1995, at B I (describing the "radical" gender role reversal of one
Chicago couple after the father quit his job in order to stay at home with the children); cf

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1997

75

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 3
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26-293

the same time, the incentives have become more compelling. Fathers

still do not do as much childcare as mothers, but many do substantially
more than their fathers did.

1

These men find programs for improving

useful.3 2

nurturing skills
Such programs encourage men to nurture,
show them how, and support their efforts.
However effective such programs may be for some men, they are

obviously not effective for all men. The effectiveness varies
tremendously depending upon individual motivation and personal

history-including a man's relationships with his children, their mother,
and his own parents. Thus, even if we accept as a general proposition
that nurturing skills can be learned by men, we cannot say that they can
or should be learned by all men, or that they should be learned by all
men at the time of divorce."
C. Family Law Doctrine

1. The Proposal
My proposed doctrinal reform is quite modest. First, parents would

simply be strongly encouraged to participate in a nurturing skills
program based on How to Talk at the time they file for divorce. The
court would again "strongly encourage" the parties to stipulate to a

specific plan for improving nurturing skills in their final judgment3
CORNELL, supra note 23, at 53 ("Mhe Lacanian framework can potentially explain
rebellion against the very order that would seem to be in their [interest because)
superiority is a pretense paid for by castration.").
371. See Adler, supra note 369; cf.Amato, supra note 5, at 153 ('[Jloint physical
associated with greater father contact, involvement, and payment of child support."

4

masculine
masculine
custody is
(footnote

omitted)).
372. For a description of a training program focusing on helping young unwed fathers
"reconnect with their children," see Tamar Lewin, Creating Fathers Out of Men with Children,
N.Y. TIMEs, June 18, 1995, at 1. Other examples would include the educators in Knoxville and the
many fathers cited throughout How to Talk. "A large research literature examining the caretaking
capabilities of fathers reveals extraordinary competence in child care, even of infants...."
Thompson, supra note 55, at 219 (citing Michael E. Lamb, Fathers and Child Development: An
Integrative Overview, in THE ROLE OF THE FATHER IN CHIlD DEVELOPmENT 1-70 (2d ed. 1981));
see also supra note 69.
373. See supra note 341 (reaching a similar conclusion with respect to individual mothers).
374. See Tochiki, supra note 92, at 7 (describing the shift from a voluntary to mandatory
divorce education program in Hawaii). By February 1995, Connecticut and Utah had passed statewide mandatory parent education statutes. See Peter Salem, Education for Divorcing Parents: A
New Direction for Family Courts, 23 HOFSTRA L. REv. 837, 842 (1995) (stating that mandatory
programs are more effective and parents who balk at the beginning usually change their mind). For
an explanation of the Utah program by a participating judge, see Judith S.H. Atherton, The X,Y,Z's
of a Divorce, or What You Need to Submit to the Court to Finalize a Divorce, UTAH B.J., Apr.
1996, at 32, 33 (explaining that the requirement of a mandatory course for divorcing parents can
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Second, the state would be required to provide a range of such

programs, available at a sliding scale fee or at no cost, to all divorcing
parents. As explained below, there would be no court imposed sanctions

for failure to participate, nor any court awarded bonus for those parents
who take advantage of the offered programs. Finally, the proposal
would make no other changes in existing law.
While such a proposal arguably lacks teeth, the parties can give it
teeth if they choose, that is, a stipulation in their final judgment would

be legally binding."' Even if they do not, moreover, precatory or
"directory" provisions are commonplace in family law. Although not
legally binding, they make expectations explicit and give shape to
otherwise inchoate obligations. A provision in a final judgment in which
each parent agrees to "encourage the child to maintain a close
relationship" with the other parent, for example, supports a standard for
parental conduct, although it may not be enforceable in any court.37
a. No Other Change in Existing Law
By making no other changes in existing law, this proposal would
keep in place protective mechanisms against abusive parents, that is,
parents who have physically or psychologically abused their spouses,
children, or both. As feminists and others suggest, this may be far more
common than we would like to believe 3 7 Nothing proposed here should
be waived upon a judicial determination that "attendance is not necessary, feasible or in the best
interests of the parties" (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-4 (Supp. 1995))). Cf Schepard et al.,
supra note 87, at 772 (arguing for "a mandatory program of education for parents involved in a
custody disputes ... and supporting school-based intervention programs for children experiencing
parental divorce and custody problems"). For a description of another effective, low-tech, low-cost
program for families, see Woodhouse, supranote 103.
375. In Tennessee, for example, while a court cannot ordinarily order a parent to pay for a
child's college education, if the parent has agreed to do so in an agreement incorporated in the
final judgment, a court will enforce that agreement. Thus, by analogy, a party who had stipulated
to such a program could be ordered to participate even if local law did not require such
participation originally. See, e.g., Solomon v. Findley, 808 P.2d 294 (Ariz. 1991) (en bane)
(overruling Helber v. Frazelle, 575 P.2d 1243, 1244 (Ariz. 1978) (en bane)); Acrey v. Acrey, 356
S.E.2d 437, 438 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987) ("[A support] agreement, which had been incorporated into
the court's order ...became binding on the parties."). Cf.Curtis v. Kline, 666 A.2d 265, 269-70
(Pa. 1995) (striking law requiring separated, divorced, or unmarried parents to provide
postsecondary education support to their adult children).
376. See Scott, supra note 147, at 631-37 (discussing the evolution and importance of
customary norms).
377. 'It is virtually impossible to estimate accurately the frequency of child abuse and
neglect" because of the varying definitions of "child abuse" and "neglect" in each state. "Thus,
estimates of the number of children abused and neglected each year range from 60,000 to 4.5
million." ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 1121-22 (citing Douglas J. Besharov, Improved
Research on Child Abuse and Neglect Through Better Definitions, in FAMILY VIOLENCE 42, 43
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be interpreted to reduce or restrict any protections otherwise available
under current doctrine. 378 Under current doctrine, however, abuse alone

does not justify a denial of visitation. Rather, family law doctrine
instructs the judge to structure visitation so as to protect the former

spouse and children. 79 This may include provisions for supervised
visitation3 in the presence of a third party or in a neutral place, for

example. 8
Thus, the real question becomes whether this proposal would
encourage abusive fathers who might otherwise disappear to stay in
contact with the post-divorce family. If it did, would it provide any
additional protection for the spouse and child inadequately protected
under existing law? Although How to Talk might help defuse a volatile
situation, it does not claim to eliminate or even significantly deter
abuse. Nevertheless, the risk remains that some abusive fathers would
be encouraged to stay. There are three rejoinders: First, because
participation is optional under this proposal, the other parent could opt
out. Although nothing suggested here precludes participation by one
parent, some abusive fathers would be less likely to proceed on their
own. Second, adoption of the proposal here could be tied to parent
education programs specifically targeting abusive parents.3 ' Third, it is
intended here, and could be made explicit, that the denial of protection
to any threatened party in reliance on How to Talk would be an abuse of
trial court discretion, immediately appealable to an appellate court.

(Douglas J. Besharov ed., 1990)); cf. Roberta L. Valente, Addressing Domestic Violence: The Role
of the Family Law Practitioner,29 FAM. L.Q. 187, 188 (1995) ("There is no one physical act, no
single type of batterer, or no characteristic of a victim which can fully define domestic violence.").
See generally HEWLEir, supra note 103, at 11 ("'[Iever before has one generation of American
children been less healthy, less cared for, or less prepared for life than their parents were at the
same age."' (footnote omitted)).
378. I am not suggesting that these protections are adequate. See, e.g., Civil Rights Remedies
for Gender-Motivated Violence Act § 40302, 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994) (creating cause of action
for victims of "a crime of violence motivated by gender"). See generally Susanne M. Browne,
Note, Due Process and Equal ProtectionChallenges to the Inadequate Response of the Police in
Domestic Violence Situations, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 1295 (1995) (providing recent statistics on
domestic violence).
379. See Robert B. Straus, Supervised Visitation and Family Violence, 29 FAM. L.Q. 229,
231-32 (1995) (focusing on the need for supervised visitation when there is past violence between
the parents).
380. See id. at 234-35.
381. See Salem et al., supra note 6, at 15 ("[A]dvocates for battered women have raised the
appropriate concern that encouraging a cooperative co-parenting relationship may be dangerous
for victims of domestic violence and their children. Many programs have responded to this
concern.... We suggest all programs should include provisions for victims of domestic violence."
(citations omitted)).
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b. No External Rewards
"Strongly encouraging" participation, rather than mandating it, is
consistent with the rejection of external rewards in How to Talk. As
How to Talk emphasizes, we learn from experiencing the consequences
of our behavior. A parent who fails to avail herself of the offered
program will experience the consequences. The inducement here is
simply the promise that parenting will be easier and more gratifying.
This should be sufficient. Because a father could not increase visitation
by completing a remedial nurturing skills course, he would not be
encouraged to take the course in hopes of doing so. He might, however,
be able to so improve his relationships with his children and his exspouse that they would agree to increased visitation.
2. Bottom Line Feminist Theory
This proposal comports with bottom line feminist theory as set out
above. Under this theory, family law doctrine should treat the parties
with empathy, encourage them to empathize with each other and respect
their problem-solving skills. This proposal satisfies these requirements
and it also stands up after "asking the woman question."
Feminist conceptions of empathy demand a more proactive, less
reactive, role for family law doctrine. This proposal recognizes parents'
feelings at divorce.3 2 By requiring family court judges to "strongly
encourage" parental participation in a How to Talk program, it makes
that recognition part of the legal process. Judicial recognition that
parents face a difficult task is supported, moreover, by strong and
growing evidence, including the first studies of the no-fault era.8 By
"strongly encouraging" participation, rather than legally mandating it,
the proposal seeks to engage the parties' cooperation without the threat
of punishment or other forms of coercion.3 4 Simply making How to
Talk programs available, even if it only means watching a video, may
make a real difference for some parents, especially in those states where
divorce education programs are already in effect.8
The proposal is also consistent with feminist conceptions of
autonomy; that is, that family law doctrine should respect the parties'
autonomy and encourage them to respect each other's autonomy,
382. See supraPart llI.B.l.a.i.
383. See authorities cited supra notes 74, 92.
384. See supraParts lII.B.l.a.ii., iii.
385. See supra notes 6, 92. The context in which support is offered may well be critical. See,
e.g., Woodhouse, supra note 103, at 260-61 (providing a young nurse's description of the
apathetic response to infant care training offered to poor new mothers).
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especially the autonomy of more vulnerable family members. The
proposal presents How to Talk as a choice 316 and respects the parents'
struggle in making that choice."" Rather than the exhaustive list of
factors relied upon by courts in structuring custody, this proposal

refrains from "asking or answering too many questions," instead,
leaving the decision up to each parent."8 It encourages parents to

' that may help them
consider How to Talk a "source outside the home"389

grapple with the "long haul of divorce."3" Importantly, this proposal
"[doesn't] take away hope"'3 9' that the parent/child relationship can
thrive even though the relationship with the other parent is over.
The real question is whether it is too deferential to family
autonomy at the expense of women's autonomy. Under the bottom line
theory of autonomy adduced above, autonomy is not an absolute, but

allows choice-a range of options, within certain parameters. It could
be argued that a mandatory program would be well within such

parameters. Such a program could be justified by showing that it
promotes the autonomy of the most vulnerable family members, either
children whose autonomy is threatened by unskilled parenting" or
parents, particularly mothers, whose autonomy is likely to be impinged
upon because of the other parent's lack of nurturing skills.

In some situations, however, mandatory participation in nurturing
skills programs might leave the most vulnerable family members even

more at risk. 93 As explained above, the role of the visiting parent is a
difficult one.3 9 Some fathers prefer to disappear from their children's
lives,395 and some custodial mothers are relieved when they do. As many

386. See supra text accompanying notes 248-54.
387. See supra text accompanying note 257.
388. See supra text accompanying note 258.
389. See supra text accompanying notes 264-66.
390. See supratext accompanying note 94.
391. See supra text accompanying notes 267-68.
392. See Weisbrod, supra note 166, at 696; Woodhouse, supra note 244, at 498.
393. There is no legal impediment to mandatory participation. See Czapanskiy, supra note 16,
at 1436-51 (explaining how the law can require parents to assume caregiving responsibilities even
though it cannot generally require a person to provide personal services).
394. See supra text accompanying notes 68-70. For a detailed description of fathers'
difficulties with visitation, see Thompson, supra note 55, at 222-24.
395. "Fathers who encounter significant obstacles to visitation may progressively withdraw
from offspring and, in so doing, lessen their own discomfort and anxiety in the visiting
relationship." Thompson, supra note 55, at 223 (footnote omitted). "[Not all divorced and single
fathers have abandoned their children" although "the majority of divorced fathers neither see nor
support their children in a systematic way." GERSON, supra note 65, at 9. For a cogent analysis of
the factors which affect whether children living with their mothers maintain contact with their
fathers, see MACCOBY & MINOOKIN, supra note 313, at 274-75.
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feminists have pointed out, it may well be better for mothers and their
children to have no contact with abusive fathers.396 Even those mothers
who believe it is good for children to maintain relationships with their
fathers may prefer to avoid their ex-spouses.3 It is often easier,
moreover, to help a child deal with an absent father than with a father
who is sometimes absent. It is also often easier to develop a comfortable

routine without a father than with a father who disrupts a child's life and
sometimes breaks her heart.

Existing law assumes that it is better for children to have continued
contact with their parents, 393 and it requires noncustodial parents to
contribute to their children's support. But existing law only imposes
legal sanctions for nonsupport; it does not require the noncustodial
parent to visit.399 Although the law assumes in theory that it is better for
children to have continued contact with both parents, in practice it
recognizes that sometimes this is not true. This proposal allows this
practical accommodation to continue. While the nurturing skills
program proposed here should enable fathers to nurture better, it is

likely to be most effective for those motivated enough to voluntarily
avail themselves of the court offered program.' Although few parents
are willing to invest the necessary time and emotional energy to attend

parent education programs voluntarily, 4 ' this proposal would help those

396. As Professor Carbone has noted, "[However much many feminists agree that fathers
should remain involved in their children's upbringing, they also share broad concern about
requiring such contact in inappropriate cases. The legal system has historically downplayed the
incidence and importance of domestic violence and has responded ineffectually where its
existence is indisputable." Carbone, supra note 53, at 198 (footnote omitted); see also authorities
cited supranotes 266, 377-81.
397. Cf. Chambers, supra note 229, at 2601 ("In other families, however, fathers who pay
may expect more control over the child or more involvement in the child's life or the mother's life
than the mother wants, and this involvement may produce stress for the mother and adverse
consequences for the child."); Johnston, supra note 90, at 165.
398. "[S]ome studies suggest that continued involvement of fathers with their children after
divorce is beneficial to the children under certain circumstances. There is, in addition, a definite
economic advantage to continued paternal involvement as it is associated with an increased
likelihood of payment of child support." Behrman & Quinn, supra note 64, at 9 (citation omitted).
399. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
400. Interest, however, in additional training may not be an important factor in
responsiveness to such a program.
Although one might expect that those who were more motivated to acquire skills would
be more inclined to acquire and use skills to their children's benefit, we did not find
sufficient evidence of such a phenomenon to lend any confidence to the presumption.
In a sense, this is a favorable finding-there is no particular advantage to being highly
motivated to benefit from the class.
Arbuthnot & Gordon, supra note 105, at 79.
401. Cf. Schepard & Schlissel, supra note 6, at 874 ("Most parents take the recommendations
of the court seriously and choose to attend P.E.A.C.E.").
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parents willing to make the necessary investment. At the same time it
would allow those who "disappear" under existing law to continue to do
SO.
In addition, this proposal should facilitate problem solving between
the parties. Now courts leave matters to be "worked out" by the parties.
Rather than leave them to their own demonstrably unsuccessful methods
of dispute resolution, courts are increasingly providing the parties with
access to mediators trained in problem solving. 4 2 By encouraging
parties to participate in a How to Talk program, the court would help the
parties to acquire these skills themselves. Indeed, the parties'
introduction to contextualized problem solving could well be the
negotiation of the provision in their agreement regarding their plan for
improving their nurturing skills.4
Finally, this proposal survives "the woman question. ''40 It
recognizes that the circumstances of divorcing parents vary
tremendously, and that it cannot be assumed that How to Talk can help
40 5
all families. Unlike the parent education programs currently in place,
How to Talk does not focus on immediate post-divorce coping skills.
Thus, it cannot be justified by the rationale used to justify those
programs. Instead, "asking the woman question" here leads to the same
conclusion as applying bottom line feminist theory; that is, How to Talk
should be strongly recommended to parents at divorce, but it should not
be mandatory. Thus, like Professor Harris's categories, this proposal is
deliberately "tentative, relational, and unstable."'
For those who
choose it, however, it promises a real improvement in the post-divorce
nurturing experience.
CONCLUSION

The practice described in How to Talk is rooted in a wide range of
parenting experience, in a refusal to impose gendered roles on parents or
402. Most states authorize courts to provide some form of mediation at divorce. See Behrman
& Quinn, supra note 64, at 8 ("Most states have laws encouraging or requiring mediation to

resolve conflicts over child custody and visitation rights."); Craig A. McEwen et al., Bring in the
Lawyers: Challenging the Dominant Approaches to Ensuring Fairness in Divorce Mediation, 79
MINN. L. REV. 1317, 1330-48 (1995) (providing a comprehensive discussion of the regulatory
schemes for mandatory mediation); see also supratext accompanying notes 231-39.
403. This is not to be confused with imposing the responsibility on parents to develop their
own "parenting plans," as Massachusetts and washington do. See MASS. GEN. LAWs, ch. 208,

§ 31 (Supp. 1997); WASH. REv. CODEANN. §§ 26.09.040, .050, .070 (West 1997).
404. See supraPart 11.B.2.
405. See supranotes 92-93.
406. See supra note 155.
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their children, and in a deep faith in our "great potential for growth and
change."' * It resonates with feminist theory because these are the
precepts at the very heart of that theory. Its lack of resonance with much
family law doctrine highlights the flawed premises of that doctrine,
grounded in the rigid stereotypes of the unitary family.
The premise that reform should focus exclusively on institutional
frameworks, that is, black letter law and the courts that interpret it, is
similarly rigid and unworkable in this context. Such reforms too often
fail to address the underlying content, the substance, the internalized
psychic constructs that simply reassert themselves in the new
framework. 4 3 How to Talk offers a method for changing these
internalized constructs, the DNA of family relations.
Raising our children as we were raised replicates a gendered
status quo not only rejected by bottom line feminist theory but by the
Supreme Court (as violative of the Equal Protection Clause)4 0 and most
state legislatures. 41 ' How to Talk helps post-divorce parents encourage
autonomy, be more empathetic, and help their children learn to solve
their own problems. Equally important, it teaches children that fathers
and mothers can both nurture. Gradually, incrementally, How to Talk
promises to make nurturing responsibilities less onerous and more
satisfying for both parents after divorce and perhaps to enable some
men to assume more responsibility and some women to feel better if
they do.412
Building on evolving conceptions of empathy, autonomy, and

407. FABER & MAZLISH, HOW TO TALK, supra note 95, at 232.
408. See Lorber et al., supra note 23, at 486 (arguing that the social structure that produces
parenting arrangements must be changed in order to change the roles of men and women).
409. In summarizing the purpose of How to Talk, the authors conclude:
We want to break the cycle of unhelpful talk that has been handed down from
generation to generation, and pass on a different legacy to our children-a way of
communicating that they can use for the rest of their lives, with their friends, their coworkers, their parents, their mates, and one day with children of their own.
FABER & MAZLISH, How TO TALK, supra note 95, at 233; see also HAMNER & TURNER, supra
note 6, at 17 ("With rapid societal changes, children cannot be reared as their own parents were.").
410. See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 281 (1979) (striking down Alabama statute imposing
alimony obligations on husbands but not wives); Stanton v. Stanton, 429 U.S. 501, 504 (1977) (per
curiam) (striking down Utah statute that treated males and females differently for purposes of child
support).
411. See, e.g., ELLumAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 503 (citing numerous state court decisions
challenging the maternal preference rule in custody cases); see also SCHNEIDER & BRtNIG, supra
note 3, at 700 (stating that the tender years doctrine, where custody of young children was
automatically awarded to mothers, has been rejected by state legislatures and state courts).
412. Parent education has been shown to have a significant impact on a parent's willingness
to have the child spend time with the other parent. See Arbuthnot & Gordon, supra note 105, at 70.
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problem solving, feminists continued to expand our notions of "family"
and "parenthood" as well as "the good life" of which both can be a vital

part. The deliberately incremental doctrinal reform proposed here builds
on and supports their work. It is necessarily open-ended, contingent, and
experimental,41 3 and its effectiveness depends upon the same kind of ongoing experimentation and critique 14 that has made feminist theory so
dynamic41 5 and How to Talk so effective. It draws on a practice intended

not for an "assimilative, homogenous society, but a facilitative,
pluralistic one,''416 im which "guys and dolls" evoke not stylized
stereotypes, 47 but simply boys playing with dolls. It is a small reform,
but potentially a transformative one, recognizing that nurturing is a

precious part of being human, and not just for women.

413. See Harris, supra note 155.
414. A description of the process through which such critiques might be concretely
incorporated into the doctrinal reform suggested here is beyond the scope of this Article. Such a
process would, however, empathize with the parties and respect their autonomy and problemsolving capabilities.
415. See, e.g., BARTLETt, supra note 151, at 634 (defining "consciousness raising" as
"making the concrete personal experiences of those directly affected by a rule or practice more
central to what the law is and how it is interpreted").
416. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 141 (1989) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
417. See Levit, supra note 10, at 1110 ("'To be blunt, we can hardly expect that boys who
learn that their peers who cry or play with dolls are sissies and faggots will grow into men
interested in displaying sensitivity or in taking on childcare responsibilities."' (quoting Fajer,
supranote 362, at 632)).
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